\A/37  THE  NATURE  OF  LIFE 

22  STUDY  IN  METAPHYSICAL  ANALYSIS 


UC-NRLF 


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BY 


FLORENCE  WEBSTI  R,  M.A. 


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NEW  YORK  CITY 
1922 


EXCHANGE 


THE  NATURE  QF/,LIE&-} :::::::/;.. 
A  STUDY  IN  METAPHYSICAL  ANALYSIS 


BY 

FLORENCE  WEBSTER,  M.A. 
K 


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PHTtOSOPHY,    COLUMBIA    UNIVERSITY 


NEW  YORK  CITY 
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"THE  NATURE  OF  LIFE— A  STUDY  IN  METAPHYSICAL 

ANALYSIS 

PREFATORY     NOTE 

I  became  interested  in  the  conception  of  life,  while  a  graduate 
student  at  Wellesley  in  1913.  The  results  of  my  study  of  it  at  that  time 
were  embodied  in  a  thesis,  entitled  "A  Conception  of  Life,"  that  was 
presented  in  partial  fulfillment  of  the  requirements  for  a  master's  de- 
gree at  Wellesley  College  in  November,  1914.  The  first  section  of 
this  paper  was  devoted  to  an  examination  of  biological  conceptions  of 
life.  The  second  was  more  definitely  philosophical  and  began  with  an 
analysis  of  experience,  which  resulted  in  a  recognition  of  two  con- 
trasting aspects  of  reality,  variously  termed  mind  and  matter,  self  and 
ideas,  the  spiritual  and  the  material,  the  psychical  and  the  physical, 
etc.  Life  was  then  defined  as  the  imperfect  union  of  these  two. 

No  attempt  was  made  to  discuss  in  any  detail  the  spiritual  or  inner 
life,  though  I  felt  strongly  that  a  philosophical  definition  of  life  should 
cover  both  physical  and  spiritual  life,  as  ethics  and  religion  deal  with 
life  quite  as  much  as  biology  does.  I  was  therefore  anxious  to  con- 
tinue my  study  of  the  nature  of  life.  However,  when  I  returned  to  it 
in  the  fall  of  1919,  I  found  that  life  appeared  in  so  many  forms  that 
my  discussion  would  have  to  be  confined  to  certain  typical  cases.  These 
are  presented  in  chapters  1 1- VI I  of  the  present  paper  under  the 
headings :  Physical  Life  and  Nutrition,  Behavior  and  Sentient  Life, 
Conscious  Life  and  Mind,  Values  and  the  Moral  Life,  Life  and  Society, 
and  Ideals  and  the  Spiritual  Life.  The  aim  in  each  case  has  been  to 
discover  the  fundamental  characteristics  of  life  and  the  basis  for  the 
differentiation  of  its  forms. 

The  two  papers  thus  agree  in  that  they  both  seek  to  define  life  in  such 
a  way  as  to  include  all  its  forms.  But  they  differ  widely  in  the  back- 
grounds against  which  this  is  worked  out  and  in  the  terms  used  to 
express  the  results.  The  first  paper  was  avowedly  philosophical  in  a 
historical  and  critical  fashion  with  a  decided  leaning  toward  idealism. 
The  second  is  far  more  naturalistic  and  realistic  and  was  written  on  the 
assumption  that  things  are  to  be  understood  by  discovering  the  structure 
to  which  they  conform.1  The  most  familiar  types  or  "kinds"  of 

i  Cf.  F.  J.  E.  Woodbridge:  "Structure,"  Journal  of  Philosophy,  Vol.  XIV, 
pp.  680-688.  / 


\ 


IV 


J-REFATORY    NOTE 


structure  are  the  spatial,  mechanical,  chemical  and  logical.  There 
appear  to  be  temporal  structures  as  well,  as  is  evident  in  music  and 
history  for  example.  Life  also  is  found  to  possess  a  temporal  structure 
in  terms  of  which  it  may  significantly  be  defined.  But  unfortunately 
temporal  structures  have  not  been  studied  with  the  care  that  has  been 
given  by  geometry  to  spatial  and  indeed  they  seem  to  have  received 
very  little  systematic  attention.  Therefore  I  have  simply  attempted 
to  indicate  the  temporal  structure  of  life  and  suggest  the  relation 
between  this  and  its  characteristic  teleological  organization. 

This  paper,  which  was  submitted  at  Columbia  University  in  Feb- 
ruary 1921  in  partial  fulfillment  of  the  requirements  for  the  doctorate, 
in  no  sense  pretends  to  be  a  complete  discussion  of  the  nature  of  life 
and  is  now  offered  rather  as  a  suggestive  study  in  metaphysical 
analysis  than  as  a  final  definition  of  life. 

F.  W. 

WOODSTOCK,  NEW  YORK, 
FEBRUARY  1922. 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 


Chapter  Page 

INTRODUCTION 

I.     THE  MANIFOLD  TYPES  OF  LIFE 3 

EXAMINATION  OF  VARIOUS  TYPES  OF  LIFE 

II.     PHYSICAL  LIFE  AND  NUTRITION 9 

Chief  characteristics:   specific   form,  growth  and   re- 
production, metaholism,  and  movement. 
Environment :  realm  of  mechanical  and  chemical  struc- 
ture. 

Chief  features  or  factors  of  physical  life. 
•        Organization  (specificity). 
Temporal  structure. 
Teleological  organization. 

III.  BEHAVIOR   AND    SENTIENT   LIFE 24 

Chief  characteristics:  behavior,  sensation  and  emotion. 
Environment   includes   realm   of   primary,   secondary 

and  tertiary  qualities. 
Chief  factors  of  sentient  life. 

Organization. 

Temporal  structure. 

Teleology   (purposive,  though  not  purposed). 

IV.  CONSCIOUS    LIFE    AND    MIND 33 

Characteristics:  cognition  and  imagination. 
Environment  includes  meaning  and  implication,  is  the 

domain  of  logical  structure. 
Chief    factors   of    mental    life. 

Organization  and  individuality. 

Temporal  structure:  prospective  and   retrospective 

aspects  of  consciousness. 
Teleology  and  conscious  purpose. 


VI  TABLE  OF   CONTENTS 

V  ^  :-':  $C9:'i\  :  ••"•• '  : 

Chapter  '  Page 

V.     VALUES   AND  THE   MORAL  LIFE 42 

Preliminary  discussion  of  teleology. 
Life  in  the  realm  of  values  or  goods. 
Chief  factors  of  moral  life. 
Organization  and  character. 
Temporal  structure. 
Teleology  and  design. 

VI.     LIFE  AND  SOCIETY 51 

Life  of  the  individual  in  society. 
Society  as  possessing  a  life  of  its  own. 
Chief  factors  of  social  life. 

Organization. 

Temporal  structure  (in  greatly  extended  form). 

Teleology,  conscious  and  unconscious. 

VII.     IDEALS  AND  THE  SPIRITUAL  LIFE 56 

Forms:   religious,  esthetic,  intellectual,   moral. 
Realm  of  Ideals:  the  true,  the  good,  the  beautiful, 

God  and  society.  * 

Chief  factors  of  the  spiritual  life. 

Organization  and  personality. 

Temporal  structure. 

Teleology  and  ideal  aims. 

CONCLUSION 

VIII.     DEFINITION   OF   LIFE 65 

In  terms  of  its  factors : 

Organization. 

Temporal  structure. 

Teleology. 
The  differences  in  its  forms  due  to  the  variety  of  the 

domains  in  which  they  occur. 


INTRODUCTION 


CHAPTER  I 

THE    MANIFOLD    TYPES    OF    LIFE 

Life  is  at  once  so  intimate  and  so  general,  appearing  in  our  most 
personal  problems  and  practical  affairs  as  well  as  in  abstract  science 
and  philosophy,  that  any  attempt  to  define  it  seems  from  the  outset 
doomed  to  failure.  Have  the  biologist  and  the  moralist  anything  in 
common  when  they  both  talk  of  life  or  are  they  rather  using  the 
same  word  with  radically  different  meanings?  Certainly  Eucken's 
inquiries  into  the  basis  and  ground  of  life  seem  to  have  nothing  to  do 
with  the  biologist's  discussion  of  protoplasm  as  the  basis  of  life;  and 
the  theologian  appears  to  have  something  quite  different  in  mind  when 
he  tries  to  expound  the  secret  of  life,  from  what  interests  the  scientist 
when  he  considers  the  origin  of  life.  In  fact  can  there  be  any  con- 
nection or  comparison  between  philosophies  of  life  such  as  the  Stoic, 
Epicurean  and  Christian  and  theories  of  life  such  as  mechanism  and 
vitalism?  Still  these  all  continue  to  discuss  life,  and  such  contrasts  as 
that  of  the  speculative  and  practical  life,  of  the  simple  and  strenuous 
life,  of  rational  and  emotional  life,  of  plant  and  animal  life,  and  even 
of  human  and  divine  life  are  common  and  familiar  enough,  as  are 
also  such  phrases  as  industrial,  business  and  economic  life,  and  col- 
lective, group  and  community  life.  But  is  there  any  significance  in 
these  all  being  termed  life  or  would  it  be  more  accurate  to  rephrase 
these  expressions,  making  the  adjectives  into  nouns  and  omitting  all 
reference  to  life?  Doubtless  this  might  be  done  in  some  cases,  but  not 
in  all,  for  life,  I  think,  has  a  definite  meaning  of  its  own.  Intellect 
and  practise  are  hardly  equivalents  for  the  intellectual  and  practical 
lives,  nor  business  and  industry  for  business  and  industrial  life,  and 
even  less  is  the  physical  the  same  as  physical  life,  and  at  the  other 
extreme  eternity  appears  to  be  quite  different  from  the  eternal  life. 
Could  Santayana's  Life  of  Reason  be  called  as  fittingly  Reason,  and 
would  Eucken's  insistence  on  the  need  for  the  independent  spiritual 
life  have  as  much  appeal  if  he  left  out  all  reference  to  life  and  talked 
about  the  need  of  an  independent  spirit  ?  Certainly  it  would  carry  very 
different  implications. 

The  differences  in  the  types  of  life  mentioned — and  the  list  might  be 
extended  greatly  in  numerous  ways — are  of  course  important  as  well  as 
evident,  and  it  is  with  no  intention  of  minimizing  these  that  I  wish  to 
suggest  that  these  varying  types  are  all  termed  life  neither  by  accident 


NATURE 'OF- LIFE-!— A'STUDY  IN    METAPHYSICAL  ANALYSIS 

nor  metaphor,  for  I  think  that  life  has  a  meaning  that  is  essential  to 
it  and  that  occurs  in  these  various  instances  and  adds  its  content  to  the 
whole,  though  its  contribution  to  the  total  significance  of  the  phrases 
is  not  always  recognized  nor  fully  appreciated.  It  is  this  essential 
meaning  of  life  as  a  universal  term  that  I  hope  to  bring  out  in  the 
present  discussion  and  which,  if  found,  will  furnish  the  definition  of 
life  that  I  am  seeking. 

The  search  for  this  definition  will  be  conducted  empirically  and  in- 
ductively by  an  examination  of  some  of  the  most  significant  types  of 
life.  The  choice  of  instances  I  trust  will  be  fairly  representative  and 
not  entirely  arbitrary  though  it  does  not  claim  to  be  complete.  Various 
typical  selections  might  be  made  and  the  forms  of  life  classified  in 
different  ways.  Plant  and  animal  life  are  naturally  classed  as  life 
on  the  biological  or  physical  plane,  while  at  the  other  extreme  the  moral 
and  religious  life  as  well  as  the  intellectual  and  rational  are  commonly 
grouped  together  under  the  term  spiritual,  personal  or  inner  life.  Are 
the  esthetic  and  sensuous,  the  conscious  and  psychical  lives  to  be 
included  in  the  same  group  as  the  religious  and  moral  as  forms  of 
personal  or  inner  life?  And  should  the  simple  and  strenuous  life, 
business  and  economic  life  be  included  in  the  same  class  as  well?  Or 
should  the  last  two  be  classed  with  national  and  tribal  life  as  forms  of 
group,  community  or  social  life?  Many  of  these  evidently  have  strange 
and  often  perplexing  likenesses  as  well  as  differences. 

In  spite  of  this  bewildering  richness  and  variety  of  forms  in  which 
life  appears,  it  seems  to  me  that  the  more  important  kinds  may  be 
included  under  a  few  general  headings,  though  in  some  cases  it  is 
difficult  to  find  a  name  that  adequately  covers  each  and  they  show  a 
tendency  to  overlap.  Most  clear  and  unequivocal  appears  what  we  may 
term  biological  life  or  life  on  the  physical  plane:  bodily  life  in  general 
whether  of  plants  or  animals,  unicellular  or  multicellular,  in  lower  or  in 
higher  forms — the  life  of  organisms  as  the  subject  matter  of  biology. 
This  aspect  of  human  life  is  the  main  interest  of  the  science  of  medicine 
and  the  principal  concern  of  hygiene  and  sanitation.  But  these  latter 
usually  seem  unsatisfactory  if  they  wholly  disregard  the  so-called 
higher  aspects  of  human  life,  for  mind  and  emotion  often  seem  quite 
as  important  as  nourishment  and  care  of  the  body.  In  a  somewhat 
similar  way  descriptions  of  animal  behavior  lead  naturally  to  the  use 
of  terms  that  are  commonly  associated  with  mental  or  psychical  processes. 
In  fact  a  discussion  of  bodily  life  in  its  various  manifestations  seems 
to  lead  inevitably  over  into  the  realm  that  is  commonly  claimed  by 
psychologists.  We  might  then  naturally  turn  from  the  discussion  of 
life  as  presented  by  biology  to  examine  it  as  seen  by  psychology.  But 


THE    MANIFOLD   TYPES  OF'LIfE' 

here  new  difficulties  confront  us.  Varied  as  is  the  subject  matter  of 
biology  and  its  many  allied  sciences  and  much  as  different  investigators 
may  disagree  as  to  the  ultimate  terms  of  explanation,  there  is  com- 
paratively little  doubt  of  what  they  are  studying,  since  organisms 
can  be  concretely  exhibited.  On  the  other  hand  the  subject  matter 
of  psychology  seems  to  be  rather  uncertain  and  doubtful.  Is  it 
consciousness  or  behavior,  mental  life  or  the  dynamics  of  mind?  In 
the  text-books  of  psychology  we  find  much  physiology,  some  physics,  and 
discussions  of  sensations,  perceptions,  instincts,  emotions,  thought, 
memory,  reason,  association,  attention,  habit,  will  and  similar  subjects 
—certainly  a  varied  list.  Are  all  these  to  be  grouped  as  mental  states 
or  psychical  processes  and  mind  conceived  as  "an  integration  of  co- 
ordinated psychical  elements  or  processes — personal  memories,  ten- 
dencies, desires,  wishes  and  the  like'*?1  An  effort  seems  to  have  been 
made  to  regard  everything  that  is  not  physical,  in  the  Newtonian  sense 
of  being  expressible  in  terms  of  m,  I,  and  t,  as  mental  and  so  legitimate 
subject  matter  for  psychology.  But  this  attempt  appears  to  fail  for 
two  quite  opposite  reasons :  first  psychologists  are  very  much  interested 
in  many  admittedly  physical  things,  and  secondly  they  are  but  little 
concerned  with  many  of  those  aspects  of  life  that  are  often  termed 
spiritual.  Of  course  we  have  psychologies  of  religion  and  of  morals — 
in  fact  all  forms  of  human  activity  may  be  treated  psychologically — but 
it  is  not  to  such  accounts  that  we  look  for  accurate  and  vivid  pictures 
of  the  religious,  moral  or  spiritual  life. 

Therefore,  in  the  interest  of  clearness  and  simplicity,  I  suggest  that 
we  do  not  attempt  to  consider  at  the  same  time  all  the  forms  of  life 
with  which  psychology  may  deal.  I  propose  indeed  that  in  the  division 
of  our  discussion  we  follow  the  lead  of  the  material  rather  than  that 
of  the  sciences  that  have  treated  it.  We  may  then,  after  considering 
physical  life  as  it  appears  in  connection  with  growth  and  metabolism, 
turn  to  that  type  of  life  which  appears  as  the  common  domain  of  biology 
and  psychology  and  which  may  be  roughly  identified  with  animal  life  as 
exhibited  in  behavior  and  sensation.  In  other  words,  I  propose  that  we 
first  discuss  vegetative  or  nutritive  life  and  then  sentient  life.  In 
connection  with  the  latter  the  question  of  consciousness  naturally  arises 
and  we  shall  devote  a  chapter  to  a  consideration  of  mental  life. 

For  an  adequate  discussion  of  life  it  would  also  seem  necessary  to 
consider  the  many  attempts  that  have  been  made  to  interpret  the 
meaning  and  value  of  life,  for  moral  and  religious  teachers  are  quite  as 
much  interested  in  life  as  biologists  and  psychologists  and  indeed  talk 

1  H.  W.  Carr:  "The  Interaction  of  Mind  and  Body,"  Proceedings  of  the 
Aristotelian  Society,  Vol.  XVIII,  p.  2. 


6   /'   Ti         TtTfc'£  bF  "Ll^E—  A  STUDY  IN   METAPHYSICAL  ANALYSIS 


a  great  deal  more  about  it.  While  people  may  be  quite  as  much  in- 
terested in  their  spiritual  and  mental  health  as  in  their  bodily  well- 
being,  and  the  desire  for  "more  abundant  life"  is  by  no  means  limited 
to  physical  health  and  vigor. 

What  an  endless  and  hopeless  mass  of  questions  are  suggested! 
Quite  so  ;  and  I  wish  to  say  at  once  that  I  have  no  intention  of  attacking 
them  all.  In  comparison  with  what  might  be  attempted  in  this  connec- 
tion, I  think  that  my  problem  may  appear  fairly  simple  and  definite, 
though  I  admit  that  from  other  angles  it  might  seem  impossibly  broad. 
But  it  is  not  my  aim  to  attempt  to  decide  the  question  of  vitalism 
versus  mechanism,  nor  to  solve  the  problem  of  the  relation  of  mind 
and  body,  nor  pass  judgment  upon  the  rival  theories  of  the  meaning 
and  value  of  life.  In  fact  I  am  not  setting  out  to  explain  or  evaluate  life 
but  simply  to  define  it. 

With  this  end  in  view,  the  first  thing  to  do  is  to  get  before  us  as 
clearly  as  possible  the  subject  of  our  discussion.  As  has  been  already 
suggested,  I  do  not  wish  to  limit  the  definition  to  any  single  form  or 
type  of  life  but  to  include  everything  that  is  covered  by  the  term,  the 
life  of  the  spirit  as  well  as  the  life  of  the  body,  conscious  and  un- 
conscious life,  instinctive  and  intellectual  life,  moral  and  religious  life, 
social  and  individual  life,  family  and  national  life,  etc.,  etc.  As  we 
evidently  can  not  examine  each  of  these  separately,  it  seems  best  to  con- 
sider some  of  the  most  typical  groups  of  them.  Therefore  I  propose 
that  we  begin  by  examining  life  on  the  biological  plane,  as  it  appears 
in  connection  with  nutrition  and  then  as  exhibited  in  behavior,  i.e.  in  the 
forms  of  vegetative  and  sentient  life.  We  shall  then  devote  a  chapter 
to  the  consideration  of  mental  life,  instead  of  attempting  to  include 
sentient  and  mental  life  together  as  forms  of  conscious  life  or  life  on 
the  psychological  plane,  for  we  have  seen  that  psychology  does  not 
appear  to  furnish  a  clear  basis  for  defining  a  type  of  life.  After  dis- 
cussing life  on  the  mental  plane,  we  shall  turn  to  consider  life  in  the 
moral  realm,  follow  that  with  an  examination  of  social  life  in  its 
varied  forms,  and  then  conclude  our  investigation  of  the  various  types 
of  life  by  trying  to  get  as  clear  a  picture  as  possible  >of  what  may  be 
termed  the  inner  life  or  life  in  the  spiritual  domain. 

In  each  case  the  aim  will  be  to  discover  the  fundamental  factors  or 
characteristics  of  life  in  the  realm  under  consideration  and  to  state 
these  as  clearly  and  generally  as  possible.  We  may  then  see  in  how 
far  these  agree  in  all  cases  as  well  as  in  what  their  differences  consist 
and  may  thus  arrive  at  the  essential  or  fundamental  meaning  of  life 
and  also  at  the  principle  of  the  differentiation  of  its  various  forms.  It 
should  then  be  possible  to  formulate  the  definition  of  life  that  is  the 
aim  of  the  present  discussion. 


Examination  of  Various  Types  of  Life 


CHAPTER  II 

PHYSICAL    LIFE    AND    NUTRITION 

Turning  now  to  biology  for  an  account  of  life  on  the  physical  plane, 
it  is  somewhat  surprising  to  find  that  biologists  as  a  rule  have  very 
little  to  say  about  life  and  a  great  deal  about  organisms  and  their 
various  forms  and  functions.  The  taxonomist  and  naturalist  describe 
the  immense  variety  of  forms  in  which  life  appears  in  nature,  noting 
in  what  ways  they  resemble  and  differ  from  each  other,  for  they 
aim  at  a  comprehensive  and  adequate  classification  of  all  forms  of 
life  as  the  result  of  their  comparative  study.  The  embryologist  on  the 
other  hand  may  confine  his  attention  to  the  study  of  the  development 
of  a  single  type  of  animal,  and  as  yet  relatively  few  have  been  studied 
in  great  detail  so  that  rather  hasty  generalizations  have  been  made  in 
this  field.  Still  much  has  been  done  to  add  to  our  knowledge  of  the 
growth  of  organisms.  In  the  branches  of  biology  so  far  mentioned 
the  main  interest  has  been  in  the  organism  as  a  whole,  but  physiology 
and  anatomy,  as  well  as  histology  and  bio-chemistry,  are  primarily 
concerned  only  with  portions  of  the  organism,  whether  these  be  organs, 
cells  or  chemical  elements  and  whether  interest  be  centered  in  their 
structures  or  their  functions. 

Before  proceeding  to  a  consideration  of  what  biology  has  to  teach 
concerning  the  fundamental  characteristics  of  living  matter,  it  may 
be  well  to  note  something  of  the  great  variety  of  organic  forms  in 
which  life  is  here  found.  The  distinction  between  plants  and  animals 
seems  obvious  enough  and  so  are  the  more  general  divisions  within 
each  of  these  kingdoms.  Flowering  plants  and  trees  are  evidently 
different  in  many  ways  from  ferns  and  mosses,  and  green  plants  from 
parasites  and  saprophytes  such  as  mushrooms  and  fungi.  In  the  animal 
kingdom  the  differences  between  vertebrate  and  invertebrate,  between 
mammal,  bird  and  fish,  between  insect,  worm  and  mollusc  are  evident. 
With  the  added  contrast  of  the  unicellular  organisms  with  the  multi- 
cellular  already  mentioned,  and  a  recognition  of  the  great  variety  of 
microscopic  life  both  animal  and  vegetable,  it  might  seem  as  hopeless 
to  try  and  discover  the  fundamental  characteristics  of  life  on  the 
biological  plane  as  does  our  more  general  undertaking  to  define  life 
on  its  many  planes.  The  difficulty  of  the  task  must  be  admitted  in 
both  cases,  but  the  fact  that  it  has  often  been  attempted  in  the  first 
may  give  us  courage  to  hope  that  it  may  be  accomplished  in  both. 


10  '  \T^^^T\JkEp>t^Er^A  STUDY  IN  METAPHYSICAL  ANALYSIS 


Great  as  is  the  variety  of  organisms,  their  difference  from  inorganic 
nature  as  it  appears  to  the  physicist  and  chemist  would  seem  to  be 
clear  and  unequivocal.  But  this  difference,  like  that  between  plants 
and  animals,  it  has  proved  difficult  to  formulate  in  such  a  way  as  to 
be  unambiguous  in  all  cases.  Indeed  there  seems  to  be  no  single 
feature  of  life  that  can  be  taken  as  its  distinctive  or  denning  charac- 
teristic, since  each  that  is  offered  turns  out  to  be  too  broad  or  too 
narrow;  and  as  a  result  most  attempts  to  define  biological  life  consist 
of  an  enumeration  of  some  of  its  more  prominent  features.  These  are 
variously  given  but  I  think  that  they  are  reducible  to  a  few  funda- 
mental ones.  Driesch  says,  "All  living  bodies  are  specific  as  to  form  — 
they  'have'  a  specific  form,  .  .  .  exhibit  metabolism;  that  is  to  say, 
they  stand  in  a  relation  of  interchange  of  materials  with  the  surround- 
ing medium,  .  .  .  and,  in  the  last  place,  we  can  say  that  all  living 
bodies  move."1  Hodge  gives  as  the  properties  of  life,  nutrition,  in- 
cluding all  the  processes  of  anabolism  and  katabolism,  reproduction 
and  growth,  and  irritability,  including  the  fundamental  functions  of 
conductivity  and  contractibility.12  Minchin's  list  is  the  power  of 
automatic  movement  exhibited  by  living  protoplasm,  amoeboid  when 
not  enclosed  in  an  envelope  and  streaming  when  so  confined  as  in 
plant  cells,  metabolism,  i.e.  anabolism  and  katabolism,  including  respira- 
tion also  and  resulting  in  growth  and  reproduction.3  Mitchell  gives  a 
similar  list  of  the  alleged  differences  between  the  organic  and  the  in- 
organic, namely  difference  in  structure,  phenomena  of  movement  in- 
cluding irritability  and  instability,  reproduction  and  mode  of  origin, 
but  points  out  that  none  of  these  are  absolute  and  concludes  that  the 
real  distinction  is  chemical  —  the  presence  of  proteid.4  Karl  Pearson 
in  his  Grammar  of  Science  examines  consciousness  and  the  laws  of 
motion  applicable  to  living  and  lifeless  matter,  but  finds  that  neither 
furnishes  the  desired  distinction  and  he  concludes  that  life  can  be 
defined  only  by  secondary  characteristics:  the  most  important  ones 
for  him  being  the  presence  of  protein,  the  method  of  growth  by  inner 
instead  of  outer  addition,  reproduction  and  the  necessity  of  a  peculiar 
environment  with  certain  conditions  of  moisture  and  temperature.5 
Henderson  in  his  attempt  to  define  life  as  a  basis  for  his  discussion  of 
the  "fitness  of  the  environment,"  emphasizes  complexity  both  struc- 
tural and  functional,  metabolism  which  he  later  holds  is  to  be  con- 

1  The  Science  and  Philosophy  of  the  Organism,  Vol.  I,  p.  16. 
J  "Living  Matter"  in  the  Baldwin  Dictionary  of  Philosophy  and  Psychology. 
3  "Protoplasm"  in  the  Encyclopaedia  Britannic  a,  nth  ed. 
.   4"Life"  in  the  Encyclopaedia  Britannica,  nth  ed. 
5  Second  edition,  London,  Black,  1900,  pp.  338-345. 


PHYSICAL    LIFE    AND    NUTRITION  II 

ceived  in  terms  of  equilibrium,  and  regulation  which  is  later  reduced 
to  organization.6  Schafer  emphasizes  the  importance  of  the  co- 
ordination of  parts  and  the  due  regulation  of  their  activity  in  the 
maintenance  of  life,7  while  Troland  says  "regulation  seems  to  be  the 
most  striking  active  characteristic  of  living  beings."8 

Many  other  similar  lists  of  the  important  characteristics  of  living 
organisms  could  be  given,  but  they  would  in  general  merely  repeat  in 
different  ways  the  features  already  noted.  Much  repetition  is  obvious 
even  in  the  few  examples  given,  though  these  were  chosen  with  a 
view  to  showing  as  much  variety  as  possible.  Indeed  it  seems  to  me 
that  the  chief  features  of  biological  life  fall  into  four  main  groups: 
the  first  of  which  may  be  described  as  specific  form  and  complexity 
of  structure,  the  second  as  development  covering  growth  and  reproduc- 
tion, the  third  as  metabolism  or  nutrition  and  including  respiration, 
and  the  fourth  as  movement.  Such  characteristics  as  organization  and 
regulation  are  found  in  connection  with  these  and  will  appear  in  the 
discussion  (description  and  analysis)  of  the  four  characteristics  just 
mentioned  which  I  now  propose  to  consider  in  greater  detail. 

When  plants  as  well  as  animals  are  considered,  specific  form  or 
structure  is  perhaps  the  most  obvious  characteristic  of  organisms.  It 
furnishes  the  chief  basis  for  biological  classification  and  has  been 
particularly  emphasized  in  the  descriptions  given  of  organisms  by 
taxonomist  and  naturalist.  The  immense  variety  and  wealth  of  organic 
forms  has  already  been  mentioned  and  is  so  evident  that  there  is  little 
need  of  considering  it  in  detail,  but  it  is  worth  while,  I  think,  to  note 
that  definite  and  complex  structure  is  not  limited  to  multicellular 
organisms.  The  structure  of  plants  and  animals  is  so  commonly 
thought  of  in  terms  of  organs  and  tissues  composed  of  cells,  that  there 
is  a  tendency  to  regard  the  cell  itself  as  simple  and  structureless.  But 
the  study  of  one-celled  animals  (the  protozoa)  shows  that  they  possess 
definite  and  specific  structure  comparable  in  complexity  and  function 
to  that  of  the  metazoa,  and  Ritter  maintains  that  definite  organs  and 
tissues  are  discoverable,  which  can  be  denied  these  names  only  by  so 
defining  them  as  to  require  that  they  be  composed  of  cells.9  Though 
less  is  known  about  the  structure  of  bacteria,  they  are  by  no  means 
formless,  as  is  evident  from  the  fact  that  so  many  varieties  of  them 

«j  The  Fitness  of  the  Environment,  New  York,  Macmillan,  1913,  pp.  30-35. 
Cf.  The  Order  of  Nature,  Cambridge,  Harvard  University  Press,  1917,  pp.  80-^4. 

7  "The  Nature,  Origin  and  Maintenance  of  Life,"  Scientific  American  Supple- 
ment, Vol.  LXXIV.  p.  227. 

*  "The  Chemical  Origin  and  Regulation  of  Life,"  Monist,  Vol.  24,  p.  96. 

9  The  Unity  of  the  Organism,  Boston,  Badger.  1919,  Vol.  I.  p.  240. 


12        THE  NATURE  OF  LIFE A  STUDY  IN   METAPHYSICAL  ANALYSIS 

f: 

are  recognizable  under  the  microscope.  Embryology  and  histology 
have  also  emphasized  the  variety  and  complexity  of  cell  structure,10 
especially  in  the  case  of  ova  and  spermatazoa,  and  also  their  specificity 
for  each  species.  For  not  only  are  the  adult  forms  of  each  species 
true  to  type,  but  so  also  are  all  forms  of  the  organism  from  germ  cell 
to  adult.  Careful  microscopic  observation  shows  that  seeds  and  eggs 
are  specific  and  typical,  while  we  all  know  that  acorns  develop  into 
oaks  and  not  elms  or  cabbages  and  that  chickens  are  hatched  from 
hens'  and  not  turtles'  eggs.  The  eggs  of  our  wild  birds  differ  about 
as  much  as  do  the  birds  themselves  and  careful  study  reveals  specific 
differences  in  the  eggs  of  fish  of  different  varieties.  The  same 
specificity  of  form  is  found  throughout  the  growth  of  each  individual. 
This  is  particularly  impressive  in  cases  where  there  are  intermediate 
forms  quite  different  from  the  mature  organism :  the  caterpillar  and 
butterfly,  tadpole  and  frog,  larva  and  mosquito  are  perhaps  the  most 
familiar  examples,  while  the  descriptions  given  of  the  development  of 
sea-urchins  and  other  simple  forms  of  marine  life  show  it  quite  as 
clearly.  Indeed  specific  form  is  not  merely  a  characteristic  of  the 
adult  but  extends  over  the  entire  life  history  of  the  organism.  Thus 
"the  living  form  may  be  called  a  'genetic  form'  or  a  form  considered 
as  a  process,"11  for  it  is  a  temporal  as  well  as  a  spatial  affair  and  in 
fact  it  seems  to  be  its  temporal  rather  than  its  spatial  aspect  that 
distinguishes  the  specific  form  of  organic  life  from  other  physical 
objects.  This  would  seem  to  be  the  reason  why  attempts  to  define  the 
specific  form  characteristic  of  living  beings  in  merely  spatial  terms 
have  failed  to  distinguish  them  from  other  physical  structures  such 
as  crystals  and  certain  liquids  and  colloids.  It  has,  of  course,  been 
customary  to  point  out  the  greater  complexity  of  their  parts,  their 
closer  inter-relatedness  and  more  perfect  integration  and  organization. 
But  though  these  latter  categories  are  important  in  any  consideration 
of  life,  they  do  not  appear  to  be  adequate  for  a  description  of  specific 
form,  as  this  can  be  understood  only  in  connection  with  the  life  his- 
tories of  the  organisms  under  consideration.  In  fact,  so  far  as  organic 
life  is  physical  it  conforms  to  the  mechanical  structure  of  its  environ- 
ment, and  thus  it  is  not  possible  to  differentiate  organisms  from  other 
physical  objects  in  merely  mechanical  and  spatial  terms.  For  it  is  in 
their  relation  to  time  rather  than  to  space  that  they  differ  from  their 
inorganic  environment,  since  their  specific  forms  are  worked  out  only 
through  temporal  processes  and  develop  according  to  specific  patterns 

10  Cf.  E.  B.  Wilson :     The  Cell  in  Development  and  Inheritance.     New  York, 
Macmillan,  1900. 

11  Driesch:    Loc.  cit.,  Vol.  I,  p.  20. 


PHYSICAL    LIFE    AND    NUTRITION  13 

in  time  as  well  as  in  space.  They  thus  possess  temporal  as  well  as 
spatial  and  mechanical  structure  and  in  fact  their  characteristic  differ- 
ences seem  to  be  due  to  the  former  rather  than  to  the  latter. 

The  case  appears  to  be  very  much  the  same  when  we  turn  to  con- 
sider the  chemical  composition  of  living  matter.  For,  though  chemical 
analysis  is  constantly  adding  to  our  knowledge  of  the  composition  of 
protoplasm  and  the  list  of  elements  found  in  it  seems  to  increase  with 
more  accurate  methods  of  investigation,  no  element  peculiar  to  living 
matter  has  been  found,  so  that  the  difference  between  organic  and  in- 
organic matter  is  apparently  due  to  its.  organization  or  structure 
rather  than  to  its  elements.  Of  organic  compounds  the  most  common 
are  carbohydrates,  fats  and  proteins,  and  the  latter  are  especially  em- 
phasized in  discussions  of  life  as  they  are  the  most  complex  and 
characteristic.  Loeb  points 'out  that  they  differ  for  different  genera 
and  even  for  different  species  of  the  same  genus,12  and  that  they  may 
even  show  family  and  individual  differences  is  suggested  by  experience 
with  blood  transfusions.  Thus  not  only  is  there  no  discoverable  living 
element,  but  the  chemical  structure  of  protoplasm  varies  with  different 
genera  so  that  Ritter  maintains  that  the  term  should  be  used  in  the 
plural — protoplasms — rather  than  in  the  singular.13  Thus  the  specificity 
so  characteristic  of  organisms  is  seen  to  hold  for  their  chemical  com- 
position. But  it  is  not  to  be  attributed  to  unique  living  elements,  for 
organic  matter  is  made  up  of  the  same  chemical  elements  that  are  found 
elsewhere  in  the  physical  world.  The  difference  is  rather  the  result  of 
the  method  of  their  composition  which  appears  to  be  a  temporal  as 
well  as  a  chemical  affair — living  compounds  being  produced  only  from 
other  living  forms.  It  is  thus  the  temporal  factor  which  appears  to 
be  at  the  bottom  of  the  difficulty  of  synthesizing  living  matter  in  the 
laboratory.  The  chemical  elements  can  be  brought  together  in  the 
right  proportions  but  the  temporal  pattern  can  not  be  compressed  into 
the  comparatively  short  time  at  the  scientist's  disposal.  That  is,  the 
structure  of  protoplasm  is  temporal  as  well  as  chemical  and  this  is 
true  both  of  living  matter  in  general  and  of  each  individual  form. 
Thus  if  we  are  to  understand  the  nature  of  living  matter  we  must  take 
account  of  both  the  long  history  of  life  upon  the  earth  and  the  specific 
life  histories  of  the  forms  under  consideration. 

This  is  further  emphasized  by  the  facts  of  heredity,  however  much 
confusion  may  be  caused  by  the  various  theories  upon  the  subject. 
If  Castle's  definition,  which  Ritter  commends  so  strongly  because 
of  "its  non-commitment  to  any  theory"  (i.e.  "by  heredity,  then,  we  mean 

2  The  Organism  as  a  Whole,  New  York,  Putnam.  1916,  p.  68. 
13  Loc .  cit..  Vol.  I.  p.  148. 


F 4        THE  NATURE  OF  LIFE A  STUDY  IN    METAPHYSICAL  ANALYSIS 

organic  resemblance  based  on  descent")14  be  accepted,  it  appears  to  be 
but  one  way  of  expressing  the  relation  of  individual  to  species  that 
may  be  described  from  another  point  of  view  in  terms  of  reproduction. 
In  either  case  the  important  thing  to  note  is  that  the  specific  form  (and 
function  as  well  for  that  matter)  of  the  species  is  maintained  through 
a  succession  of  individuals,  each  of  which  develops  "in  accordance 
with  a  scheme  or  pattern  characteristic  of  the  species  to  which  the 
organism  belongs,  so  that  any  particular  individual  in  the  series 
resembles  those  which  have  gone  before  it."15  This  by  no  means 
excludes  variation,  which  is  also  characteristic  of  organic  development 
and  must  be  reckoned  with  as  a  fact  however  it  may  or  may  not  be 
explained  by  the  theories  of  heredity. 

In  all  development  then,  whether  it  be  individual  growth  or  reproduc- 
tion, there  is  continuity  in  the  midst  of  change.  In  some  of  the  most 
familiar  cases  of  animal  growth  this  appears  as  the  maintenance  of 
specific  form  amid  slowly  but  constantly  changing  matter,  but  a  study 
of  the  development  of  any  individual  from  germ  to  adult  shows  changes 
in  form  as  well  as  in  matter,  while  the  fact  that  all  organisms  arise 
from  other  organisms  emphasizes  the  material  continuity  of  life.  This 
brings  the  temporal  nature  of  life  to  our  attention  again  and  suggests 
the  wide  range  of  temporal  structure,  the  importance  of  which  has 
already  appeared  in  our  examination  of  the  specific  form  of  organisms. 
In  fact  development  and  form  are  seen  to  be  very  closely  related,  since 
the  specific  form  of  an  individual  can  only  be  understood  by  reference 
to  its  inheritance  and  growth,  while  development  proceeds  specifically 
and  produces  characteristic  forms  at  all  stages  and  can  only  be  under- 
stood in  connection  with  these.  The  temporal  structure  characteristic 
of  life  thus  possesses  definite  direction. 

As  for  the  mechanism  of  reproduction  and  growth  much  is  surmised 
and  comparatively  little  is  known.  There  seems  to  be  a  correlation 
between  the  chromosomes  of  the  germ  and  certain  definite  character- 
istics of  the  adult  forms,  but  the  cytoplasm  as  well  as  the  nucleus 
would  seem  to  be  important  in  determining  development  and  the  germ 
though  a  single  cell  is  far  from  structureless.  But  this  does  not  neces- 
sarily mean  that  it  contains  a  preformation  of  the  organism  that  is  to 
develop  from  it,  which,  indeed,  in  view  of  the  great  complexity  and 
variety  of  forms  that  often  intervene  would  seem  quite  impossible.16 
But  fortunately  it  is  not  necessary  for  the  present  purpose  of  definition 

14  Loc.  cit.,  Vol.  I,  p.  315. 
is  Ibid.,  Vol.  I,  p.  322.  * 

!6C/.  E.  B.  Wilson:  'The  Problem  of  Development,"  Science,  N.  S.  21, 
pp.  281-294. 


PHYSICAL    LIFE    AND    NUTRITION  15 

to  explain  all  the  phenomena  of  life,  so  the  problem  of  epigenesis 
versus  pre formation  and  evolution  may  be  left  to  the  biologists  to 
decide  by  observation  or  theory  as  best  they  can. 

The  process  of  growth  proceeds  by  differentiation  and  integration 
or  organization.  With  the  metazoa  this  is  closely  connected  with  cell 
division,  the  organism  arising  from  a  single  germ  cell  by  a  process  of 
successive  divisions  that  result  in  the  differentiation  of  the  cells  of  the 
various  tissues  together  with  their  organization  or  integration  into 
organs  and  the  organism  as  a  whole.  Of  course  differentiation  and 
integration  proceed  together :  the  germ  is  the  organism  as  a  whole  in 
a  one-celled  stage  and  throughout  the  process  of  development  the 
organism  always  exists  as  a  whole  but  it  is  constantly  becoming  more 
complex  as  its  tissues  and  organs  become  differentiated,  but  it  remains 
a  single  whole  throughout,  as  its  organization  keeps  pace  with  the 
differentiation.  With  the  protozoa  all  individual  growth  is  confined  to 
a  single  cell,  though  this  may  be  described  in  terms  of  differentiation 
and  organization  as  these  tiny  animals  possess  a  complex  structure 
comparable  to  the  tissues  and  organs  of  the  higher  forms.  Here  cell- 
division  means  reproduction ;  and  in  a  similar  sense  most  of  the  growth 
of  multicellular  organisms  can  be  described  as  reproduction  since  it 
proceeds  by  cell  division  while  what  in  these  cases  is  specifically  called 
reproduction  may  be  regarded  as  a  special  instance  of  their  growth. 
The  mechanism  by  which  this  is  brought  about  becomes  increasingly 
complicated  especially  in  the  case  of  sexual  reproduction,  but  the  great 
interest  in  this  latter  form  should  not  blind  us  to  the  essential  similarity 
of  the  process  in  all  cases. 

All  growth  and  development  proceeds  upon  the  basis  of  metabolism, 
which  in  fact  is  sometimes  regarded  as  the  fundamental  characteristic 
of  Hie  and  especially  of  the  life  of  the  cell.  In  this  broad  sense  metab- 
olism may  be  regarded  as  covering  nutrition  and  respiration  as  well. 
It  is  customary  to  distinguish  anabolic  from  katabolic  processes  as 
respectively  constructive  and  destructive.  In  general  anabolism  may 
be  regarded  as  including  the  absorption  of  food-stuffs  which  are  ob- 
tained from  the  environment  both  organic  and  inorganic  and  the  con- 
version of  this  material  into  the  organic  compounds  characteristic  of 
the  organism,  thus  making  possible  both  growth  and  repair  within  the 
living  body.  Katabolism,  on  the  other  hand,  covers  the  breaking  down 
of  organic  compounds  with  the  liberation  of  energy.  Neither  process 
is  entirely  synthetic  or  analytic  in  the  chemical  sense,  since  all  organic 
compounds  that  are  taken  in  as  food  are  broken  down  into  simpler 
complexes  before  they  are  finally  synthesized  into  compounds  charac- 
teristic of  the  organism  employing  them,  while  the  fact  that  synthetic 


l6        THE  NATURE  OF  LIFE A  STUDY  IN    METAPHYSICAL  ANALYSIS 

processes  accompany  the  analytic  in  katabolism  is  apparent  in  the 
neutralization  of  certain  poisonous  products  resulting  from  the  dis- 
sociations characteristic  of  katabolism.  Chemically  at  least  the  meta- 
bolism of  plants  appears  to  be  radically  different  from  that  of  animals, 
as  is  evident  from  the  different  roles  played  by  oxygen  and  carbon 
dioxide  in  the  two  cases  and  the  fact  that  green  plants  can  utilize  in- 
organic material  to  an  extent  that  is  impossible  for  colorless  plants 
and  animals.  Certain  micro-organisms  seem  to  possess  different 
chemical  powers  from  either  plants  or  animals  :17  an  important  example 
being  the  power  possessed  by  the  nodule  bacteria,  found  in  the  roots 
of  leguminous  plants,  of  fixing  the  free  nitrogen  of  the  air  so  that  it 
is  available  for  the  use  of  plants,  while  other  forms  of  bacteria  liberate 
the  nitrogen  in  dead  organic  compounds  so  that  it  is  again  utilizable.18 
But  it  is  with  the  general  characteristics  of  metabolism  rather  than 
the  details  of  its  mechanism  that  we  are  at  present  concerned.  In  this 
connection  it  is  to  be  noted  that  all  organisms  are  capable  of  taking 
materials  from  their  environment  and  building  these  into  their  own 
structure.  This  is  accomplished  by  a  process  of  dissociation  and  rein- 
tegration,  as  compounds  are  broken  down  into  simpler  substances 
before  being  absorbed  and  built  up  into  the  tissue  of  the  organism.  The 
resulting  compounds  are  probably  specific  in  chemical  composition11* 
and  it  is  certainly  through  this  metabolic  process  that  the  specific  form 
of  the  organism  is  developed  and  maintained.  In  this  sense  metabolism 
as  well  as  growth  may  be  regarded  as  teleological  if  this  means  that  a 
definite  end  is  attained  through  a  variety  of  means20  or  that  the  indi- 
viduality of  the  whole  is  maintained  through  constantly  changing  mat- 
ter, or  if  "all  processes  leading  to  factual  wholeness"  are  regarded  as 
teleological.21  Each  of  these  expressions  is  inadequate  and  in  some 
ways  objectionable  and  we  shall  later  examine  in  greater  detail  the 
meaning  of  teleology,  so  that  all  I  wish  to  do  here  is  to  call  attention 
to  the  fact  that  organic  development  is  in  a  sense  teleological.  The 
teleology  here  apparent  is  evidently  closely  connected  with  the  tendency 
of  organisms  to  develop  in  definite  ways :  that  is,  it  is  to  be  understood 
in  terms  of  tendency  and  direction  and  so  seems  to  be  closely  related 

17  Cf.  J.  Johnstone :  The  Philosophy  of  Biology,  Cambridge,  University 
Press,  1914,  pp.  267  ff. 

!8  Cf.  E.  O.  Jordan :  General  Bacteriology,  Philadelphia  and  London,  Saun- 
ders,  1918,  Chapter  34. 

19  Cf.  J.  Loeb :     Loc.  cit.,  Chapter  III. 

20  Cf.  E.  A.  Singer,  Jr. :     "The  Pulse  of  Life,"  Journal  of  Philosophy,  Vol. 
XI,  pp.  648-649. 

21  H.  Driesch :    The  Problem  of  Individuality,  London,  Macmillan,  1914,  p.  3. 


PHYSICAL    LIFE   AND    NUTRITION  17 

to  the  temporal  structure  that  we  have  seen  to  be  characteristic  of  living 
beings. 

As  the  anabolic  processes  furnish  the  basis  for  the  development  and 
growth  of  organisms,  so  the  katabolic  appear  as  the  foundation  of  their 
activity  and  movement.  Reference  has  already  been  made  to  the 
amoeboid  and  automatic  movements  that  are  said  to  be  characteristic 
of  protoplasm  in  all  its  forms.  As  I  propose  to  consider  behavior  in 
connection  with  sentient  life,  we  may  here  simply  note  the  fact  that 
irritability,  conductivity  and  contractibility  are  characteristic  of  all 
protoplasm  and  may  be  regarded  as  the  basis  of  all  types  of  behavior, 
while  we  shall  reserve  a  detailed  discussion  of  behavior  for  the  next 
chapter.  This  is  admittedly  a  limitation  of  the  biological  conception  of 
life  which  may  appear  arbitrary  to  many  biologists.  But  as  has  already 
been  suggested,  my  present  interest  is  in  the  description  and  analysis 
of  the  nature  of  life  as  it  appears  in  many  different  realms  and  connec- 
tions. In  each  case  my  aim  is  to  get  as  clear  a  view  of  life  as  possible, 
while  my  interest  in  denning  the  different  domains  themselves  is  de- 
cidedly secondary.  It  is  not  my  purpose  to  dictate  to  biologist  or  psy- 
chologist what  they  should  study  nor  what  the  relations  between  them 
should  be,  but  to  go  to  them  for  a  description  of  life  as  they  see  it. 
But  as  psychology  does  not  seem  to  present  a  single  definite  picture  of 
conscious  life,  but  rather  a  confused  variety,  it  has  seemed  better  for 
our  present  inquiry  to  consider  sentient  life,  as  characterized  by  behavior 
and  sensation,  as  distinct  from  mental  life.  Since  the  first  interests 
both  biologists  and  psychologists  and  their  treatments  of  it  overlap  to 
a  considerable  extent,  as  they  both  deal  with  the  same  material  and 
differ  rather  in  their  presuppositions  and  explanations  than  in  the  facts 
with  which  they  are  concerned,  I  have  chosen  to  consider  this  common 
field  separately  rather  than  to  assign  it  to  either. 

Our  examination  of  the  characteristic  features  of  living  organisms 
has,  I  think,  shown  the  important  factors  of  life  on  the  biological  or 
physical  plane.  First,  the  biologist  emphasizes  the  fact  that  he  deals 
with  life  only  as  it  is  found  in  connection  with  matter,  for  the  question 
of  disembodied  life  has  no  interest  for  him.  Life  here  then  possesses 
spatial  and  mechanical  and  also  chemical  structure.  It  is  this  aspect 
of  life  that  seems  all  important  to  biological  mechanists  and  they  there- 
fore hope  to  be  able  finally  to  explain  all  life  phenomena  completely  in 
physico-chemical  terms.  Such  a  hope  may  seem  to  be  supported  by 
the  fact  that  chemical  analysis  reveals  no  new  element  peculiar  to  living 
matter  and  that  organisms  possess  no  unique  mechanical  structure. 
This  is  hardly  to  be  wondered  at  since  living  organisms  maintain  them- 
selves in  a  physico-chemical  environment  upon  which  they  depend  for 


l8        THE  NATURE  OF  LIFE A  STUDY  IN   METAPHYSICAL  ANALYSIS 

the  material  required  for  their  development.  They  thus  show  a  certain 
continuity  with  their  environment  as  well  as  among  their  own  forms. 
But  if  physical  life  were  indistinguishable  from  its  mechanical  environ- 
ment, we  might  as  well  abandon  the  term  life  in  this  connection  and 
confess  that  we  were  dealing  with  only  the  physical.  The  mechanists 
however  are  hardly  willing  to  go  so  far  as  that  and  usually  admit  that 
life  possesses  a  peculiar  structure  of  its  own.  Chemically  this  may  be 
expressed  by  saying  that  protoplasm  and  protein  are  peculiar  to  organic 
matter,  not  in  the  sense  that  they  can  not  be  analyzed  into  simpler 
inorganic  elements,  but  rather  that  they  have  not  been  synthesized  from 
these  elements.  Of  course  many  compounds  that  were  once  regarded 
as  organic  because  they  were  found  only  in  connection  with  organisms 
have  now  been  synthesized  in  the  laboratory,  and  chemists  may  hope 
sometime  to  do  the  same  with  the  higher  organic  compounds.  How- 
ever that  may  be,  certain  chemical  compounds  do  not  seem  to  occur  in 
nature  apart  from  organic  matter,  though  their  distinction  from  in- 
organic compounds  is  not  expressible  in  terms  of  the  chemical  elements 
which  they  contain,  but  is  rather  a  function  of  the  peculiar  architecture 
of  the  mixtures  due  to  their  long  history  as  well  as  to  their  high  com- 
plexity.22 "In  other  words,  the  present  physical  and  chemical  struc- 
ture of  organisms  must  be  explained  not  only  in  terms  of  atoms  and 
molecules  but  also  in  terms  of  the  history  of  living  matter  upon  the 
earth."23  In  fact,  as  we  have  seen,  life  is  characterized  by  its  temporal 
rather  than  by  its  mechanical  and  chemical  structure. 

Its  temporal  structure  was  also  emphasized  by  our  consideration  of 
organic  development.  Here,  as  in  connection  with  chemical  composi- 
tion and  specific  form,  the  historical  aspect  is  usually  most  stressed, 
but  as  has  already  been  suggested  a  future  reference  is  involved  as 
well.  An  acorn  is  not  only  the  result  of  its  past  but  may  also  be  said 
to  hold  its  future  "in  suspension."  An  attempt  to  understand  life, 
then,  seems  to  necessitate  a  consideration  of  the  nature  of  temporal 
structure  and  an  investigation  of  some  of  its  more  important  "kinds." 

To  be  noted  first  is  the  difference  between  time  as  it  appears  in 
mechanics  and  in  biology.  The  former  may  be  called  physical  or 
mathematical  time  and  appears  as  a  succession  of  instants  which  are 
only  externally  related,  and  is  thus  essentially  atomic.  Like  space,  it 
may  be  regarded  as  a  type  of  separation  or  mode  of  extension  and  may 
be  described  as  a  univeral  form  of  connection  whose  elements  are 
accordingly  indistinguishable  in  themselves  and  so  devoid  of  indi- 

J2P.  C.  Mittchell:    "Life,"  Encyclopaedia  Britannica,  nth  ed. 
28  Comstock  and  Troland :    The  Nature  of  Matter  and  Electricity,  New  York, 
Van  Nostrand,  1917,  p.  194. 


PHYSICAL    LIFE   AND    NUTRITION  H> 

viduality.  It  may  then  be  regarded  as  analogous  with  space  or  even  as 
a  fourth  dimension  of  space.  In  this  sense  time  appears  an  an  inde- 
pendent variable  in  the  differential  equations  of  mechanics.  Here  its 
direction  is  unimportant  and  the  distinction  between  past  and  future  is 
lost  and  the  time  sequence  may  be  regarded  as  reversible  or  repeatable. 
This  time,  "flowing  equably  in  measurable  lapses"24  and  "measured  in 
terms  of  simultaneous  displacements,"25  is  by  no  means  identical  with 
the  temporal  structure  to  which  biology  directs  attention,  and  in  fact 
even  in  chemistry  there  appears  to  be  "successive  or  genuinely  temporal 
displacements"  which  seem  to  indicate  the  existence  of  essentially 
temporal  structures.25  And  the  importance  of  history  in  such  physical 
sciences  as  geology  for  example  in  its  explanation  of  the  formation  of 
strata,  seems  to  assign  to  time  a  role  quite  different  from  that  played 
by  it  in  mechanics.  In  these  last  cases  we  seem  really  to  have  some- 
thing that  may  be  described  as  simple  temporal  structure  characterized 
by  succession  and  direction,  but  in  other  respects  resembling  physical 
and  mathematical  time. 

But  the  temporal  structure  that  appears  to  be  characteristic  of  life 
on  the  biological  plane  is  still  more  complicated  and  less  like  the  time 
of  mechanics.  Whitehead  conceives  it  as  rhythm  which  involves  a 
pattern  that  differs  somewhat  in  each  exhibition,  since  "the  essence  of 
rhythm  is  the  fusion  of  sameness  and  novelty ;  so  that  the  whole  never 
loses  the  essential  unity  of  the  pattern,  while  the  parts  exhibit  the  con- 
trast arising  from  the  novelty  of  their  detail."26  Certainly  many  life 
processes  are  obviously  rhythmic,  so  that  life  without  doubt  possesses 
a  rhythmic  temporal  structure,  but  this  seems  hardly  to  be  the  dis- 
tinguishing feature  of  life  as  molecules  and  solar  systems  also  exhibit 
rhythm  and  it  is  an  essential  feature  of  music  as  well.  Here  the  unit 
is  no  longer  the  instant  of  mathematical  time  but  rather  an  appreciable 
duration  that  possesses  a  pattern  within  itself  so  that  "the  more  perfect 
rhythm  is  built  upon  component  rhythms,"26  and  the  present  is  no 
mathematical  instant,  but  in  Royce's  words  a  "time  span"  of  greater 
or  lesser  length,  and  is  not  to  be  conceived  as  the  sum  of  a  definite 
number  of  instants  any  more  than  a  line  is  constructed  from  a  certain 
number  of  mathematical  points.27  Rhythmical  or  musical  time  then 
seems  to  possess  direction  and  to  consist  of  unique  and  individual 

24  A.    N.    Whitehead:      An   Enquiry    Concerning    the   Principles   of   Natural 
Knowledge,  Cambridge,  University  Press,  1919,  p.  i. 

25  F.   J.    E.   Woodbridge:      ''Structure,"   Journal   of  Philosophy,   Vol.   XIV. 
p.  681. 

xLoc.  cit.,  p.  198. 

27  Cf.  E.  G.  Spaulding :  The  New  Rationalism,  New  York,  Holt,  1918, 
PP-  451-454- 


2O         THE  NATURE  OF  LIFE A  STUDY    IN    METAPHYSICAL   ANALYSIS 

elements,  in  such  a  way  as  to  render  it  irreversible  but  not  irrepeatable, 
for  a  certain  repetition,  albeit  with  variation,  seems  essential  for 
rhythm. 

Bergson's  discussion  of  duration  comes  nearer  to  characterizing  the 
temporal  structure  that  our  examination  has  suggested  as  an  important 
factor  in  the  conception  of  life.  This  he  sharply  contrasts  with  mathe- 
matical or  spatialized  time,  as  an  intensive  in  contrast  to  an  extensive 
manifold.  Its  elements  are  unique  and  individual,  yet  interpenetrate, 
that  is  they  may  be  said  to  be  internally  rather  than  externally  related, 
and  form  irreversible  and  non-repeatable  series.28  Though  such  a 
statement  leaves  much  to  be  desired  in  the  way  of  clearness  and  pre- 
cision, it  is  highly  suggestive,  I  think,  as  pointing  out  the  immense 
difference  between  time  as  it  appears  in  the  mechanical  and  in  the 
biological  realm,  and  so  helps  to  free  us  from  the  domination  of  the 
former  in  our  investigations  of  the  latter.  Here  time  as  duration  does 
not  appear  to  be  homogeneous  and  amorphous,  but  to  possess  a  definite 
structure  describable  in  terms  of  differentiation  and  integration,  of 
organization  and  direction. 

Sketchy  as  the  preceding  discussion  of  time  has  been,  I  think  that 
it  suggests  the  possibility  of  a  great  variety  .of  temporal  structures. 
The  description  of  time  as  one-dimensional  with  the  implied  compari- 
son of  it  with  a  line,  whose  most  essential  characteristic  is  its  division 
into  two  parts,  past  and  future,  by  a  point  called  the  present  would 
seem  to  very  strictly  limit  or  even  to  exclude  the  possibility  of  variety 
of  temporal  structure.  But  the  difficulty  here  seems  to  be  due  to  the 
comparison  of  time  with  a  line  rather  than  to  the  fact  that  it  is  regarded 
as  one-dimensional,  for  the  great  variety  of  series,  including  discrete, 
denumerable,  dense  and  continuous,  suggests  that  variety  of  structure 
is  not  dependent  upon  multiple  dimensionality.  While  the  possible 
wealth  of  temporal  structure  may  perhaps  be  suggested  if  it  is  recalled 
that  the  third  dimension  of  space,  though  describable  as  an  added  axis 
to  the  coordinates  of  a  plane,  makes  possible  a  complexity  of  structure 
in  three  dimensions  that  would  be  quite  inconceivable  to  a  two-dimen- 
sional creature.  For  example,  a  circle  may  be  the  cross-section  of  a 
sphere,  cylinder  or  cone,  while  each  of  these  may  have  ellipses  as  cross- 
sections  as  well.  Thus  if  time  were  to  be  conceived  as  a  fourth  dimen- 
sion, it  would  be  most  inapt  to  call  it  a  line  unless  our  three-dimensional 
space  were  then  regarded  as  a  single  point  of  that  line.  It  would 
seem  that  in  a  sense  mechanics  can  do  this,  though  in  thus  assimilating 

28  See  Creative  Evolution,  trans,  by  Mitchell,  New  York,  Holt,  1911,  pp.  1-23. 
Also  Time  and  Free  Will,  trans,  by  Pogson,  New  York,  Macmillan,  1912, 
Chapter  II. 


PHYSICAL    LIFE    AND    NUTRITION  21 

time  to  space  it  appears  to  limit  itself  to  a  special  type  of  temporal 
structure  and  to  disregard  all  others.  To  refer  to  the  preceding  ex- 
ample, extension  in  time  as  commonly  conceived  has  an  effect  analogous 
to  that  which  gives  a  cylinder  when  a  circle  is  extended  into  three 
dimensions,  the  other  possible  structures  such  as  the  sphere  and  cone 
of  which  the  circle  may  be  the  two-dimensional  representative  being 
wholly  disregarded.  In  other  words,  in  regarding  time  as  a  fourth 
dimension,  it  is  frequently  conceived  as  simply  extending  spatial  struc- 
tures in  a  new  direction  in  the  way  in  which  a  cylinder  may  be  regarded 
as  a  circle  pulled  out  into  three  dimensions,  and  the  immense  increase 
in  variety  and  complexity  of  structure  that  it  would  make  possible 
seems  to  have  been  overlooked. 

In  fact  it  would  seem  that  temporal  structure  has  received  little  con- 
sideration for  itself,  but  rather  has  been  dominated  by  the  practical 
concerns  of  men.  This  may  account  for  the  predominant  place  assigned 
to  the  present  and  the  feeling  that  what  temporal  structure  there  is  must 
be  historical  and  in  some  way  condensed  into  the  present.  It  is  true 
that  the  here-and-now  is  the  position  of  our  effective  action,  that  the 
past  appears  to  us  as  the  irrevocable  and  the  future  as  the  realm  of 
possibility,  but  we  can  no  more  act  in  all  parts  of  space  than  in  all 
parts  of  time  and  I  wish  to  suggest  that  temporal  structures  are  not 
to  be  necessarily  expressed  in  terms  of  past,  present  and  future,  any 
more  than  spatial  structures  are  in  those  of  right  and  left,  front  and 
back,  up  and  down  with  reference  to  ourselves.  In  other  words,  I  am 
urging  that  temporal  structure  like  spatial  structure  is  not  dependent 
upon  particular  existences,  but  is  rather  a  principle  to  which  they 
conform.  If  this  is  the  case,  temporal  as  well  as  spatial  structures  and 
the  formulae  of  mathematics  would  seem  to  belong  to  what  the  neo- 
realists  term  the  subsistential  in  contrast  to  the  existential  realm  or  in 
Platonic  terminology  to  the  realm  of  ideas  or  essences.  The  future 
then  as  well  as  the  past  would  be  included  in  temporal  structures  in 
the  same  sense  that  the  distant  is  in  spatial,  which  evidently  means  that 
both  distinctions  are  due  to  our  interests  and  position  and  not  inherent 
in  the  structures  themselves.  Of  course  this  is  not  to  be  taken  as 
implying  that  the  future  course  of  existence  is  predetermined,  for  all 
structure  is  inert  and  no  causal  efficacy  is  to  be  attributed  to  it.29  But 
important  as  efficient  causes  are  in  controlling  all  things,  they  are  by 
no  means  adequate  for  our  understanding  of  the  universe  or  ourselves, 
since  an  inquiry  into  the  "reasons  why"  includes  the  "in  order  that" 
or  "for  what"  as  well  as  the  "because,"  and  purposes  as  well  as  causes 

2»  Cf.  Woodbridge :    Loc.  cit.,  p.  688. 


22        THE  NATURE  OF  LIFE A  STUDY  IN   METAPHYSICAL  ANALYSIS 

have  to  be  considered.  We  are  thus  naturally  led  to  a  considerations 
of  teleology. 

The  contrast  of  the  teleological  and  mechanical  is  often  expressed 
as  that  between  efficient  and  final  causes,  when  it  is  easy  to  make 
teleology  appear  ridiculous  as  maintaining  that  a  non-existent  future 
can  produce  something  in  the  present.  But  if  our  analysis  of  temporal 
structure  is  correct,  this  contradiction  does  not  arise  unless  we  attempt 
to  treat  teleology  mechanistically,  which  inevitably  leads  to  confusion 
as  it  involves  an  abandonment  of  the  distinction  with  which  we  were 
operating.  As  teleology  is  commonly  discussed  in  terms  of  purpose  or 
value,  anything  like  an  adequate  examination  of  it  will  naturally  be 
deferred  until  we  have  considered  some  of  the  other  forms  of  life  in 
which  it  is  more  prominent.  Here  we  shall  only  note  the  form  in 
which  it  appears  in  biological  life.  Organic  growth  and  development 
are  teleological  in  the  sense  that  specific  ends  are  attained  through  a 
variety  of  means30  or  that  "a  great  many  of  the  processes  occurring  in 
the  organism  bring  about  this  wholeness,  or  restore  it  if  it  is  disturbed 
in  any  way."31  This  would  seem  to  imply  a  close  relation  between 
teleology  and  organization,  coordination  and  regulation  and  Hender- 
son's examination  of  fitness  and  adaptation  apparently  leads  to  the 
same  result.32  So  far  then  as  biology  is  concerned,  if  reference  to 
consciousness  be  excluded,  teleology  seems  to  be  closely  connected  with 
the  temporal  structure  and  organization  characteristic  of  life.  But  it 
is  equally  true  that  the  organization  characteristic  of  biological  life 
may  be  defined  in  terms  of  teleology  and  temporal  structure,  while  aa 
adequate  description  of  the  latter  seems  to  require  reference  to  both 
teleology  and  organization. 

In  fact  organization  seems  to  be  a  very  important  feature  of  biological 
life.  Indeed  it  is  so  common  and  general  a  characteristic  of  organisms 
that  it  is  expressed  by  quite  a  variety  of  terms  according  to  the  em- 
phasis and  context  in  which  it  occurs.  Thus  we  speak  of  the  integration, 
coordination,  correlation  and  regulation  of  life  processes  and  in  its 
more  static  aspect  we  describe  it  as  a  complex  system,  "creative 
synthesis"  or  organic  whole,  and  refer  to  its  structure,  spatial  and 
temporal.  Different  as  are  some  of  the  connotations  of  these  terms, 
they  all  seem  to  emphasize  a  fundamental  characteristic  of  organic  life 
that  implies  a  certain  relational  unity  and  durability  based  on  multi- 
plicity and  complexity.  This  may  suggest  Singer's  comparison  of  life 
to  a  wave  moving  freely  through  an  ocean  of  mechanism,33  which 

30  Cf.  Singer :     Loc.  cit.,  pp.  648,  649. 
3*  H.  Driesch :    Problem  of  Individuality,  p.  3. 
?2  Cf.     The  Order  of  Nature,  pp.  204  ff. 
33  Loc.  cit.,  p.  650. 


PHYSICAL    LIFE   AND    NUTRITION  23 

brings  us  back  again  to  the  dependence  of  life  upon  mechanism  as 
evident  by  its  physico-chemical  basis  and  environment. 

The  characteristic  factors  of  life  as  it  appears  on  the  biological 
plane — namely  its  mechanical  basis,  temporal  structure,  organization 
and  teleological  aspect — then  seem  to  be  closely  interrelated,  at  least 
so  far  as  they  appear  as  the  features  of  life,  though  each  in  itself  may 
l>e  definable  apart  from  the  others  and  from  life.  Certainly  mechanism 
can  be  so  treated  and  probably  some  forms  of  temporal  structure.  At 
the  other  extreme  teleology  may  be  regarded  as  independent  of  the 
others,  while  organization  appears  to  be  most  dependent  upon  the  rest. 
Our  analysis  therefore  can  not  claim  to  have  reached  the  ultimate  or 
simple  elements  of  life,  but  I  hope  that  it  has  proceeded  far  enough  to 
show  certain  important  features  in  terms  of  which  life  may  be  signifi- 
cantly defined.  If  this  be  admitted,  life  on  the  biological  plane  implies 
a  mechanical  basis,  temporal  structure  and  teleological  organization. 


CHAPTER  III 

BEHAVIOR    AND    SENTIENT    LIFE 

As  we  found  it  convenient  to  limit  our  discussion  of  biological  life 
in  the  preceding  chapter  to  its  metabolic  aspects,  omitting  any  examina- 
tion of  behavior,  we  have  now  to  consider  that  aspect  of  life  which  is 
treated  by  both  biologists  and  psychologists.  It  may  well  be  termed 
sentient  life.  We  approached  it  in  the  last  chapter  in  connection  with 
movement,  and  might  there  have  considered  tropisms  and  reflex  and 
instinctive  actions,  but  this  would  have  naturally  led  to  a  discussion 
of  habit  and  learning,  of  acquired  and  of  voluntary  actions  and  so  have 
carried  us  over  into  the  domain  commonly  assigned  to  psychology.  It 
therefore  seemed  wise  first  to  consider  physical  life  as  expressed  by 
the  growth  and  development  of  specific  forms  through  metabolic  pro- 
cesses. As  this  is  the  most  evident  aspect  of  plant  life,  it  may  be 
termed  vegetative  life  or  described  as  nutritive  life,  as  nutrition  is  its 
most  marked  feature,  or  it  might  be  called  physical  and  chemical  life 
as  it  is  dependent  upon  and  conforms  to  the  physical  and  chemical 
structure  of  its  surroundings.  With  animal  life  other  aspects  of  the 
environment  become  important,  for  animals  react  to  many  qualitative 
differences.  We  have  therefore  to  consider  sentient  life  and,  making 
use  of  whatever  biologists  and  psychologists  have  to  offer  in  this  con- 
nection and  avoiding  questions  of  explanation,  endeavor  to  get  as  clear  a 
picture  of  the  facts  as  possible.  Therefore  let  us  try  to  approach  our 
material  without  presuppositions  and  not  trouble  ourselves  with  such 
puzzles  as  those  of  the  objective  and  the  subjective,  the  possible  criteria 
of  consciousness,  or  such  questions  as  whether  animals  or  even  other 
men  have  minds.  We  are  concerned  neither  with  why  things  are  as 
they  are  nor  how  it  is  possible  for  them  to  be  so,  but  desire  simply  to 
find  out  what  they  are  in  so  far  as  that  will  throw  light  on  the  nature 
of  life. 

Turning  then  to  an  examination  of  organic  behavior,  we  may  first 
note  that  it  extends  over  a  wide  range  and  differs  greatly  in  com- 
plexity and  variety,  as  might  be  expected  from  the  great  number  of 
different  forms  of  organisms.  Though  movement  and  behavior  are 
of  course  most  obvious  in  animal  life,  they  are  also  evident  in  some 
forms  at  least  of  plant  life  and  there  would  seem  to  be  less  difference 
between  the  behavior  of  certain  plants  and  some  of  the  lower  animals 
than  between  the  latter  and  higher  animals:  thus  the  heliotropism  of 


BEHAVIOR    AND    SENTIENT    LIFE  25 

certain  sessile  animals  very  closely  resembles  that  of  plants,  while  the 
movement  of  certain  motile  plant  forms  is  very  like  the  behavior  of 
some  of  the  lower  animals.1  In  this  respect  as  in  many  others  there 
seems  to  be  no  sharp  break  between  plant  and  animal  life.  Though 
it  is  natural  to  contrast  these  simple  forms  of  behavior  with  that  of 
the  higher  animals  and  especially  with  human  behavior,  it  none  the 
less  seems  impossible  to  find  a  clear  dividing  line  between  them.  This 
is  only  what  might  be  expected  if  the  continuity  of  animal  life  is 
accepted.  As  we  attempted  in  the  last  chapter  to  consider  biological 
or  physical  life  as  exhibited  in  nutrition  and  growth  in  all  its  varied 
forms  of  plant  and  animal,  unicellular  and  multicellular,  so  we  now 
propose  to  make  our  examination  of  organic  behavior  as  wide  and 
inclusive. 

Jennings  has  given  us  illuminating  accounts  of  the  behavior  of  some 
of  the  lower  organisms,  including  amoeba,  paramecium  and  other  forms 
of  protozoa  as  well  as  a  few  of  the  metazoa.2  Loeb's  discussions  of 
tropisms  contain  descriptions  of  plant  as  well  as  of  animal  behavior. 
Animal  psychology  has  been  collecting  great  masses  of  material  con- 
cerning the  behavior  of  animals  of  various  types,  including  rats,  guinea 
pigs,  dogs,  monkeys,  etc.?  while  behavioristic  psychology  treats  human 
behavior  after  the  same  fashion  and  would  leave  out  all  reference  to 
consciousness.  For  the  present  I  propose  to  follow  this  lead  and  con- 
sider behavior  as  an  organic  process  and  postpone  the  discussion  of 
consciousness.  This  does  not  necessarily  imply  that  we  must  consider 
that  all  behavior  is  purely  and  completely  mechanical,  for  we  have 
already  seen  that  biological  life  can  not  be  fully  expressed  in  mechanical 
terms.  The  world  is  not  so  simple  that  the  unconscious  is  necessarily 
mechanical.  Further  we  have  seen  that  teleology  does  not  appear  to 
be  dependent  upon  consciousness  and  that  teleology  and  mechanism 
need  not  be  contradictory.  In  fact  teleological  processes  may  move 
through  a  mechanical  world  or  conform  to  mechanical  structure,  and 
causes  and  uses  appear  to  be  categories  of  different  levels  and  so  may 
be  applied  to  the  same  things  without  contradiction. 

As  before,  our  interests  lie  in  description  and  analysis,  not  in  ex- 
planation. Jennings  in  describing  "the  daily  life  of  paramecium" 

1  Cf.  }.   Loeb :      The  Mechanistic   Conception    of  Life,   Chicago,   University 
Press,    1912,    pp.    28,    29.     Also    his    Studies    in    General    Physiology,    Chicago, 
University  Press,  1905,  Chapter  I. 

2  H.  S.  Jennings :     Behavior  of  the  Lower  Organisms,  New  York,  Columbia 
University  Press,  1906. 

3  See  M.  F.  Washburn :     The  Animal  Mind,  New  York,  Macmillan,  1917,  for 
some  brief  accounts  of  results,  and  especially  for  a  list  of  titles  dealing  with 
the  subject. 


2.6        THE  NATURE  OF  LIFE A  STUDY  IN   METAPHYSICAL  ANALYSIS 

says  ''the  animal  swims  about,  continually  hesitating  as  it  reaches 
regions  where  conditions  differ,  trying  new  directions,  and  changing 
its  course  frequently.  Every  faint  influence  in  the  water  affects  it, 
for  the  animal  is  very  sensitive."4  "Its  behavior  is  in  principle  much 
like  that  of  a  blind  and  deaf  person,  or  one  that  feels  his  way  about 
in  the  dark.  It  is  a  continual  process  of  proving  all  things  and  hold- 
ing to  that  which  is  good."5  Its  movements  are  of  course  limited  by 
its  structure,  and  its  "action  system"  includes  only  a  small  number  of 
definite  movements.  With  greater  complexity  of  structure,  a  greater 
variety  of  actions  becomes  possible  and  the  higher  animals  possess  very 
complicated  mechanisms  of  response. 

As  we  have  already  had  occasion  to  note,  the  protozoa  are  by  no 
means  structureless,  and  even  the  amoeba,  which  Jennings  describes 
as  a  "simple  naked  mass  of  protoplasm,"  "reacts  to  all  classes  of 
stimuli  to  which  higher  animals  react  (if  we  consider  auditory  stimula- 
tion merely  a  special  case  of  mechanical  stimulation)."6  In  the  higher 
forms  of  life  we  find  definite  organs  developed  to  perform  the  various 
functions  that  in  the  simpler  seem  to  be  characteristic  of  protoplasm. 
Thus  the  higher  animals  possess  sense  organs,  nervous  system  and 
muscles  which  cooperate  to  bring  about  the  response  to  stimuli  that  is 
characteristic  of  behavior.  These  structures,  of  course,  vary  greatly 
in  complexity  with  different  types  or  grades  of  animals,  but  their 
function  and  principle  seem  to  be  the  same  throughout.  The  sense 
organs  become  differentiated  to  correspond  with  specific  qualitative 
differences  in  the  environment  which  affect  the  organism,  while  the 
function  of  the  nervous  system  is  not  only  conduction  as  is  commonly 
stated,  but  also  integration,  as  Sherrington  has  pointed  out.7 

Various  types  of  action  thus  become  possible  and  we  find  behavior 
described  as  reflex,  instinctive,  habitual,  learned,  intelligent,  purposive, 
etc.  These  distinctions  evidently  rest  on  different  bases  and  some 
imply  the  contrast  between  conscious  and  unconscious  action.  Reflex 
action  is  considered  the  simplest  type  and  in  diagram  form  the  specific 
stimulation  of  a  sense  organ  is  supposed  to  bring  about  a  definite 
reaction  quite  automatically,  as  the  "spinal  frog"  wipes  off  acid  or  we 
wink  when  something  moves  near  our  eyes.  This  is  evidently  dependent 
upon  the  sensitivity  of  the  receptor  organs  and  indeed  all  organic 
behavior  seems  to  be  dependent  upon  the  sensibility  of  the  organism. 
Thus  behavior  seems  to  indicate  unequivocally  the  fact  of  sensation. 

*  Loc.  cit.,  pp.  104,  105. 

5  Ibid.,  p.  107. 

6  Ibid.,  p.  19. 

7  The  Integrative  Action  of  the  Nervous  System,  New  York,  Scribner's,  1906. 


BEHAVIOR    AND    SENTIENT    LIFE  27 

The  sensibility  of  organisms  doubtless  varies  greatly  in  range  with  the 
differences  in  their  structure  and  "action  systems."  Though  the  lower 
animals  react  to  all  types  of  stimuli,  their  reactions  vary  so  little  that 
it  seems  likely  that  they  only  discriminate  between  edible  and  inedible 
substances,  possessing  what  is  sometimes  called  the  chemical  sense.8 
They,'  of  course,  react  to  mechanical  contact,  though  not  always  in  the 
same  way,  and  their  avoidance  reactions  may  be  connected  with  a  sense 
of  pain  or  unpleasantness  rather  than  with  definite  sense  qualities. 
With  the  development  and  differentiation  of  sense  organs,  the  chemical 
sense  is  developed  into  those  of  taste  and  smell.  With  the  develop- 
ment of  ears,  sound  becomes  differentiated  from  mechanical  contact  and 
finally  tones  are  distinguished  from  noises.  Many  animals  and  plants 
are  sensitive  to  changes  in  the  direction  or  intensity  of  light  and  the 
development  of  eyes  of  increasing  complexity  of  structure  makes  pos- 
sible the  discrimination  of  a  great  variety  of  color  and  form. 

Life  now  seems  to  move  in  a  vastly  richer  and  more  varied  world 
than  that  assigned  to  it  in  the  last  chapter :  light  and  heat  are  important 
aspects  of  it.  while  smells,  sounds  and  colors  are  distinguished.  In 
fact  sentient  life  moves  in  a  realm  that  is  characterized  by  secondary 
as  well  as  primary  qualities.  Psychologists  experiment  with  sensory 
discrimination  and  deal  directly  with  sounds,  tastes  and  odors  as  well 
as  with  lights  of  different  colors,  intensity  and  direction.  Now  if  sen- 
sation is  understood  to  be  one  form  or  kind  of  consciousness,  it  may 
he  said  that  we  have  gone  beyond  the  domain  of  physical  life  and 
entered  that  of  psychical.  As  these  are  commonly  considered  to  be 
mutually  exclusive  and  quite  distinct,  and  even  of  opposite  nature,  it 
is  rather  strange  that  we  have  passed  so  easily  from  the  one  to  the 
other.  But  I  think  that  there  is  much  to  be  said  against  regarding 
sensations  as  elements  of  mind,  as  I  hope  will  be  clearer  after  our  dis- 
cussion of  mind  and  consciousness  in  the  next  chapter.  For  the  present 
I  simply  want  to  point  out  that  sensation  may  be  regarded  as  a  physical 
or  physiological  fact  or  event,  a  function  of  the  organism  and  specific 
aspects  of  its  environment,  and  expressible  in  terms  of  interaction  be- 
tween them.  Sensation  is  thus  dependent  on  both  the  organism  and 
its  environment  and  varies  with  either  of  them.  Thus  a  rose  may 
appear  red  to  most  people,  but  not  at  twilight  or  to  a  color-blind  person. 
Similarly  there  are  physical  or  physiological  explanations  -for  the  so- 
called  illusions  of  the  senses  that  have  caused  so  much  trouble  when 
treated  as  epistemological  problems :  thus  the  straight  stick  partly  im- 
mersed in  water  appears  l)ent  because  of  the  difference  of  refraction 
<»f  air  and  water;  the  tepid  water  feels  hot  to  one  hand  and  cold  to 

8  Cf.  Washburn :    Loc.  cit.,  Chapter  V. 


28        THE  NATURE  OF  LIFE A  STUDY  IN    METAPHYSICAL  ANALYSIS 

the  other  because  it  is  warmer  than  the  one  and  cooler  than  the  other ; 
and  parallel  lines  seem  to  converge  and  square  towers  at  a  distance 
look  round  because  of  the  laws  of  perspective  and  optics  and  affect 
the  sensitive  plate  of  a  camera  in  the  same  way  that  they  do  our  eyes. 

Of  course  I  do  not  mean  that  we  may  not  be  conscious  of  sensations 
but  only  that  they  are  then  objects  of  consciousness  and  not  its  elements. 
Their  existence  is  thus  not  dependent  upon  consciousness  but  upon  the 
functioning  of  an  organism.  The  same  seems  to  be  true  of  pain  and 
pleasure  and  of  feeling  and  emotion  as  well,  as  these  appear  to  depend 
directly  upon  the  condition  of  the  organism  and  to  be  intimately  con- 
nected with  its  behavior.  Emotional  life  may  thus  be  regarded  as  one 
form  of  sentient  life.  The  chief  characteristics  of  the  latter  would 
then  be  sensation,  emotion  and  behavior.  We  have  already  indicated 
something  of  the  close  relation  between  these  and  also  the  wide  range 
and  variety  of  animal  behavior;  probably  sensation  and  feeling  differ 
quite  as  much,  the  former  depending  largely  upon  the  degree  of  the 
differentiation  of  sense  organs,  the  latter  probably  upon  the  complexity 
and  organization  of  the  bodily  processes,  especially  the  nervous  system. 
But  this  is  not  to  be  understood  as  implying  that  the  lower  animals 
including  the  unicellular  are  without  sensation  and  feeling,  for  Jennings 
has  found  that  they  respond  to  stimuli  in  different  ways  and  possess 
discriminating  sensibility.  He  also  notes  that  they  appear  to  desire 
and  hunt  food  and  react  to  injurious  agents  as  if  in  pain.9 

We  have  now  to  examine  these  characteristics  of  sentient  life  to  see 
what  light  they  throw  on  the  nature  of  life  as  it  appears  in  this  realm. 
Behavior  here  appears  to  be  an  interaction  of  organism  and  environ- 
ment in  a  fashion  somewhat  parallel  to  metabolism  in  vegetative  life. 
The  difference  between  them  is  most  evident  in  the  higher  forms  of 
animal  life  where  different  systems  of  organs  have  been  developed  for 
each,  while  their  close  relation  is  more  evident  in  the  lower  forms 
where  there  is  less  differentiation  of  function.  But  everywhere  the 
behavior  and  metabolism  of  the  organism  are  closely  interrelated  and 
sentient  life  is  continuous  with  nutritive  life. 

What  an  organism  does  in  any  situation  is  dependent  upon  its  con- 
dition and  the  nature  of  the  stimuli  affecting  it:  that  is,  behavior  is  a 
function  of  both  organism  and  environment  and  is  thus  dependent 
upon  both  internal  and  external  factors.  The  fact  to  be  noted  first 
is  that  activity  and  movement  appear  to  be  characteristic  of  organic 
life;  external  stimuli  thus  influence  rather  than  cause  behavior,  and 
the  energy  required  for  this  activity  is  derived  from  the  metabolic 
processes  within  the  organism  and  is  not  furnished  by  the  stimulus, 

9  Loc.  cit.,  pp.  329-332. 


BEHAVIOR    AND    SENTIENT    LIFE  2Q 

the  action  of  which  rather  resembles  the  pulling  of  a  trigger  than  a 
mechanical  push.  The  action  of  an  organism  also  depends  upon  its 
structure  and  the  character  of  what  Jennings  calls  its  "action  system" : 
thus  the  lower  organisms  possess  only  a  very  limited  number  of  pos- 
sible responses,  while  greater  differentiation  of  organs  together  with 
their  integration  by  the  nervous  system  places  a  great  variety  of  action 
at  the  disposal  of  the  higher  animals.  The  behavior  of  an  organism 
is  thus  dependent  in  a  general  sense  upon  its  past  growth  and  develop- 
ment as  supplying  the  mechanism  and  energy  for  action.  Even  so  a 
given  stimulus  does  not  always  set  off  the  same  response,  as  the  specific 
state  of  the  organism  at  the  moment  is  important  as  well  as  its  general 
character :  for  example  hungry  and  well-fed  animals  react  differently 
to  food.10  Even  Loeb's  attempted  reduction  of  instincts  to  tropisms 
shows  that  these  vary  with  physiological  conditions  so  that  "in  ants, 
the  winged  males  and  females  become  intensely  positively  heliotropic 
at  the  time  of  mating  .  .  .  after  copulation  the  female  loses  its 
wings  and  also  its  positive  heliotropism.  It  becomes  now  intensely 
stereotropic.1 1  Similarly  a  caterpillar  that  is  forced  by  its  heliotropism 
to  climb  up  a  plant  stalk  to  the  leaves,  after  feeding  upon  these  "loses 
its  positive  heliotropism  almost  completely  and  entirely.'*12  Now  the 
condition  of  an  organism  is,  as  we  saw  in  the  last  chapter,  closely  con- 
nected with  its  temporal  structure.  This  is  most  commonly  expressed 
in  a  recognition  of  the  effect  of  the  past  upon  it,  but  behavior  seems 
also  to  possess  a  future  reference.  Thus  an  adequate  description  of 
the  behavior  of  organisms  requires  reference  to  their  temporal 
structure. 

This  of  course  becomes  more  important  and  evident  with  the  develop- 
ment of  higher  forms  of  behavior  and  with  the  increasing  prominence 
of  learning.  Indeed  in  the  learning  processes  of  the  higher  animals 
the  temporal  structure  of  sentient  life  becomes  very  obvious.  Much 
experimental  work  has  l^een  done  in  this  field,  especially  with  the 
ability  of  animals  to  learn  to  run  mazes  and  to  manipulate  simple  locks 
and  puzzle-boxes.  Learning  here  progresses  by  the  method  commonly 
called  that  of  trial  and  error,  useless  or  harmful  movements  being 
gradually  eliminated  and  the  desired  result  more  rapidly  attained.13 
Here  a  teleological  as  well  as  a  temporal  aspect  seems  evident,  as  acts 

10  Cf.  S.  J.  Holmes  :  The  Evolution  of  Animal  Intelligence,  New  York,  Holt. 
1911.  pp.  150  ff. 

^Forced  Movements,  Tropisms  and  Animal  Conduct,  Philadelphia  and 
London,  Lippincott,  1918,  p.  158. 

12  ; bid.,  p.  162. 

13  Cf.  Washburn :    Loc.  cit.,  pp.  257-285. 


30        THE  NATURE  OF  LIFE A  STUDY  IN   METAPHYSICAL  ANALYSIS 

are  usually  performed  in  order  to  obtain  food  or  to  avoid  punishment. 
The  same  would  seem  to  be  true  of  a  great  part  of  animal  behavior, 
which  appears  to  be  in  general  adaptive  in  that  it  keeps  or  brings  the 
organism  into  conditions  that  are  favorable  to  the  continuance  of  its 
life  processes.  The  simplest  forms  of  behavior  seem  to  be  food  getting 
and  avoidance  of  injurious  stimuli.  With  the  higher  organisms, 
especially  man,  other  ends  are  sought  and  attained,  but  self-preserva- 
tion, together  with  the  sometimes  incompatible  aim  of  preserving  the 
species,  certainly  remains  fundamental  in  the  types  of  life  that  we  have 
so  far  considered.  Thus  Singer  would  define  life  as  purposive  behavior 
and  give  self-preservation  as  the  defining  purpose.14  But  definitely 
purposed  or  voluntary  action  would  seem  to  require  consciousness  in 
the  sense  discussed  in  the  next  chapter,  and  thus  to  go  beyond  instinctive 
and  emotional  reactions.  It  thus  seems  that  the  teleology  characteristic 
of  sentient  life  is  still  unconscious  and  of  the  same  general  type  as 
that  which  we  found  to  be  one  of  the  features  of  biological  life. 

Indeed  vegetative  and  sentient  life  appear  to  be  continuous  and  in 
fact  may  be  regarded  as  but  two  aspects  of  biological  or  physical  life. 
This  is  particularly  evident  with  the  lower  organisms,  for  their  behavior 
and  metabolic  processes  are  so  closely  connected  that  it  would  seem 
unnatural  to  assign  them  to  different  worlds.     But  with  the  higher 
plants  and  animals  the  case  seems  different,  for  we  recognize  a  high 
degree    of    organization    in    the    former    without    any    corresponding 
development  in  behavior,  while  with  the  latter  behavior  and  sensation 
may  be  developed  to  such  an  extent  that  their  connection  with  other 
aspects  of  physical  life  is  obscured  and  they  may  come  to  be  conceived 
as  phases  of  conscious  life.    The  distinction  between  the  two  seems  to 
be  expressible  in  terms  of  the  domains  or  realms  in  which  they  move, 
for  it  seems  possible  to  conceive  of  vegetative  life  existing  in  a  purely 
physical  and  chemical  environment  and  we  imagine  that  plants  may 
have  existed  on  our  earth  before  the  appearance  of  animals.     Similarly 
the  metabolic  processes  of  biological  life  seem  to  be  largely  expressible 
in  physical  and  chemical  terms  if  once  the  organism  with  its  temporal 
structure  is  given.    In  other  words  nutritive  life  moves  in  a  mechanical 
and  chemical  domain,  while  with  sentient  life  we  seem  to  have  moved 
into  a  wider  and  more  varied  realm.    Light  and  temperature,  taste  and 
smell,  sound  and  color  become  important  factors;  m,  I,  and  t  are  no 
longer  sufficient  for  its  description  and  even  a  recognition  of  the  differ- 
ences of  chemical  elements  is  inadequate.     Sentient  life  thus  moves 
in  a  world  of  great  wealth  and  variety  of  secondary  and  even  tertiary 
as  well  as  primary  qualities. 

1*  "The  Pulse  of  Life,"  Journal  of  Philosophy,  Vol.  XI,  p.  650. 


BEHAVIOR    AND    SENTIENT    LIFE  3! 

But  however  different  the  realms  of  vegetative  and  sentient  life 
may  appear,  the  continuity  of  these  two  forms  of  life  is  quite  as 
evident.  The  biological  organism  whose  development  and  organization 
we  examined  in  the  last  chapter,  appeared  in  the  present  one  as  an 
individual  center  of  activity.  In  both  cases  our  analysis  of  life  has 
shown  the  importance  of  its  temporal  structure.  In  the  case  of  vegeta- 
tive life  this  was  most  evident  in  the  growth  and  development  of  the 
organism,  but  appeared  to  be  essential  as  well  for  an  understanding 
of  its  specific  form  and  chemical  composition.  While  in  that  of  sentient 
life  it  was  specially  obvious  in  connection  with  learning,  which  pos- 
sesses a  future  reference  as  well  as  depending  upon  past  experience ; 
but  all  behavior  and  sensibility,  so  far  as  their  appearance  in  concrete 
cases  is  concerned,  appeared  to  be  dependent  upon  the  temporal  struc- 
ture or  life  history  of  the  individual  organism  of  which  they  are 
functions. 

The  teleological  aspect  of  life  that  we  noted  in  connection  with 
organic  growth  was  made  more  prominent  by  our  examination  of 
behavior.  Here  it  is  evidently  to  be  conceived  in  terms  of  use,  as  the 
helping  or  hindering  of  definite  tendencies.  The  organism  appears 
as  a  specific  center  of  interest  to  which  its  environment  contributes  in 
varying  degrees.  We  have  seen  that  the  lower  organisms  react  to  a 
stimulus  according  to  its  influence  upon  their  life  processes,  that  they 
seem  to  discriminate  only  between  food  and  injurious  stimuli  and  thus 
appear  to  be  sensible  of  pleasure  and  pain  as  connoting  "normal,  un- 
hindered functioning"  and  the  interruption  or  hindering  of  such 
functioning.  Indeed  this  seems  to  be  the  nature  of  sensuous  pleasure 
and  the  "specific  quale  of  this  type  of  value  lies  in  its  helping  to  fulfil 
a  certain  fundamental  tendency  resident  in  the  organism,"  namely  "to 
perpetuate  its  own  normal  unhindered  functioning."15  Thus  teleology 
in  so  far  as  it  appears  in  connection  with  sentient  life  seems  to  be  very 
closely  connected  with  its  temporal  structure;  for  life  processes  are 
specific  and  directed  tendencies,  such  for  example  as  those  evident  in 
the  growth  and  development  of  their  specific  forms,  but  characteristic 
also  of  their  metabolism  in  general;  now  anything  that  aids  these 
tendencies  is  of  use  to  the  organism,  while  anything  that  hinders  them 
is  injurious  to  it.  Other  things  and  processes  thus  have  positive  or 
negative  value  for  it  in  so  far  as  they  help  or  hinder  it  in  its  life 
processes.  If  "the  value  of  an  object  consists  in  its  helping  to  com- 
plete or  fulfil  some  tendency  already  present,"16  the  close  connection 

15  W.  H.  Sheldon :     "An  Empirical  Definition  of  Value,"  Journal  of  Phil- 
osophy, Vol.  XI,  p.  115. 

16  Ibid.,  p.  121. 


32        THE  NATURE  OF  LIFE A  STUDY   IN    METAPHYSICAL  ANALYSIS 

of  teleology  and  temporal  structure  is  evident,  for  in  a  world  that  was 
permanent  or  whose  changes  were  chaotic  or  undirected  there  would 
be  no  specific  tendencies  to  be  helped  or  hindered  and  so  values  in  the 
sense  just  defined  would  be  impossible.  Indeed  it  is  only  in  a  world 
that  has  temporal  structure  that  progressive  change  and  development 
can  occur  and  action  be  directed  toward  ends.  The  temporal  structure 
here  indicated  evidently  implies  both  duration  and  direction  and  is  not 
to  be  identified  with  the  mathematical  time  of  physics. 


CHAPTER     IV 

CONSCIOUS    LIFE   AND    MIND 

Life  as  pictured  in  the  last  chapter,  moving  in  a  world  of  colors  and 
sounds  as  well  as  possessing  mechanical  and  chemical  structure,  doubt- 
less appears  to  resemble  very  closely  what  is  often  termed  conscious 
life.  But  we  were  there  dealing  with  physical  and  physiological  facts 
and  there  seemed  to  be  no  need  of  introducing  any  mysterious  sub- 
jective factor.  Indeed  sentient  life  seemed  quite  clearly  to  be  a  special 
aspect  of  biological  life :  thus  we  could  speak  of  vegetative  and  sentient 
life  as  two  forms  of  bodily  or  physical  life  in  the  broad  sense  of  the 
term;  and  behavior  and  sensation  seemed  to  be  physiological  processes 
quite  as  much  as  did  metabolism. 

We  are  now  to  consider  conscious  or  mental  life,  and  may  begin  by 
indicating  how  it  differs  from  sentient  life  and  why  we  are  treating  it 
in  a  separate  chapter.  The  common  tendency  to  treat  sensation  and 
emotion  as  forms  of  consciousness  parallel  with  thought  or  cognition 
perhaps  makes  our  division  seem  strange  and  artificial,  and  anyone  who 
prefers  may  regard  the  preceding  chapter  as  dealing  with  one  aspect 
of  conscious  or  psychological  life  rather  than,  or  as  well  as,  with 
biological  life.  Of  course  most  psychologists  would  do  so  and  that 
was  my  original  intention,  but  the  division  between  the  facts  with 
which  psychologists  and  biologists  deal  did  not  seem  to  be  at  all  clear 
and  indeed  the  whole  range  of  psychology  appeared  so  confused  that 
it  seemed  best  to  divide  our  discussion  of  life  as  the  material  with 
which  we  were  dealing  seemed  to  indicate  rather  than  try  to  follow  the 
lines  of  demarcation  between  the  various  sciences  that  treat  it. 

The  fact  that  psychologists  may  question  the  existence  of  conscious- 
ness, often  preferring  to  define  their  science  in  other  terms,  and  seldom 
attempt  to  tell  what  they  mean  by  consciousness  aside  from  giving 
varied  and  confused  lists  of  what  it  is  supposed  to  comprise,  further 
made  it  doubtful  whether  we  could  get  much  help  from  them  as  to  the 
exact  nature  of  conscious  life.  If  we  turn  then  to  recent  philosophical 
discussions  of  the  nature  of  consciousness,  we  find  that  epistemological 
problems  and  difficulties  have  caused  considerable,  not  to  say  bewilder- 
ing confusion  in  this  field.  But  examination  shows  that  a  part  at 
least  of  the  trouble  is  the  result  of  confusing  the  facts  of  sensation  and 
emotion  with  their  possible  cognitive  relations  and  of  treating  sensation 
per  se  as  cognitive.  Thus  consciousness  is  defined  in  terms  of  the 


34        THE  NATURE  OF  LIFE A  STUDY  IN   METAPHYSICAL  ANALYSIS 

interaction  of  organism  and  environment,  which  obviously  gives  a 
definition  of  sensibility  and  behavior,  but  fails  to  distinguish  these  as 
unconscious  from  their  conscious  phases.  This  has  seemed  less  absurd 
than  might  have  been  expected,  since  subconscious  and  unconscious 
psychical  processes  are  generally  admitted  and  though  psychical  and 
conscious  are  commonly  taken  as  synonyms,  to  call  the  former  uncon- 
scious does  not  appear  to  most  people  a  contradiction  in  terms.  The 
whole  situation  seems  to  be  the  result  of  a  philosophical  conception  that 
set  consciousness  over  against  the  physical  world,  made  the  gulf  be- 
tween them  impassable  for  either  and  had  to  manufacture  an  uncon- 
scious consciousness,  or  to  cover  the  contradiction  an  unconscious 
psychical  realm,  to  contain  what  might  be  conscious  but  was  not  so  at 
any  given  time.  Of  course  in  some  systems  this  latter  function  was 
neatly  performed  by  God  or  the  Absolute. 

However  our  present  concern  is  not  with  philosophical  systems,  but 
with  the  facts  of  conscious  life.  I  propose  therefore  to  identify  con- 
sciousness with  awareness  or  cognition  rather  than  with  the  vague 
realm  of  the  psychical.  But  anyone  may  include  what  was  said  in  the 
preceding  chapter  as  well  as  much  that  will  be  discussed  in  the  follow- 
ing chapters  as  aspects  of  conscious  life  if  he  so  prefers.  My  present 
interest  is  not  to  defend  any  particular  concept  of  consciousness  nor 
in  fact  the  definitions  of  any  of  the  realms  in  which  life  is  found,  but 
rather  to  get  before  us  as  clear  a  picture  of  life  as  possible  in  each 
case. 

What  then  is  the  fundamental  characteristic  of  conscious  or  mental 
life?  It  is  in  a  word  knowledge,  cognition  or  awareness.  Sensations 
and  emotions  enter  consciousness  when  one  is  aware  of  them,  but  when 
they  remain  below  the  level  of  consciousness  they  are  simply  physical 
and  physiological  processes  and  as  such  were  treated  in  the  last  chapter. 
How  they  look  outside  of  consciousness  we  of  course  can  not  know, 
for  it  is  impossible  to  know  an  object  without  being  aware  of  it.  But 
the  so-called  "ego-centric  predicament"  appears  to  be  no  different  here 
than- elsewhere,  for  it  is  always  impossible  to  know  objects  outside  of 
knowledge.  We  have  then  to  examine  more  carefully  the  nature  of 
knowledge  if  we  are  to  get  a  definite  picture  of  mental  life.  An 
identification  of  knowledge  with  awareness  emphasizes  immediately  its 
relational  aspect  and  also  the  wide  range  of  its  objects,  for  one  may 
be  aware  of  chairs  and  tables,  solar  systems  and  ethical  ideals,  in  fact 
the  whole  realm  of  objects  of  possible  knowledge,  universals  as  well 
as  particulars,  past  and  future  as  well  as  present.  It  is  thus  evident 
that  the  domain  in  which  conscious  life  moves  is  vastly  greater  than 
those  of  vegetative  and  sentient  life;  for  one  thing  its  effective  environ- 


CONSCIOUS    LIFE   AND    MIND  .  35 

ment  is  greatly  extended  in  both  time  and  space,  but  that  is  by  no  means 
the  only  difference  between  unconscious  and  conscious  life  for  things 
have  a  meaning  for  the  latter  that  they  did  not  possess  for  the  former. 

In  fact  meaning  seems  to  be  the  essential  feature  of  consciousness.  If 
this  is  the  case,  the  sensations  and  images  or  ideas  that  are  commonly 
regarded  as  its  elements  rather  appear  to  be  its  objects,  the  bearers  or 
carriers  of  knowledge  than  knowledge  itself.  They  thus  figure  as 
symbols  or  signs  whose  function  it  is  to  suggest  something  beyond 
themselves  and  thus  require  interpretation.  Life  thus  comes  to  move 
in  a  realm  where  things  have  meanings  and  implications  as  well  as 
mechanical  and  chemical  structure.  The  self -transcendence  of  objects 
here  suggested  shows  that  they  belong  to  a  logical  structure  that  may 
be  termed  "mental"  or  "transcendental/'1  and  regarded  as  neither 
temporal  nor  spatial,  though  these  same  objects  may  also  belong  to 
temporal  and  spatial  structures  as  well.  Indeed  in  many,  if  not  most 
cases,  this  self -transcendence  of  the  objects  of  consciousness  appears 
to  possess  a  very  definitely  spatial  and  temporal  aspect,  since  con- 
sciousness is  both  retrospective  and  prospective  and  its  stimuli  may 
recede  in  both  space  and  time  as  consciousness  develops.2  That  is, 
for  conscious  life  the  meaning  and  implications  of  its  objects  depend 
upon  the  fact  that  memory  and  imagination  are  essential  and  funda- 
mental as  well  as  awareness,  and  indeed  are  implied  by  it. 

Like  other  forms  of  cognition,  memory  always  seems  to  possess  a 
sensational  (images  here  being  included  as  well  as  sensations  proper) 
basis,  which  appears  to  be  important  as  the  carrier  of  meaning  rather 
than  as  the  memory  itself;  and  the  images  may  vary  from  a  vivid 
picturing  of  the  past  through  all  degrees  of  sketchiness  to  merely 
verbal  images,  and  if  these  all  refer  to  the  same  fact  or  event  they 
would  be  recognized  as  so  far  the  same  memory  however  different 
were  the  images  on  which  they  were  based.  Here  again  meaning  rather 
than  sensuous  content  seems  to  be  the  essential  characteristic  of  con- 
sciousness or  mind.  But  in  this  connection  the  meaning  must  be 
recognized  as  referring  to  the  past,  which  shows  the  importance  of 
temporal  structure  for  conscious  life.  Though  memory  is  usually- 
referred  to  as  reproductive  imagination,  it  is  evidently  no  mere  repeti- 
tion and  frequently  possesses  a  productive  aspect  as  well,  as  is  par- 
ticularly apparent  in  learning.  In  a  similar  way,  so-called  creative  or 
productive  imagination  possesses  a  past  as  well  as  a  future  reference 
and  the  same  is  true  of  anticipation.  Thus  if  the  term  imagination  is 

1  Cf.  Woodbridge :    "Structure,"  Journal  of  Philosophy,  Vol.  XIV,  p.  683. 

2  Cf.  W.  P.  Montague :    "A  Realistic  Theory  of  Truth  and  Error,"  The  New 
Realism,  New  York,  Macmillan,  1912,  pp.  278-285. 


36        THE  NATURE  OF  LIFE A  STUDY  IN   METAPHYSICAL  ANALYSIS 

used  to  cover  all  these  aspects,  it  clearly  indicates  the  importance  of 
temporal  structure  for  conscious  life;  especially  when  we  realize  that 
in  experience  all  awareness,  whether  perceptual  or  conceptual,  is  really 
a  special  case  of  imagination  where  we  have  no  particular  interest  in 
its  temporal  reference  whether  past  or  future.  For  the  meanings  that 
things  have  for  us  are  so  universally  connected  with  our  past  experi- 
ence and  our  interests  and  purposes  that  we  often  give  the  fact  but 
scanty  attention. 

Our  discussion  of  consciousness  thus  brings  us  again  to  a  considera- 
tion of  purpose,  the  importance  of  which  has  already  been  suggested 
in  connection  with  behavior.  Perhaps  the  most  commonly  emphasized 
characteristic  of  purpose  is  its  relation  to  temporal  structure,  for 
purpose  would  seem  to  be  meaningless  in  a  non-temporal  world.  The 
temporal  structure  here  required  would  evidently  be  one  in  which 
direction  was  important,  or  in  other  words  it  is  "duration"  and  not 
merely  mathematical  time  which  is  in  question  here.  The  same  is 
perhaps  even  more  evident  in  connection  with  memory,  since  the  cumu- 
lative aspect  of  duration  is  here  especially  prominent.  Unfortunately 
the  future  seems  to  have  been  always  more  difficult  to  deal  with  than 
the  past,  because  it  somehow  seems  easier  to  conceive  that  the  past  is 
preserved  in  the  present  than  that  the  future  can  be  operative  in  the 
present.  Now  it  seems  to  me  that  at  least  a  part  of  the  difficulty  has 
been  due  to  the  fact  that  practical  and  theoretical  considerations  have 
been  allowed  to  become  too  thoroughly  intertwined,  with  the  result 
that  we  have  nothing  like  as  clear  a  conception  of  temporal  as  of 
spatial  structure.  This  appears  to  be  one  reason  why  we  are  constantly 
trying  to  compress  all  temporal  structure  into  the  present  and  treat 
memory  as  though  it  made  the  past  present,  and  anticipation  and  pur- 
pose as  though  they  could  make  the  future  in  some  inconceivable  way 
present.  But  that  neither  memory  nor  anticipation  in  reality  aim  at 
such  an  accomplishment  would  seem  to  be  evident  enough  from  the 
fact  that  their  intention  is  to  refer  to  past  or  future  without  being 
them.  As  a  past  event  is  not  made  present  by  being  remembered,  so 
a  future  event  is  not  made  present  by  being  imagined ;  for  in  either  case 
it  is  the  idea  or  image  that  is  present,  while  its  meaning  is  its  past  or 
future  reference.  In  fact  meaning  always  seems  to  require  a 
transcendence  of  present  date,  as  is  perhaps  even  more  evident  when  it 
is  expressed  in  terms  of  implication,  and  though  this  can  evidently  be 
developed  in  logic  without  reference  to  temporal  structure,  its  ap- 
pearance in  conscious  life  seems  to  be  dependent  upon  the  temporal 
structure  characteristic  of  life,  in  much  the  same  wav  that  the  mechanical 


CONSCIOUS    LIFE    AND    MIND  37 

and  chemical  structure  of   biological  life  can   be  understood   only  in 
connection  with  its  temporal  structure. 

However,  purpose  is  characterized  not  only  by  its  temporal  aspect, 
but  is  evidently  also  closely  connected  with  what  we  have  called  tele- 
ology: in  fact  purpose  is  often  identified  with  teleology  or  taken  as  its 
defining  characteristic.  But  in  the  sense  in  which  we  have  been  using 
the  term  teleology,  purpose  appears  to  be  merely  a  special  case  of 
teleology  that  becomes  possible  with  consciousness.  Indeed  conscious- 
ness gives  new  efficacy  to  both  the  temporal  and  teleological  factors 
of  life.  On  the  physical  plane  they  appeared  rather  as  characteristics  of 
life  than  as  factors  in  its  processes.3  The  growth  and  development  of 
biological  organisms  quite  clearly  conform  to  temporal  structure,  and 
in  fact  we  have  seen  that  no  aspects  of  living  beings  could  be  adequately 
understood  aside  from  their  temporal  structure  and  teleological  organi- 
zation, but  neither  of  these  appeared  as  effective  factors  in  bringing 
about  their  own  embodiments :  efficiency  in  this  realm  apparently  being 
confined  to  mechanical  and  chemical  factors.  In  other  words,  temporal 
structure  and  teleology  appeared  as  characteristics  of  life  rather  than 
of  the  physical  realm  in  which  it  was  finding  embodiment.  With 
sentient  life  that  domain  seemed  to  be  extended  considerably,  as  it 
included  what  are  commonly  called  secondary  and  tertiary  qualities  as 
well  as  the  primary  ones ;  there  seemed  also  to  be  recognition  or  rather 
feeling  of  use  in  the  discrimination  of  food  and  the  avoidance  of  in- 
jurious stimuli.  But  with  conscious  life  both  temporal  structure  and 
teleology  gain  immensely  in  importance;  the  past  is  definitely  remem- 
bered and  used  and  the  future  is  consciously  planned  for.  The  varied 
uses  of  things  are  recognized,  advantage  and  disadvantage  are  antici- 
pated and  means  taken  to  gain  the  one  and  avoid  the  other.4  Conscious- 
ness thus  seems  to  open  the  door  to  a  most  varied  world  and  in  fact 
appears  to  be  so  essential  to  many  other  forms  of  life,  some  of  which 
will  be  considered  later,  that  the  term  conscious  life  might  be  used  to 
cover  all  these  as  well  as  sentient  life.  But  in  the  narrower  sense  of 
the  term  which  we  have  for  the  present  adopted  in  the  interest  of 
clarity,  mental  life  is  to  be  conceived  as  moving  in  the  realm  of  logical 
structure  which  is  definable  in  terms  of  implication  and  meaning.  Its 
elements  may  be  anything  so  long  as  they  conform  to  its  structure; 
they  thus  include  physical  objects,  sensations,  ideas,  universals,  values, 
ideals — a  varied  host,  indeed  anything  that  may  be  known.  Conscious 
life  in  the  broad  sense  of  that  term  is  of  course  concerned  with  many 
<>t~  their  aspects,  but  mental  life  in  so  far  as  it  is  contrasted  with  other 

3  Cf.  F.  ].  E.  Woodbridge  :     "Natural  Teleology,"  Essays  in  Modern  Theology 
and  Related  Subjects,  New  York,  Scribner's,  191 1,  p.  323. 

4  Ibid.,  p.  323. 


38        THE  NATURE  OF  LIFE A  STUDY  IN   METAPHYSICAL  ANALYSIS 

aspects  of  personal  life,  is  to  be  conceived  as  moving  in  the  realm  of 
logical  structure,  rather  than  as  including  all  the  forms  of  life  that 
would  be  impossible  without  consciousness. 

The  preceding  discussion  has  shown,  I  think,  that  the  characteristic 
feature  of  consciousness  or  mind  is  meaning  and  that  sense  qualities 
are  rather  a  basis  of  knowledge  than  knowledge  itself,  that 
is  they  are  the  objects  of  knowledge  or  its  signs  or  symbols  and 
the  same  is  apparently  true  of  pleasure  and  pain.  Though  it  has 
been  customary  to  regard  these  latter  as  well  as  knowledge  as  aspects 
of  consciousness,  we  have  tried  to  clarify  the  discussion  of  psychological 
or  conscious  life  by  distinguishing  between  sentient  and  mental  life. 
The  characteristic  marks  of  the  former  would  be  sensibility  in  its  two 
aspects  of  sensation  and  feeling,  both  of  which  are  to  be  understood 
in  terms  of  the  relation  or  interaction  of  organism  and  environment 
and  thus  as  a  function  of  either  according  to  the  way  in  which  one 
wishes  to  express  it.  But  in  so  far  as  they  are  physical  facts  only,  they 
would  not  seem  to  be  rightly  called  conscious,  which  they  become  only 
as  they  assume  meaning  or  are  related  in  special  ways  either  among 
themselves  or  with  other  objects.  But  though  in  general  we  readily 
distinguish  things  from  their  meanings,  in  the  case  of  sensations  and 
feelings  the  two  seem  to  have  been  pretty  thoroughly  confused,  so  that 
in  this  case  the  objects  of  consciousness  have  been  assimilated  to 
consciousness,  and  some  of  the  neo-realists  having  noted  this  fact 
have  carried  it  farther  and  identified  consciousness  with  a  class  of 
objects  5  of  any  sort.  Now  it  seems  to  me  that  objects  are  no  more 
consciousness  than  they  are  time  or  space  and  in  fact  their  relation  to 
logical  structure  is  similar  to  their  relation  to  mechanical  and  chemical 
structures. 

Meaning  and  logical  structure  thus  might  be  independent  of  organ- 
isms, and  mental  life  go  on  without  any  connection  with  physical  life  if 
it  could  build  up  a  progressive  organization  of  elements  derived  from  a 
logical  environment:  that  is,  if  there  were  objects  that  possessed  only 
logical  structure,  an  independent  mental  life  might  be  possible,  but  I 
should  think  that  it  would  be  useless  and  at  any  rate  speculations  con.- 
cerning  it  are  idle  as  conscious  life  as  we  know  it  is  found  only  in 
connection  with  physical  life.  On  the  other  hand  there  may  be  sentient 
life  that  can  not  rightly  be  called  conscious,  and  it  would  seem  to  be  this 
of  which  we  find  clear  evidence  in  the  case  of  animals.  Singer's  dis- 
cussion of  sensibility6  and  Jennings's  descriptions  of  the  behavior  of 

6  E.g.  E.  B.  Holt:     The  Concept  of  Consciousness,  New   York,   Macmillan, 
1914,  p.  182. 
•  In  the  Journal  of  Philosophy,  Vol.  XIV,  pp.  337-350. 


CONSCIOUS    LIFE   AND    MIND  39 

the  lower  organisms  seem  to  show  clearly  that  we  are  there  concerned 
with  sentient  rather  than  with  mental  life.  The  same  is  apparently 
the  case  with  many  of  our  reflex  and  habitual  reactions  which  depend 
directly  upon  the  proper  functioning  of  our  sense  organs,  but  still  are 
generally  recognized  as  unconscious.  If  this  is  the  case,  sentiency  or 
sensibility  may  well  be  identified  with  a  type  of  behavior  and  is  properly 
a  subject  for  biological  investigation;  in  fact  much  that  is  now  studied 
under  the  title  of  psychology  would  seem  to  belong  under  this  head. 
Sensibility  is  then  one  of  the  characteristics  of  physical  life,  at  least 
as  it  appears  in  many  animal  forms,  varying  in  degree  with  the  de- 
velopment of  the  organisms  and  the  increasing  differentiation  of  their 
sense  organs  and  integrative  action  of  their  nervous  systems.  Sensa- 
tion so  conceived  as  an  object  of  knowledge  and  not  as  a  type  of 
consciousness  would  be  a  purely  physical  or  rather  physiological  pro- 
cess, and  the  same  would  be  true  of  pleasure  and  pain  and  indeed  of 
all  the  affective  aspects  of  "consciousness."  But  these  various  vital 
processes  also  often  figure  in  logical  structures,  they  are  related  by  way 
of  meaning  and  implication  or  "act  as  a  part  of  a  system  of  symboliza- 
tion" "  and  thus  enter  consciousness. 

Since  our  conscious  life  is  based  directly  upon  sensibility  in  its 
various  forms,  the  connection  between  sensation  and  cognition  has 
been  taken  or  rather  mistaken  for  one  of  degree  rather  than  of  kind, 
so  that  sensation  is  conceived  as  an  elementary  form  of  knowledge,  or 
inference  as  an  unsatisfactory  substitute  for  intuition.  But  if  our 
analysis  has  been  correct,  sensation  and  knowledge  are  radically  dif- 
ferent however  closely  they  may  be  connected  in  practical  life.  As 
meaning  has  been  shown  to  be  the  essential  factor  of  our  cognitive  ex- 
perience, it  appears  as  the  distinguishing  feature  of  mental  life.  So 
conceived  mental  life  would  not  include  our  entire  inner  or  spiritual 
life,  but  rather  appears  as  one  aspect  of  it  perhaps  roughly  parallel  with 
our  moral  or  our  esthetic  life.  It  may  thus  be  regarded  as  one  phase 
of  our  personal  life  stressing  certain  aspects  of  it,  namely  the  inter- 
pretation of  meaning  and  logical  relations.  That  is,  mental  life  is 
lived  in  the  realm  of  implications  and  meanings,  just  as  biological  life 
occurs  in  the  domains  of  physics  and  chemistry;  or  mental  life  may  be 
said  to  operate  within  logical  structure  as  biological  life  does  within 
mechanical  and  chemical  structures.  But  in  neither  case  is  life  to  be 
identified  with  its  medium  or  environment,  though  this  may  furnish 
the  distinguishing  mark  of  the  different  kinds  or  grades  of  life. 

7  A.  Meyer:  "Misconceptions  at  the  Bottom  of  'Hopelessness  of  all  Psy- 
chology/ "  Psychological  Bulletin,  Vol.  IV,  p.  178. 


4O        THE  NATURE  OF  LIFE A  STUDY  IN    METAPHYSICAL  ANALYSIS 

The  logical  domain,  which  may  be  called  "mind  in  a  metaphysical 
sense"  as  distinct  from  mental  life  or  from  individual  minds,  appears 
to  be  as  timeless  as  are  the  spatial  and  mechanical  domains,  but  space- 
less as  well,  for  logical  structures  "have  that  kind  of  aloofness  from 
time  and  space  which  we  indicate  by  the  ordinary  word  '  mental '  and 
the  extraordinary  word  '  transcendental.'  "  8  Objects  within  this  domain 
are  related  by  implication  and  suggestion.  Thus  sensations  and  feelings 
appear  within  it  as  signs  or  symbols  that  may  be  variously  interpreted. 
They,  like  all  other  objects  and  events,  appear  to  possess  a  great  multi- 
plicity of  meanings  or  implications,  and  mental  life  seems  to  consist  in 
the  selection  and  organization  of  certain  of  these  into  individual  wholes. 
The  possibility  of  such  an  organization  appears  to  be  dependent  upon 
the  temporal  structure  characteristic  of  life.  In  other  words,  life  on 
the  mental  as  well  as  on  the  biological  plane  appears  to  be  continuous 
with  its  environment  from  which  it  selects  the  elements  which  form 
the  basis  for  its  characteristic  organization,  which  in  turn  can  be  ex- 
pressed only  in  terms  of  its  temporal  structure.  The  importance  of  this 
in  connection  with  such  conscious  processes  as  memory  and  anticipation 
is  evident  and  our  analysis  has  shown  that  the  same  is  true  of  all 
cognitive  processes,  for  as  Dr.  Carr  says  "to  be  conscious  or  aware 
of  an  object  is  not  to  contemplate  it  but  to  recognize  it.  Recognition 
implies  precognition,  .  .  .  presupposes  memory  and  also  construc- 
tive imagination."9  That  is,  consciousness  as  it  occurs  in  concrete 
forms  is  very  definitely  a  temporal  affair,  however  timeless  mental 
or  logical  structure  may  be  in  itself. 

This  clearly  indicates  that  the  organization  characteristic  of  mental 
life  is  not  to  be  unthinkingly  identified  with  logical  structure.  Perhaps 
the  difference  between  them  can  be  most  pertinently  expressed  by 
pointing  out  that  mental  life  is  always  connected  with  individuals  which 
may  be  called  mental  organisms  after  the  analogy  of  biological  organ- 
isms, though  they  are  probably  more  commonly  spoken  of  as  individual 
minds  or  as  selves.  But  the  latter  terms  seem  to  imply  greater  richness 
and  variety  of  content  and  organization  than  seem  to  belong  to  mental 
life  in  the  restricted  sense  in  which  we  are  now  using  the  term,  for  they 
are  commonly  understood  to  include  the  entire  inner  life,  moral  and 
religious  as  well  as  mental.  Individuality  thus  appears  to  be  one  of 
the  fundamental  characteristics  of  mental  life.  This  was  suggested 
on  the  biological  plane  by  the  importance  of  specific  form  and  is  com- 
monly considered  in  psychology  under  the  heading  of  personal  identity. 
The  fact  that  this  is  most  evident  in  recognition  and  memory,  and  in 

8  Woodbridge :     "Structure,"  Journal  of  Philosophy,  Vol.  XIV,  p.  683. 
» "The    Interaction    of    Mind    and    Body,"    Proceedings    of    the    Aristotelian 
Society,  Vol.  XVIII,  p.  TO. 


CONSCIOUS    LIFE    AND    MIND  4! 

anticipation  and  hope  shows  very  clearly  that  it  is  closely  connected 
with  temporal  structure,  which  is  evidently  required  for  the  continuity 
and  development  of  the  self  and  indeed  for  its  very  organization.  For 
the  characteristics  of  an  individual  mind  depend  upon  its  past  ex- 
periences and  its  aims  and  interests,  both  of  which  determine  the  selec- 
tion that  it  makes  from  the  many  meanings  and  implications  presented 
to  it. 

In  conclusion,  it  may  be  interesting  to  compare  mental  and  physical 
life  as  their  characteristic  features  have  been  brought  out  in  this  and 
the  preceding  chapters.  In  both  cases  life  presented  a  typical  organiza- 
tion of  elements  that  were  derived  from  its  environment  or  medium. 
The  fact  that  these  possess  very  different  structures  in  the  two  cases, 
would  account  for  the  difference  between  mental  and  physical  life. 
The  adjectives  thus  appear  to  characterize  the  domains  in  which  life 
is  found  rather  than  the  nature  of  life  itself,  and  thus  describe  the 
elements  which  furnish  the  basis  of  its  organization.  This  organization, 
characteristic  of  life,  seems  to  be  most  naturally  expressed  in  terms 
of  differentiation  and  integration,  or  of  selection  and  assimilation,  and 
can  be  understood  only  in  connection  with  its  temporal  structure.  It 
also  seems  to  require  individualization.  Biological  organisms  are  so 
obviously  individual  centers  of  activity  that  we  failed  to  note  this  as 
one  of  the  essential  characteristics  of  life  on  the  physical  plane,  but  the 
attempt  to  distinguish  mental  life  from  mind  in  general  showed  how 
important  is  this  aspect  of  life.  Driesch  and  Singer  10  have  suggested 
it  in  their  discussions  of  the  teleological  aspect  of  life  and  indeed  it 
may  be  the  best  way  of  calling  attention  to  the  non-mechanical  aspect 
of  life.  Thus  life  so  far  as  its  elements  or  material  is  concerned  appears 
to  be  continuous  with  its  environment  or  the  plane  on  which  it  is 
moving,  but  the  principle  of  its  organization  seems  to  be  at  right  angles 
to  this,  if  we  may  use  a  spatial  figure  in  such  a  connection,  and  to 
involve  the  selection  and  assimilation  of  those  elements  which  can  be 
built  up  into  the  individual  form  of  life  in  any  given  case.  This 
principle  of  organization  is  sometimes  described  as  teleological,  though  a 
term  with  less  confused  connotations  would  be  desirable.  Still  it  is 
difficult  to  find  terms  to  express  the  exact  meaning  which  seems  to  re- 
quire some  combination  of  individuality  and  teleology;  and  we  shall 
continue  our  examination  of  it  in  the  next  chapter. 

10  For  example  Driesch's  constant  emphasis  upon  the  importance  of  factual 
wholeness  of  the  individual  organism  and  definition  of  teleology  by  reference 
thereto.  (Cf.  Problem  of  Individuality,  p.  3.)  While  Singer's  discussion  of 
purpose  and  freedom  and  especially  his  selection  of  self-preservation  as  the 
defining  purpose  of  life  show  a  similar  tendency  to  connect  teleology  and 
individuality.  ("The  Pulse  of  Life,"  Journal  of  Philosophy,  XI,  645-655.) 


CHAPTER  V 

VALUES   AND   THE    MORAL   LIFE 

We  saw  in  the  last  chapter  that  consciousness  made  possible  a  recog- 
nition of  the  uses  of  things  and  so  the  conscious  utilization  of  them. 
Life  thus  comes  to  move  in  a  realm  of  recognized  values,  and  the 
selection  and  organization  of  these  goods  may  be  regarded  as  charac- 
teristic of  the  moral  life — in  Woodbridge's  words,  "with  consciousness, 
the  world's  teleology  is  a  moral  teleology."  l  We  may  therefore  pause 
for  a  survey  and  consideration  of  the  aspects  of  teleology  that  have 
already  come  to  our  attention  before  proceeding  to  a  direct  examination 
of  the  moral  life.  Here  we  shall  need  to  keep  in  mind  constantly  that 
our  problem  is  merely  one  of  definition  with  no  attempt  at  explanation, 
for  most  discussions  of  teleology  have  been  greatly  confused  by  at- 
tempts to  explain  it.  But  our  present  aim  is  to  analyze  and  define 
teleology  in  such  a  way  as  to  make  its  significance  as  clear  as  possible, 
especially  in  reference  to  its  relation  to  life. 

The  discussion  of  life  on  the  biological  plane  has  already  shown  how 
inevitably  we  regard  life  processes  as  teleological  and  the  examination 
of  behavior  further  emphasized  the  purposive  aspect  of  life,  while  with 
consciousness  it  became  even  more  evident  in  conscious  purpose  and 
planning.  The  facts  thus  indicated  are  numerous  and  have  been 
variously  expressed  by  such  words  as  fitness  and  adaptation,  selection 
and  use,  purpose  and  design.  Thus  organic  growth  and  development 
may  be  described  as  teleological  in  the  sense  that  through  the  selection 
and  assimilation  of  material  derived  from  its  environment  the  organism 
preserves  its  individuality.  As  has  already  been  suggested,  this  aspect 
of  life  seems  so  important  to  Singer  that  he  defines  life  as  purposive 
behavior  and  gives  self-preservation  as  the  dominant  purpose.2  In- 
deed an  examination  of  the  behavior  of  organisms  shows  that  life  pro- 
cesses are  most  naturally  described  in  teleological  terms.  This  does 
not  mean  that  they  are  not  at  the  same  time  mechanistic  in  the  sense 
of  conforming  to  the  mechanical  and  chemical  structure  of  their  en- 
vironment. For  the  same  thing  may  be  both  mechanical  and  teleological 
without  the  distinction  between  the  two  categories  being  in  the  least 
blurred.  For  example,  a  machine  is  the  common  symbol  of  perfect 

1  "Natural   Teleology,"   Essays  in   Modem    Theology   and   Related   Subjects 
P-  324. 

2  "The  Pulse  of  Life,"  Journal  of  Philosophy,  Vol.  XI,  pp.  647-650. 


VALUES  AND  THE  MORAL  LIFE  43 

mechanism  and  its  action  conceived  as  purely  mechanical,  but  it  is  at 
the  same  time  one  of  the  most  obvious  instances  of  design  and  purpose. 
Thus  there  appears  to  be  no  incompatibility  between  mechanism  and 
teleology  as  descriptive  terms  and  the  common  opposition  between  them 
appears  to  result  from  an  attempt  to  determine  their  relative  merits 
as  explanations  on  the  same  level.  In  the  battle  over  these,  evident 
facts  have  been  lost  sight  of,  facts  and  theories  have  been  confused, 
and  interest  in  the  latter  has  obscured  the  former  until  unprejudiced 
description  seems  to  have  become  almost  impossible.  We  have  now 
to  attempt  to  find  our  way  through  this  tangle  with  the  hope  of  making 
as  clear  as  possible  the  nature  of  teleology  and  its  connection  with  life. 

Attention  has  already  been  called  to  the  teleological  aspect  of  the 
growth  and  development  of  organisms.  The  acorn  develops  into  the 
oak,  as  has  so  often  been  remarked,  and  the  germs  of  animals  into 
adults  of  the  same  species,  and  individuals  maintain  themselves  amid 
considerable  changes  in  their  environment  and  within  limits  adapt 
themselves  thereto.  Their  metabolism,  which  is  so  obviously  chemical, 
has  a  teleological  aspect  as  well,  since  it  proceeds  by  selection  as  well 
as  assimilation  and  is  most  naturally  described  as  the  maintenance  of 
the  individuality  of  the  whole  through  constantly  changing  matter  or 
the  attainment  of  a  definite  end  through  a  variety  of  means.  In  fact 
teleology  and  the  organization  that  has  appeared  to  be  characteristic 
of  life  seem  to  be  very  closely  related,  as  both  emphasize  the  importance 
of  individuality  and  wholeness  in  contrast  with  undifferentiated  multi- 
plicity. We  had  thus  been  led  to  define  life  in  terms  of  its  selection 
and  organization  of  elements,  not  forgetting  that  these  processes  are 
distinctly  temporal  and  non-static.  In  fact  it  is  one  of  the  interesting 
features  of  teleology  that  it  seems  to  imply  temporal  structure  as  well 
as  use  or  value.  Value  here  must  be  understood  in  a  very  general 
sense  as  covering  use,  adaptation,  fitness  as  well  as  planned  or  pur- 
posed ends,  and  I  would  use  it  to  indicate  the  aspect  of  teleology  other 
than  its  temporal  structure. 

The  teleological  aspect  of  life  on  the  biological  plane  is  probably 
even  more  evident  in  connection  with  the  behavior  of  organisms  than 
in  their  growth  and  metabolism.  Mechanistic  attempts  to  give  an  ac- 
count of  the  behavior  of  animals  in  terms  of  merely  mechanical  and 
chemical  reactions  show  how  inadequate  such  terms  are  to  furnish  com- 
plete descriptions  of  the  facts  under  observation.  The  behavior  of  the 
bee  gathering  honey  or  the  man  going  to  buy  a  new  house  may  perhaps 
be  best  "explained"  in  terms  of  tropisms  and  chemical  stimuli,  etc., 
but  these  evidently  furnish  but  a  poor  and  ridiculously  scanty  descrip- 
tion of  the  activities  which  are  certainly  more  naturally  and  adequately 


44        THE  NATURE  OF  LIFE A  STUDY   IN    METAPHYSICAL  ANALYSIS 

described  in  terms  of  ends  or  purposes.  Indeed  so  much  of  the  action 
of  living  organisms  is  evidently  adaptive  or  purposive  that  it  can  not 
be  easily  described  in  wholly  non-teleological  terms.  But  this  is  not  to 
be  understood  as  necessarily  implying  the  presence  of  consciousness  in 
any  particular  case,  for  though  purposive  behavior  is  sometimes  given 
as  a  criterion  of  consciousness,  this  like  the  others  commonly  given 
seems  to  show  the  presence  of  sensibility  rather  than  of  mind  and  so 
does  not  prove  the  presence  of  consciousness.  We  further  recognize 
many  cases  of  adaptation  and  fitness  without  reference  to  conscious- 
ness, so  we  should  be  careful  not  to  identify  teleology  with  conscious 
purpose;  and  in  fact  Henderson's  discussions  of  "the  Fitness  of  the 
Environment"  and  "the  Order  of  Nature"  seem  to  show  that  it  is  not 
even  limited  to  the  biological  realm  but  is  found  in  inorganic  nature  as 
well.  If  this  is  the  case,  it  would  appear  to  be  a  category  of  very  wide 
range,  applying  to  the  properties  of  the  chemical  elements,  the  growth 
of  plants,  the  behavior  of  animals  and  a  great  variety  of  human  actions. 
Though  teleology  is  thus  not  to  be  limited  to  conscious  processes  and 
activities,  it  is  more  commonly  recognized  in  such  -connections,  and 
attempts  made  to  explain  it  rather  than  to  explain  it  away  usually  end 
by  resorting  to  "a  psychic  factor."*  But  this  is  not  our  purpose  in 
connecting  teleology  and  consciousness,  as  we  have  forsworn  all 
attempts  at  explanation.  We  however  need  to  keep  in  mind  the  various 
forms  in  which  teleology  appears,  if  our  discussion  of  it  is  to  be  com- 
prehensive. We  may  thus  note  that  while  in  the  realms  of  unconscious 
nature  we  commonly  speak  of  adaptation  and  fitness,  of  selection  and 
use,  on  the  conscious  planes  we  more  naturally  employ  such  terms  as 
purpose  and  design,  value  and  goods.  If  the  analysis  of  consciousness 
in  the  last  chapter  is  correct,  the  difference  between  conscious  and  un- 
conscious teleology  is  to  be  understood  in  terms  of  implication  and 
meaning.  But  neither  biology  nor  psychology  seem  to  take  adequate 
account  of  the  importance  of  teleology  and  value  for  life.  This  is 
commonly  recognized  by  classing  both  as  sciences  and  contrasting 
science  and  value,  the  latter  being  regarded  as  the  subject  matter  for 
ethics,  esthetics,  etc.  which  are  then  denied  the  title  of  science  in  the 
strict  sense  of  the  word,  though  they  are  sometimes  called  normative 
sciences.  I  am  not  interested  to  discuss  these  distinctions  at  present, 
but  we  may  note  that  teleology  and  value  seem  to  play  a  more  prominent 
part  in  moral  and  religious  life  than  in  physical  and  mental  life.  In 
fact  the  most  significant  aspects  of  our  inner  or  spiritual  life  have  to 
do  directly  with  values  and  ideals.  The  same  may  be  said  of  certain 

8  Cf.  L.  T.  Hobhouse :    Development  and  Purpose,  London,  Macmillan,  1913, 
Pt.  II,  ch.  4,  especially  p.  328. 


VALUES    AND    THE    MORAL    LIFE  45 

aspects  of  our  social  life — national  and  church  life  emphasizing  the  ideal 
aspect,  while  economic  and  business  life  rather  stress  the  practical 
values. 

The  facts  of  use  and  adaptation  seem  to  be  quite  as  natural  as  those 
of  form  and  activity;  square  pegs  do  not  fit  round  holes  and  some 
processes  help  while  others  hinder  one  another.  Thus  things  are 
related  as  means  and  ends  as  naturally  as  they  are  as  cause  and  effect. 
The  fact  that  many  processes  may  be  described  in  either  causal  or 
teleological  terms,  by  no  means  implies  that  the  two  are  the  same  or 
that  one  is  dependent  upon  the  other.  We  have  already  had  occasion 
to  note  that  a  thing  may  belong  to  many  orders  or  conform  to  many 
structures  without  any  confusion  resulting,  so  long  as  distinctions  are 
kept  clear  and  the  terms  appropriate  to  one  are  not  applied  to  another. 
The  moral  here  is  that  means  and  ends  are  not  to  be  confused  with 
causes  and  effects,  as  they  are  descriptive  of  different  types  of  order 
and  only  confusion  results  from  treating  ends  as  a  new  type  of  cause. 
It  is  a  failure  to  recognize  this  that  is  at  the  bottom  of  at  least  a  part 
of  the  confusion  and  misunderstanding  in  the  controversy  between 
mechanism  and  vitalism  and  also  of  much  of  the  ambiguity  in  the 
statements  of  the  latter.  For  discussions  of  teleology  have  generally 
led  to  a  reduction  of  it  to  some  sort  of  mechanism  or  the  ascription 
of  it  to  consciousness  or  mind  often  of  a  sub-  or  super-normal  form: 
that  is  it  has  been  conceived  as  the  result  of  necessity  or  design. 

Now  without  any  attempt  at  explanation,  let  us  try  to  get  before  us 
as  clearly  as  possible  the  exact  meaning  and  implications  of  teleology. 
Though  we  have  seen  that  it  is  variously  expressed  by  such  terms  as 
adaptation,  fitness,  purpose  and  design,  it  is  perhaps  most  clearly  and 
simply  described  in  terms  of  means  and  ends.  Thus  the  teleological 
realm  is  that  in  which  things  are  related  as  means  and  ends.  Such  a 
statement  suggests  the  complexity  of  the  relation  as  well  as  its 
asymmetry.  The  distinction  of  means  and  ends  is  evident  and  is 
apparently  essential  to  any  teleological  order  or  value  situation.  Thus 
means  serve  ends  or  are  valuable  by  reference  to  them,  or  may  be 
regarded  as  fitted  or  adapted  to  bring  them  about.  Here  the  means 
are  often  conceived  as  valuable  or  useful  for  the  end  or  simply  as  good 
by  reference  to  it,  and  thus  the  value  that  we  naturally  regard  as 
characteristic  of  teleology  seems  to  be  ascribed  entirely  to  one  of  the 
terms  of  the  relation  and  the  means  alone  appear  to  be  valuable  while 
the  end  may  be  described  as  invaluable,  as  either  beyond  or  outside  the 
range  of  valuation.  But  this  seems  to  be  a  rather  strange,  not  to  say 
contradictory,  state  of  affairs,  since  it  is  the  ends  that  usually  seem  so 
important  for  any  value  situation  that  they  are  commonly  considered 


46        THE  NATURE  OF  LIFE — A  STUDY  IN   METAPHYSICAL  ANALYSIS 

to  be  goods  or  values.  Would  it  be  better  then  to  attribute  value  to 
both  means  and  ends?  If  we  do,  we  shall  have  to  distinguish  between 
intrinsic  and  extrinsic,  between  immediate  and  instrumental  values,  for 
the  distinction  between  means  and  ends  must  be  maintained  if  there  is 
to  be  any  teleology  and  value.  Under  the  circumstances  may  we  not 
follow  the  lead  suggested  by  our  analysis  of  consciousness  and  conceive 
value  like  mind  as  a  relation  rather  than  as  a  term,  attribute  or  quality  ? 
Sheldon  would  give  an  affirmative  answer  to  this  question  for  he  finds 
"the  same  logical  structure"  in  all  cases  of  value,  namely  "given  any 
tendency,  in  dead  nature,  in  living  organisms,  in  conscious  minds,  which 
presses  toward  a  certain  end:  any  other  tendency  that  furthers  this 
is  for  it  a  good,  and  any  that  resists  it  is  for  it  bad."4  Thus  "  'good' 
is  the  relation  bet^veen  the  fulfilment  (or  furthering)  and  the  tendency; 
a  relation  uniquely  determined,  and  sufficiently  determined,  by  the 
two."5 

Such  a  definition  of  value  in  terms  of  tendency  seems  to  require 
directed  change  and  so  would  be  impossible  in  either  a  static  or  a 
chaotically  changing  world.  In  fact  its  temporal  aspect  can  be  em- 
phasized until  teleology  is  identified  with  any  future  reference  or  even 
with  the  future  portion  of  temporal  structure.  But  however  closely 
teleology  and  temporal  structure  are  related,  they  certainly  are  not 
identical.  The  confusion  of  them  is  apparently  the  result  of  using 
both  as  explanatory  categories  in  the  sense  of  final  causes  that  are 
effective,  probably  through  the  medium  of  consciousness,  in  bringing 
about  action  in  the  present.  Now  temporal  structure  as  we  have  been 
using  it  could  never  be  employed  in  a  causal  sense,  for  it  is  essentially 
an  inert  principle  to  which  existences  conform.  We  have  also  urged 
that  the  distinctions  of  past,  present  and  future  are  the  result  of  our 
practical  interests  and  that  an  adequate  comprehension  of  the  nature  of 
temporal  structure  would  require  a  treatment  of  it  that  would  transcend 
these  distinctions  in  the  same  way  that  geometry  has  that  of  near  and 
far.  This  is  not  to  be  understood  as  a  denial  of  the  close  connection  of 
teleology  and  time  in  all  concrete  cases.  Again  the  relation  seems  to 
be  very  similar  to  that  noted  in  the  case  of  mind  or  consciousness,  for 
there  logical  structure  or  mind  in  a  metaphysical  or  universal  sense 
appeared  to  be  quite  unconnected  with  time,  or  timeless  and  eternal, 
while  particular  meanings  as  they  occur  in  individual  minds  are  very 
evidently  connected  with  the  temporal  structure  that  these  possess. 
Similarly  the  important  aspect  of  teleology  as  descriptive  of  a  new 

4  "An    Empirical    Definition    of    Value,"    Journal    of    Philosophy,    Vol.    XL 
p.  121. 
» Ibid.,  p.  122. 


VALUES    AND    THE    MORAL    LIFE  47 

order  of  being  is  value  or  use,  while  its  temporal  aspect  would  seem  to 
be  ascribable  to  its  concretion  in  particular  instances.  This  is  perhaps 
most  obvious  in  connection  with  conscious  purpose  whose  anticipatory 
aspect  is  so  evident,  for  consciousness  seems  to  make  possible  a  more 
extended  temporal  range. 

It  is  in  this  world  of  values  that  the  moral  life  moves :  it  appears  to 
be  a  realm  of  varying  extent,  which  may  be  nearly  as  wide  as  that  of 
consciousness  while  in  a  sense  it  may  include  certain  aspects  of  the 
unconscious  as  well.  For  though  morality  would  be  impossible  without 
consciousness,  conscious  and  moral  life  are  not  commonly  identified, 
morality  being  more  closely  connected  with  the  teleological  order  of 
things  than  with  their  logical  structure.  Thus  the  values  with  which 
the  moral  life  is  concerned,  are  by  no  means  confined  to  the  mental  or 
intellectual  values  but  include  as  well  "goods  of  the  physical  sort,  such 
as  health,  bodily  comfort,  sensuous  pleasure,"  "the  goods  of  artistic 
appreciation,"  the  goods  of  human  character  and  of  social  life,  such 
as  friendship,  courtesy,  honest}',  peace,  cooperation,  etc.6  In  fact  it 
would  seem  to  be  because  of  the  plurality  of  values  of  varied  types  that 
the  problem  of  ethics  so  often  appears  to  be  the  determination  of  a 
single  summum  bomtm.  For  evidently  it  is  impossible  for  a  single 
life  to  include  all  values  because  of  their  multiplicity  as  well  as  their 
incompatibility,  as  "Professor  James  writes  piquantly:  No  man  can 
be  'a  great  athlete,  and  make  a  million  a  year,  be  a  wit,  bon-vivant,  and 
a  lady-killer,  as  well  as  a  philosopher;  a  philanthropist,  statesman, 
warrior,  and  African  explorer,  as  well  as  a  tone-poet  and  saint';"  and 
"to  each  of  us,  of  all  the  possible  careers — not  remotely  or  hypothetically 
possible,  but  reasonably  available  under  realizable  conditions — one  alone 
becomes  actual."7  Indeed  moral  life  like  physical  life  requires  definite 
organization  and  an  attempt  to  include  all  values  would  be  as  disastrous 
here  as  it  would  be  on  the  physical  plane  for  an  organism  to  try  to 
absorb  everything  that  came  its  way  or  to  develop  into  all  forms  of 
organic  life  at  once.  Organization  requires  selection  and  sacrifice,  the 
psychical  as  well  as  the  animal  organism  must  be  something  definite  to 
be  at  all,  and  like  the  germ  or  embryo  maintains  itself  by  assimilating 
what  favors  its  task.8 

In  other  words  the  moral  life  appears  to  be  a  particular  organization 

6  S.    P.    Lamprecht :       "The    Need    for    a    Pluralistic    Emphasis    in    Ethics," 
Journal  of  Philosophy,  Vol.  XVII,  pp.  562-3. 

7  J.  Jastrow :    The  Qualities  of  Men,  Boston  and  New  York,  Houghton  Mifflin 
Co.,  1910,  p.  65. 

8  Cf.   E.   Gilson :      "Essai   sur  la  vie  interieure,"  Revue  Philosophique,   Vol. 
LXXXIX,  p.  33- 


48        THE  NATURE  OF  LIFE — A  STUDY  IN   METAPHYSICAL  ANALYSIS 

of  values.  Now  the  method  of  this  organization  is  variously  described 
in  terms  of  discrimination  and  integration,  of  selection  and  assimila- 
tion, of  rationalization,  socialization  or  idealization.  However  in  every 
case  they  seem  to  imply  a  process  directed  toward  a  more  or  less 
definitely  conceived  end  and  conforming  to  the  temporal  structure  that 
we  have  everywhere  found  characteristic  of  life.  This  temporal  aspect 
of  the  moral  life  is  of  course  evident  in  discussions  of  moral  progress 
or  development,  and  Dewey  and  Tufts  emphasize  "the  dynamic,  pro- 
gressive character  of  morality"  and  speak  of  the  moral  life  as  "a 
moving  process,  something  still  in  the  making  ;"9  but  it  also  appears  in 
any  adequate  analysis  of  character,  for  it  is  impossible  to  understand 
a  person's  character  without  knowing  both  his  past  experience  and 
training  and  also  his  purposes  and  aims,  for  a  man  is  not  only  what  he 
has  been  but  also  what  he  is  going  to  be.  As  a  seed  is  at  once  the 
result  of  the  past  and  the  possibility  of  the  future,  holding  in  suspen- 
sion as  it  were  its  potential  growth,  so  moral  character  may  be  said 
both  to  concentrate  the  results  of  its  past  and  to  hold  in  suspension  the 
potentialities  and  possibilities  of  its  future.  As  I  have  suggested  be- 
fore, such  descriptions  of  the  temporal  structure  of  life  seem  to  me 
unsatisfactory,  since  they  attempt  to  compress  the  past  and  the  future 
into  the  present.  Now  I  think  our  examination  of  life  has  shown  the 
inadequacy  of  such  a  conception  of  temporal  structure,  though  we  have 
not  yet  found  the  exact  terms  in  which  to  describe  it.  However  we 
see  again  that  life  is  no  instantaneous  or  momentary  affair,  for  moral 
life  requires  both  duration  and  direction. 

This  brings  us  to  the  teleological  aspect  of  the  moral  life  itself  in 
contrast  to  that  of  its  domain:  for  the  moral  life  appears  to  be  teleo- 
logical in  two  ways.  As  we  have  already  seen  it  moves  in  the  realm 
of  values  or  goods,  or  of  means  and  ends ;  in  this  sense  it  is  related  to 
teleology  or  value  much  as  mental  life  is  to  logical  structure  or  mean- 
ing. But,  further,  the  organization  of  the  moral  life  is  teleological  in 
the  same  sense  as  are  the  other  types  of  life  that  we  have  examined. 
That  is,  moral  as  well  as  physical  growth  or  development  is  progres- 
sive and  in  specific  directions.  Just  what  its  aim  or  end  is  or  should 
be  has  been  the  concern  of  many  ethical  theories,  which  have  variously 
described  it  as  happiness,  pleasure,  self-realization,  self-sacrifice,  etc., 
and  unsatisfactory  and  contradictory  as  these  may  appear,  they  agree 
in  pointing  to  the  need  of  a  definite  plan  of  action,  guiding  principle 
or  life  purpose.  The  difficulty  with  them  seems  to  be  in  part  at  least 
due  to  their  failure  to  recognize  the  need  of  specific  plans  for  indi- 
viduals, for  they  tend  to  insist  upon  a  general  formula  for  all  cases, 

»  Ethics,  New  York,  Holt,  1908,  p.  4. 


VALUES    AND    THE    MORAL    LIFE  49 

something  as  though  one  should  try  to  make  all  biological  organisms 
conform  to  a  single  type.  That  is,  I  think  that  ethical  theory  should 
recognize  a  greater  variety  of  forms  of  moral  life.  On  the  other  hand 
an  ethics  that  would  explain  moral  life  wholly  in  terms  of  the  in- 
tegration of  experience  and  deny  all  reference  to  ends,  in  avoiding  the 
abstractions  of  the  opposite  type,  would  appear  to  be  self-contradictory 
if  its  denial  of  the  teleological  aspect  of  the  moral  life  were  taken  too 
literally  and  uncritically.  Thus  though  Holt  scorns  an  ethics  of  ends, 
his  quarrel  is  with  final  causes  as  motive  forces,  while  his  and  Freud's 
"wishes"  are  evidently  both  temporal  and  teleological  and  the  integrative 
process  that  he  so  warmly  advocates  as  the  formula  for  this  ethics 
"from  below"  must  possess  at  least  as  much  temporal  structure  and 
teleological  reference  as  does  organic  growth.10 

Thus  the  moral  life  seems  to  possess  the  same  fundamental  features 
that  we  have  found  to  be  characteristic  of  the  other  forms  of  life  that 
we  have  so  far  examined — for  like  biological  and  conscious  life  it  is 
to  be  defined  in  terms  of  an  organization  that  conforms  to  a  definite 
temporal  structure  and  possesses  a  teleological  reference.  Its  continuity 
with  these  other  forms  of  life  is  evident  and  is  especially  stressed  by 
such  writers  as  Holt  and  Gilson,  who  emphasize  the  importance  of 
reflexes  and  impulses  as  the  basis  of  the  higher  forms  of  action,  and 
evidently  without  behavior  conduct  would  be  impossible  as  we  could 
hardly  be  moral  agents  if  we  were  not  capable  of  action.  Morality 
also  requires  consciousness  as  well  as  sentiency,  for  as  is  commonly 
recognized  an  action  to  be  moral  must  be  voluntary  and  that  implies 
knowledge  on  the  part  of  the  agent  as  well  as  the  power  to  act. 

The  relation  between  intelligence  and  morality  has  been  variously 
construed  from  that  of  identity  to  that  of  opposition.  Erskine  has 
pointed  out  the  Anglo-Saxon  distrust  of  intelligence  and  glorification 
of  will  and  character,11  while  Holt  on  the  other  hand  would  agree 
with  Socrates  that  wisdom  and  virtue  are  one.12  The  fact  of  the  case 
would  seem  to  be  that  the  relation  of  mind  and  morality  varies  some- 
what with  the  circumstances  and  especially  with  the  connection  of 
morality  with  custom  and  social  tradition.  Thus  society  may  extol  the 
good  or  brave  fool  in  contrast  with  the  brilliant  knave  and  point  out 
that  there  is  no  necessary  connection  between  morality  and  intelligence. 
On  the  other  hand,  if  the  individual  attempts  to  go  beyond  mere  com- 
formity  to  tradition  and  custom  and  to  be  truly  or  rationally  moral 
rather  than  merely  conventional,  intelligence  appears  to  be  essential. 

10  The  Freudian  Wish  and  Its  Place  in  Ethics,  New  York,  Holt,  1915. 

11  The  Moral  Obligation  to  be  Intelligent,  New  York,  Duffield,  1916,  pp.  4  ff. 

12  Loc.  cit.,  pp.  138-140. 


5O        THE  NATURE  OF  LIFE A  STUDY  IN   METAPHYSICAL  ANALYSIS 

Consciousness  and  some  slight  degree  of  intelligence  would  seem  to 
be  required  for  morality,  but  beyond  that  it  appears  possible  for  mental 
and  moral  life  to  develop  independently,  as  is  not  surprising  if  the 
teleological  order  of  things  is  not  identical  with  their  logical  structure. 
Thus  some  of  the  best  things  of  life  do  not  appear  to  be  the  result  of 
our  conscious  efforts,  and  beautiful  characters  may  develop  who  do 
not  seem  to  be  conscious  of  their  dominant  aims,  showing  that  some 
of  the  higher  as  well  as  the  lower  forms  of  teleology  may  be  uncon- 
scious. I  do  not  wish  to  minimize  the  importance  or  value  of  intelli- 
gence but  rather  to  suggest  that  there  appears  to  be  a  difference,  though 
no  discontinuity,  between  mental  and  moral  life  and  further  that  the 
difference  seems  to  be  expressible  in  terms  of  the  domains  in  which 
they  occur. 


CHAPTER  VI 

LIFE    AND    SOCIETY 

What  may  be  called  social  or  group  life  has  two  quite  different 
though  closely  related  phases,  the  life  of  the  individual  in  society  and 
the  life  of  the  community  itself.  In  the  first  case  the  adjectives  appear 
to  describe  the  type  of  environment  in  which  the  individual  life  is 
carried  on;  thus  we  speak  of  the  military,  political  or  business  life  of 
individuals,  contrast  a  man's  family  life  with  his  public  life  and  com- 
pare the  advantages  of  village  and  city  life.  On  the  other  hand  the 
life  of  a  group  appears  to  be  something  quite  different  from  the  life 
of  any  or  all  of  its  members.  The  life  of  a  nation  or  tribe  may  extend 
over  centuries  and  wide  areas  as  is  perhaps  even  more  evident  in  the 
life  of  a  church  such  as  the  Roman  Catholic.  The  same  of  course 
applies  in  lesser  degree  to  smaller  groups,  such  as  the  family,  clan, 
business  and  political  associations,  clubs,  colleges,  armies,  special  regi- 
ments, etc.  College  life  may  thus  mean  either  the  life  of  an  individual 
in  a  special  type  of  environment  or  the  continued  life  of  the  college 
itself. 

Fortunately  for  our  present  purpose  it  will  not  be  necessary,  I  think, 
to  decide  the  question  whether  any  or  all  these  groups  are  persons  or 
superindividuals,  and  whether  there  is  a  group  consciousness  over  and 
above  the  consciousness  of  the  individuals  that  compose  the  group. 
For  all  these  problems  arise  mainly  in  attempts  at  explanation.  The 
difficulties  in  dealing  with  them  appear  to  me  to  be  considerably  in- 
creased by  confusions  in  the  concept  of  consciousness  and  by  the 
tendency  to  identify  it  with  life.  Now  as  we  have  so  often  pointed 
out,  our  present  aim  is  not  explanation,  but  analysis  and  definition, 
so  that  we  are  concerned  only  with  the  facts  of  the  matter,  and  nations 
and  other  groups  appear  quite  definitely  to  live  as  well  as  sometimes 
to  die,  whether  or  not  they  are  conscious  persons.  This  is  hardly 
surprising ;  as  life  does  not  seem  to  be  identical  with  or  even  dependent 
upon  consciousness.  It  should  therefore  be  possible  to  examine  social 
life  without  being  drawn  into  the  present  controversies  as  to  the  nature 
of  the  community.1 

Before  going  further  I  may  point  out  that  I  do  not  wish  to  confine 

1  Such  for  example  as  those  discussed  by  the  American  Philosophical  Asso- 
ciation in  1919.  For  a  preliminary  presentation  see  the  Philosophical  Review, 
Vol.  XXVIII,  pp.  547-597- 


52        THE  NATURE  OF  LIFE A  STUDY  IN   METAPHYSICAL  ANALYSIS 

our  discussion  of  social  life  to  any  one  of  its  forms,  but  rather  so  far 
as  possible  to  include  them  all.  As  our  discussion  of  biological  life 
included  animal  and  vegetable,  unicellular  and  multicellular  organisms 
of  all  sorts,  so  in  considering  collective  life  we  are  to  keep  in  mind  its 
many  varieties,  and  society  and  similar  words  will  be  used  in  a  very 
broad  sense  to  cover  such  various  types  of  communities  as  clans, 
tribes,  nations,  clubs,  colleges,  business  associations,  industrial  organiza- 
tions, political  groups,  churches,  armies,  etc.,  etc. — a  varied  array  cer- 
tainly, but  hardly  more  heterogeneous  than  the  multiplicity  of  organic 
forms  with  which  biology  deals. 

If  now  we  look  for  the  characteristic  features  of  such  groups,  we 
find  that  they  all  possess  a  certain  amount  of  organization,  which 
evidently  varies  a  good  deal  in  the  different  cases.  In  fact  societies 
are  often  classified  according  to  the  complexity  of  their  structure  and 
the  degree  of  their  organization,  which  is  often  described  in  terms  of 
differentiation  and  integration.  Thus  the  more  complex  and  higher 
forms  of  society  show  a  greater  differentiation  of  parts  and  specializa- 
tion in  the  functions  of  their  members  or  component  groups,  together 
with  a  more  perfect  and  complete  organization  or  integration  of  these. 
A  well  organized  army  or  business  perhaps  illustrates  this  even  more 
clearly  than  the  modern  state,  though  Plato's  Republic  has  made  it 
familiar  in  connection  with  the  ancient  city-state,  as  well  as  the  simi- 
larity between  society  and  an  animal  organism.  This  comparison  is 
frequently  expressed  by  describing  the  state  or  society  in  terms  of 
organic  unity,  which  may  then  be  contrasted  with  physical  or  mechanical 
unity  and  perhaps  with  chemical  unity  and  the  differences  between  them 
explained  by  reference  to  the  relative  importance  of  the  parts  and  the 
whole.2  However  suggestive  this  may  be  for  some  purposes,  our 
failure  in  an  earlier  chapter  to  distinguish  biological  organisms  from 
other  objects  in  their  environment  in  terms  of  their  physical  and 
chemical  structure,  and  the  discovery  that  their  peculiar  organization  is 
due  rather  to  their  temporal  structure,  suggest  the  probable  futility  ot 
trying  to  understand  social  organization  and  life  without  taking  into 
consideration  its  temporal  structure.  McDougall  apparently  recognizes 
this  when  he  remarks  that  "society  consists  of  the  dead  as  well  as  of  the 
living  and  the  part  of  the  living  in  determining  its  life  is  but  insignifi- 
cant as  compared  with  the  part  of  the  dead."3  This  is  particularly 
evident  in  the  case  of  nations,  of  the  Catholic  Church,  of  tribes  and 
families  that  preserve  their  traditions  for  generations,  and  to  a  lesser 
extent  of  colleges  and  universities.  That  the  future  as  well  as  the 

2Cf.   J.    S.    Mackenzie:      An   Introduction    to    Social   Philosophy,   Glasgow. 
MacLehose,  1890,  Chapter  III,  p.  129. 
3  The  Group  Mind,  New  York  and  London,  Putnam,  1920,  p.  8. 


LIFE    AND    SOCIETY  53 

past  is  important  for  social  life  is  emphasized  by  Royce  in  his  dis- 
cussion of  the  nature  of  communities  and  in  his  distinction  between 
communities  of  memory  and  of  hope.4  In  other  words  the  organization 
of  society  at  any  time  can  not  be  adequately  understood  without  refer- 
ence to  its  temporal  structure.  In  this  the  life  of  nations  and  other 
groups  resembles  the  other  forms  of  life  that  we  have  already  studied. 
The  great  range  and  extent  of  the  temporal  structure  of  life  becomes 
particularly  evident  in  this  connection,  since  some  forms  of  social  life 
cover  centuries,  as  is  evident  in  the  growth  of  traditions,  customs, 
languages  and  institutions.  In  voluntary  or  purposive  groups,  the 
future  aspect  of  their  temporal  structure  is  more  evident  as  is  also  their 
teleological  nature,  since  they  are  commonly  formed  to  bring  about 
certain  definite  ends  as  in  the  case  of  charitable  associations  as  well 
as  business  and  industrial  organizations.  But  most  groups  have  both 
a  historical  and  a  purposive  aspect  and  indeed  both  appear  to  be  im- 
portant for  any  adequate  community  life.  Royce  in  his  discussion  of 
the  early  Christian  church  emphasizes  its  need  of  a  past  as  well  as  a 
future  reference,  and  in  fact  his  whole  discussion  of  the  community 
shows  its  essentially  temporal  nature.5  The  importance  of  both  the 
traditional  and  purposive  features  of  group  life  are  also  very  evident 
in  the  life  of  a  college6  or  an  army7  and  their  traditions  are  often  con- 
sciously and  carefully  cultivated. 

The  teleological  aspect  of  definitely  purposive  groups  is  of  course 
evident,  but  it  seems  to  be  present  in  other  cases  as  well.  For,  as  we 
have  already  seen,  natural  teleology  is  not  to  be  identified  with  con- 
scious purpose  and  in  fact  is  not  dependent  upon  consciousness.  Thus 
we  saw  that  biological  life  has  a  certain  teleological  aspect  and  many 
natural  societies  seem  to  be  teleological  in  very  much  the  same  way. 
This  appears  to  be  closely  connected  with  the  direction  of  their  temporal 
structure,  and  to  be  more  correctly  described  in  terms  of  means  and 
ends  or  the  helping  and  hindering  of  tendencies  than  in  terms  of  con- 
scious forethought  and  planning.  In  fact  the  teleology  exhibited  in 
the  life  of  communities  may  be  either  conscious  or  unconscious. 

The  close  interdependence  of  individuals  and  society  especially  in 
its  more  fundamental  forms  is  quite  evident,  for  "we  can  understand 
the  life  of  individuals  and  the  life  of  societies  only  if  we  always  con- 
sider them  in  relation  to  one  another."8  Groups  of  all  sorts  obviously 
depend  for  their  existence  upon  that  of  individuals,  while  individuals 

*  The  Problem  of  Christianity,  New  York,  Macmillan,  1913,  Vol.  II,  pp.  35-53- 
3  Ibid.,  pp.  35-39- 

6  Cf.  McDougall :    Loc.  cit.,  p.  129. 

7  Cf.  Ibid.,  p.  71. 

8  Ibid.,  p.  8. 


54        THE  NATURE  OF  LIFE A  STUDY  IN    METAPHYSICAL  ANALYSIS 

in  turn  owe  a  great  deal  to  the  communities  in  which  they  live.  '  'In 
fact,  what  we  call  an  individual  man  is  what  he  is  because  of  and  by 
virtue  of  community,  and  communities  are  not  mere  names,  but  some- 
thing real.'  Already  at  birth  the  child  is  what  he  is  in  virtue  of  com- 
munities: he  has  something  of  the  family  character,  something  of  the 
national  character,  something  of  the  civilized  character  which  comes 
from  human  society.  As  he  grows,  the  community  in  which  he  lives 
pours  itself  into  his  being  in  the  language  he  learns  and  the  social 
atmosphere  he  breathes,  so  that  the  content  of  his  being  implies  in  its 
every  fibre  relations  of  community."9  In  fact  without  the  family, 
state  and  some  sort  of  educational  and  religious  organizations,  the  life 
of  the  individual  would  indeed  be  "solitary,  poor,  nasty,  brutish  and 
short,"  for  "in  such  condition,  there  is  no  place  for  industry,  because 
the  fruit  thereof  is  uncertain;  and  consequently  no  culture  of  the 
earth;  no  navigation,  nor  use  of  commodities  that  may  be  imported  by 
sea;  no  commodious  buildings;  no  instruments  of  moving,  and  remov- 
ing such  things  as  require  much  force;  no  knowledge  of  the  face  of 
the  earth;  no  account  of  time;  no  arts;  no  letters;  no  society;  and 
which  is  worst  of  all,  continual  fear,  and  danger  of  violent  death."10 
Not  of  course  that  such  a  state  of  affairs  ever  existed,  but  it  may 
serve  to  indicate  how  much  individuals  owe  to  society. 

The  hereditary  group  is  evidently  based  on  the  fact  of  biological 
inheritance  and  emphasizes  and  extends  the  dependence  of  the  indi- 
vidual upon  earlier  forms  of  life.  This  has  its  importance  for  mental 
as  well  as  physical  life  as  is  evident  in  the  great  importance  of  educa- 
tion, by  which  the  accumulated  knowledge  and  customs  of  the  group 
are  passed  on  to  the  individual.  A  "man  without  a  fellow"  thus  seems 
almost  as  impossible  as  a  man  without  an  ancestor,  and  it  has  often 
been  pointed  out  of  late  that  the  development  of  self-consciousness  is 
probably  due  to  comparison  and  contrast  with  our  fellows,  since  it  is 
through  their  attitudes  toward  us  and  ours  toward  them  that  we  come 
to  know  both  them  and  ourselves.11  McDougall  evidently  has  the  same 
point  in  mind  when  he  emphasizes  the  need  of  contrasting  and  rival 
groups  for  the  full  development  of  the  "group  mind."12 

It  is  hardly  necessary  to  point  out  that  at  the  present  stage  of 
civilization  human  individuals  depend  upon  their  social  environment 
not  only  for  most  of  the  necessities  of  life  but  also  for  many  of  its 

»E.  Barker:  Political  Thought  in  England  from  Herbert  Spencer  to  the 
Present  Day,  New  York,  Holt  (Home  University  Library,  No.  98),  pp.  62,  63. 

10  T.  Hobbes :    Leviathan,  Part  I,  chapter  13. 

11  Cf.  J.  Royce:    Loc.  cit.,  Vol.  I,  pp.  129  ff.     Also  E.  A.  Singer,  Jr.:     "Man 
and  Fellow-Man,"  Journal  of  Philosophy,  Vol.  X,  pp.  141  ff. 

12L0C.  cit.,  pp.  226  ff. 


LIFE   AND    SOCIETY  55 

values  and  ideals.  This  is  so  true  of  the  moral  life  that  discussions 
of  primitive  morals  consist  largely  in  a  description  of  primitive  social 
customs  and  institutions,  and  in  fact  much  of  the  importance  and 
significance  of  moral  life  is  due  to  its  social  setting,  for  many  of  the 
virtues  would  be  impossible  or  meaningless  unless  men  lived  and 
worked  together  and  without  social  relationships  human  life  would  be 
poor  indeed,  for  friendship  and  love  as  well  as  rivalry  and  com- 
petition would  be  gone.  The  religious  life  also  has  quite  definitely 
social  aspects  and  discussions  of  primitive  religions  as  of  primitive 
morals,  not  only  emphasize  these  but  seem  to  make  religion  wholly  a 
social  affair.  With  the  more  developed  forms,  it  is  common  to  dis- 
tinguish between  the  religious  experience  of  individuals  such  as  James 
describes  in  his  Varieties  of  Religious  Experience  and  the  social  aspect 
of  religion  as  expressed  in  organized  churches.  We  shall  consider 
the  religious  life  as  a  form  of  the  spiritual  life  in  the  next  chapter, 
but  we  may  here  note  not  only  that  churches  such  as  the  Roman 
Catholic  evidently  possess  a  type  of  life  very  similar  to  that  of  nations 
and  states,  but  also  that  most  forms  of  religion  have  a  social  as  well 
as  a  personal  aspect.  Thus  again  is  the  continuity  of  the  different 
forms  of  life  brought  to  our  attention.  Though  society  may  be  con- 
ceived as  an  ideal  we  have  not  attempted  to  discuss  it  here  as  such 
but  have  left  such  a  consideration  of  it  for  the  next  chapter  and  have 
confined  ourselves  in  the  present  one  to  an  examination  of  society  or 
rather  of  a  multitude  of  different  types  of  groups  and  associations  as 
facts  and  have  simply  inquired  into  the  nature  of  social  life  as  it 
exists. 

Our  discussion  of  social  life,  both  as  the  life  of  society  and  as  that 
of  the  individual  in  society,  has  shown  the  same  fundamental  features 
to  be  characteristic  of  these  types  of  life  as  we  have  previously  found 
in  the  case  of  the  other  forms  of  life  that  we  have  examined.  AH 
forms  of  group  life  were  found  to  possess  some  definite  organization, 
however  much  this  might  vary  in  different  cases,  and  it  was  further 
discovered  that  this  organization  could  be  understood  only  in  connection 
with  its  temporal  structure  and  teleological  reference.  Here  we  found 
the  temporal  aspect  of  life  particularly  prominent,  as  the  growth  of 
customs  and  language  as  well  as  the  importance  of  history  showed  the 
great  extent  and  range  that  its  temporal  structure  must  cover.  In  the 
case  of  the  individual  this  was  especially  emphasized  by  the  importance 
of  education.  On  the  other  hand  the  teleological  aspect  of  life  is  less 
obvious  here  than  in  the  moral  life  and  appeared  to  resemble  in  some 
cases  that  found  on  the  biological  plane,  being  frequently  unconscious, 
though  of  course  with  some  types  of  association  it  becomes  more 
evident  and  deliberate. 


CHAPTER  VII 

IDEALS  AND  THE   SPIRITUAL   LIFE 

So  far  we  have  been  concerned  with  what  might  be  termed  the 
various  forms  of  natural  life,  though  in  the  last  chapters  especially 
our  attention  has  been  directed  to  certain  ideals  toward  which  some 
aspects  of  life  seem  to  point.  I  therefore  propose  now  to  examine  life 
as  it  appears  in  connection  with  these  ideals.  The  moral  life  can  be 
considered  from  this  angle,  e.g.  when  it  appears  as  the  worship  of  an 
absolute  good;  and  perhaps  the  categorical  imperative  belongs  here  as 
well,  as  it  seems  out  of  place  in  the  naturalistic  ethics  that  we  discussed 
in  a  preceding  chapter.  However  that  may  be,  it  is  quite  possible  tu 
conceive  the  ends  or  aims  of  the  moral  life  in  ideal  terms,  and  simi- 
larly society  or  humanity  may  appear  to  be  an  ideal  rather  than  a 
fact.  Thus  though  the  religious  life  perhaps  stands  out  as  preeminently 
connected  with  the  ideal,  the  true  or  the  beautiful  may  sometimes  take 
the  place  assigned  by  religion  to  God,  and  the  intellectual  or  contem- 
plative life  and  the  esthetic  or  artistic  life  appear  as  aspects  of  the 
spiritual  life. 

Our  discussion  of  the  spiritual  life  will  thus  have  to  be  very  general 
and  confined  to  an  examination  of  its  fundamental  characteristics  with- 
out any  attempt  at  exposition  or  evaluation  of  its  many  forms.  For 
we  are  not  here  so  much  concerned  with  special  philosophies  of  life 
or  the  various  answers  that  have  been  given  to  the  question  of  its  mean- 
ing and  value,  as  we  are  to  get  clearly  before  us  the  subject  matter 
with  which  these  theories  deal.  For  as  I  have  had  occasion  to  point 
out  before,  I  am  not  attempting  to  explain  or  evaluate  life,  but  simply 
to  examine  some  of  its  forms  with  the  hope  of  discovering  its  nature. 
Thus  the  aim  of  the  present  chapter  is  limited  to  a  portrayal  of  the 
characteristics  of  the  spiritual  or  inner  life  and  our  interest  in  the  many 
interpretations  of  it  is  quite  secondary  and  entirely  limited  to  what 
light  they  can  throw  upon  its  nature.  Though  most  of  the  discussions 
of  this  form  of  life  are  primarily  concerned  with  an  interpretation  or 
evaluatibn  of  it,  I  hope  nevertheless  that  it  will  be  possible  to  make 
clear  the  subject  matter  itself  and  so  get  before  us  a  picture  of  life 
at  this  level  as  well  as  at  the  others  that  we  have  considered  in  the 
preceding  chapters. 

As  has  been  suggested  already,  I  intend  to  deal  with  a  great  variety 
of  related  forms  of  life.  The  inner  life  is  commonly  recognized  to 


IDEALS  AND  THE  SPIRITUAL   LIFE  57 

possess  several  aspects:  Gilson  names  the  intellectual,  esthetic,  moral 
and  religious,  and  Santayana  discusses  the  Life  of  Reason  in  society, 
religion,  art  and  science  as  well  as  common  sense.  The  religious  life 
appears  in  many  forms  such  as  the  ascetic  and  saintly,  the  mystic  and 
unitive  lives,  and  also  as  a  life  of  love,  faith,  loyalty  or  piety,  and  the 
various  religions  and  sects  each  offer  their  theories  of  life  and  try 
to  lead  their  disciples  to  a  fuller,  richer,  better  or  more  abundant  life. 
We  are  thus  concerned  with  many  forms  of  what  may  be  called  in 
general  personal  life  or  the  life  of  the  spirit.  Certain  aspects  of  this 
have  been  touched  upon  in  the  preceding  chapters:  we  have  had 
occasion  to  note  the  social  aspects  of  the  religious  life  in  particular, 
while  the  close  connection  between  moral  and  spiritual  life  is  too 
evident  to  require  comment.  This  serves  to  show  again  the  continuity 
of  life  in  its  various  forms  despite  the  obvious  differences  in  the  realms 
in  which  it  moves. 

As  the  religious  life  is  the  most  commonly  recognized  and  discussed 
form  of  the  spiritual  life,  we  may  well  begin  our  examination  with  it. 
However  much  religions  may  differ  in  many  respects,  they  agree  in 
giving  us  "another  world  to  live  in."  How  this  other  world  is  con- 
ceived, of  course,  varies  greatly  with  different  religions  and  might 
to  a  large  extent  be  used  to  differentiate  them.  But  however  that  may 
be,  the  spiritual  life  appears  to  move  in  a  realm  very  different  from 
those  in  which  we  found  the  types  of  life  already  examined.  Just 
how  this  new  world  is  to  be  defined  seems  far  from  clear,  and  it  is 
not  my  present  aim  to  defend  any  particular  conception  of  it,  for  it 
is  life  and  not  spirit  that  we  are  considering.  We  may  content  our- 
selves therefore  with  saying  that  the  religious  life  moves  in  a  spiritual 
realm,  while  the  various  forms  of  worship,  sacrifice  and  prayer  help 
one  to  maintain  or  regain  contact  with  it.  Naturally  most  of  the  in- 
terest in  discussions  of  religious  life  have  thus  turned  upon  the  nature 
of  God  and  spirit,  of  the  joys  of  living  in  this  wonderful  world  and 
of  the  means  of  reaching  it.  Religious  life  as  the  saintly  or  ascetic 
or  mystic  life,  and  even  more  in  its  aspects  of  the  future  or  eternal 
life,  may  thus  come  to  be  regarded  as  moving  in  a  realm  quite  apart. 
But  in  its  more  common  forms  religious  life  is  clearly  continuous  with 
the  other  types  of  personal  life.  Gilson  can  thus  refer  to  religion  as 
the  superior  hygiene  of  personality1  and  call  it  the  maker  of  men  or 
producer  of  personalities.2  So  conceived  religion  gives  meaning  and 
value  to  life.  It  furnishes  the  individual  with  a  pretty  coherent  view 
of  the  world  and  an  idea  of  what  his  life  in  it  should  be.  In  Santayana's 

1  "Essai  stir  la  vie  interieur,"  Revue  Philosophique,  Vol.  LXXXIX,  p.  52. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  55. 


58        THE  NATUKE  OF  LIFE A  STUDY  IN   METAPHYSICAL  ANALYSIS 

words  it  gives  him  spiritual  nationality,3  and  defines  the  meaning  of 
life  for  him  so  that  Gilson  says  that  to  deprive  a  man  of  his  religion  in 
order  to  set  him  free  is  like  freeing  an  animal  of  its  skeleton  and 
nervous  system.4  Or  more  baldly  put,  our  personal  life  as  well  as  our 
physical  life  must  have  specific  form,  for  in  Gilson's  words,  to  be 
is  to  be  determinate.5 

Though  the  religious  life  may  be  regarded  as  the  most  complete  and 
perfect  form  of  the  spiritual  or  inner  life,  other  forms  are  to  be  con- 
sidered as  well.  Gilson  emphasizes  the  esthetic  and  moral  aspects  and 
in  a  different  category  the  intellectual.  These  evidently  have  close 
connections  with  the  types  of  life  that  we  have  examined  in  the 
preceding  chapters.  Sentient  life  may  be  regarded  as  the  natural  basis 
of  the  esthetic  and  artistic  life ;  thus  Gilson  calls  art  a  hygiene  of  sen- 
sibility,6 and  emotion  as  well  as  sensation  appears  to  be  essential  for 
both  artistic  creation  and  esthetic  appreciation.  Thus  Noyes  says, 
"a  work  of  art  is  the  statement  of  the  artist's  insight  into  nature, 
moulded  and  suffused  by  the  emotion  attending  his  perception,"7  and 
"it  is  not  thought  that  constitutes  appreciation;  it  is  emotion."8  But 
the  artistic  and  the  esthetic  life  are  evidently  not  identical  with  sentient 
and  emotional  life,  for  the  latter  in  many  cases  appears  unconnected 
with  art,  while  in  all  art  we  go  beyond  mere  sensation  and  emotion. 
For  art  requires  and  expresses  a  special  type  of  selection  and  organiza- 
tion of  elements  not  peculiar  to  it.  Thus  both  sentient  and  esthetic 
life  in  a  sense  move  in  a  world  of  sense  qualities,  but  they  perceive 
objects  with  such  different  interests  that  art  appears  to  transform 
this  world.  The  difference  may  be  most  briefly  indicated  by  referring 
it  to  beauty,  thus  suggesting  the  importance  of  the  ideal  for  the  esthetic 
life.  Or  more  concretely,  sentient  and  emotional  life  views  its  world 
quite  naturally  in  relation  to  itself,  while  for  artistic  and  esthetic  life 
the  same  world  is  significant  only  because  of  its  inner  meaning  and 
harmony.  Perhaps  this  difference  is  more  commonly  stated  by  regard- 
ing the  one  as  a  bodily  and  the  other  as  a  spiritual  function  or  activity. 
This  may  be  a  very  suggestive  and  satisfactory  mode  of  statement 
if  it  is  not  understood,  as  is  sometimes  the  case,  as  implying  the  dis- 
continuity of  these  forms  of  life. 

A  very  similar  connection  may  be  noted  between  conscious  or  mental 

3  The  Life  of  Reason,  New  York,  Scribner's,  1916,  Vol.  Ill,  p.  5. 
*  Loc.  cit.,  p.  54. 

5  Ibid.,  p.  42. 

6  Ibid.,  p.  50. 

7  The  Gate  of  Appreciation,  Boston,  Houghton  Mifflin  Co.,  1907,  p.  241. 

8  Ibid.,  p.  35. 


IDEALS  AND  THE  SPIRITUAL  LIFE  59 

life  as  it  was  discussed  in  Chapter  IV  and  what  may  be  termed  intel- 
lectual or  speculative  life.  Both  evidently  move  in  the  domain  of 
logical  structure,  while  differing  considerably  in  their  attitude  toward 
it.  Thus  one  may  come  to  worship  and  serve  truth  in  a  truly  religious 
fashion  as  did  the  hunter  in  Olive  Schreiner's  dream,  or  he  may  be 
rather  polytheistic  in  his  intellectual  devotion  and  recognize  many 
forms  of  truth;  but  in  any  case  the  ardent  seeker  for  truth,  whether 
monistically  or  pluralistically  conceived,  seems  to  be  living  in  a  world 
quite  different  from  that  described  in  connection  with  conscious  life, 
and  here  again  the  difference  seems  to  be  expressible  only  by  reference 
to  the  ideal. 

In  like  manner  the  good  may  be  conceived  as  an  ideal  rather  than 
a  fact,  and  thus  be  treated  religiously  rather  than  morally.  The  dis- 
tinction here  is  probably  less  generally  and  clearly  recognized  than  in 
the  two  previous  cases,  for  the  division  here  may  be  regarded  as  com- 
ing within  the  moral  life  rather  than  in  the  contrast  between  the 
moral  and  religious  aspects  of  the  inner  life.  But  in  whatever  terms 
it  is  expressed  and  whether  values  and  ideals  be  identified  or  contrasted, 
there  seem  to  be  two  very  different  attitudes  toward  them.  If  value 
is  defined  as  in  the  preceding  chapters  in  terms  of  use  and  tendency, 
then  ideals  seem  to  take  us  into  a  new  realm  or  dimension  of  being, 
which  of  course  is  sometimes  described  in  terms  of  value  and  may 
then  be  contrasted  with  its  more  practical  aspects.  In  other  words 
the  ideals  that  we  are  now  considering  appear  to  be  quite  different 
from  the  type  of  value  that  we  have  elsewhere  discussed  in  terms  of 
means  and  ends.  For  one  thing  those  values  were  to  be  used  and 
employed,  while  ideals  appear  rather  as  the  objects  of  love  and  service. 

Among  these  ideals  God  and  society  may  also  be  included.  Of 
course  both  may  be  treated  as  facts  as  well  and  we  have  attempted  to 
present  such  a  discussion  of  society.  But  that  it  may  be  an  ideal  also 
is  shown,  I  think,  by  the  fact  that  it  may  be  treated  as  an  object  of 
religious  devotion  and  as  such  served.  Thus  Comte  tried  to  institute 
a  religion  of  humanity;  and  in  some  of  our  churches  to-day  social 
service  of  one  sort  or  another  seems  to  take  the  place  of  what  was 
once  regarded  as  the  truly  religious  office  of  the  church.  Royce's 
emphasis  upon  the  "beloved  community"  in  his  discussion  of  the 
Problem  of  Christianity  may  be  regarded  as  an  attempt  to  interpret 
the  present  social  interest  of  religion  in  terms  of  Christian  dogma  and 
he  certainly  treats  the  community  as  an  object  for  loyalty  and  devotion 
in  a  quite  religious  fashion.  Similarly  God  may  be  conceived  as  an 
ideal  rather  than  as  a  natural  fact,  but  the  God  that  means  the  ideal 
of  life  is  not  to  be  identified  with  the  God  which  means  the  forces  of 


60        THE  NATURE  OF  LIFE A  STUDY  IN   METAPHYSICAL  ANALYSIS 

nature.9  The  opposition  that  the  former  conception  often  arouses  is 
due  I  think  to  a  feeling  that  ideals  are  less  real  than  facts  or  that  they 
are  merely  subjective.  Would  any  one  object  to  God  being  called 
ideal  in  the  Platonic  sense?  For  is  not  this  just  the  way  that  he  is 
most  adequately  conceived?  And  in  this  sense  are  not  ideals  more 
truly  real  than  anything  else?  In  such  a  discussion  real  is  apparently 
a  value  rather  than  an  existential  category.  But  we  are  not  at  present 
undertaking  to  defend  any  particular  theory  of  the  nature  of  ideals, 
but  rather  to  examine  the  spiritual  life  as  it  is  lived  in  their  presence. 

For  as  sentient  life  moved  in  a  world  of  sense  qualities,  mental  life 
in  one  of  meaning  and  implication,  and  moral  life  in  one  of  means  ami 
ends,  so  the  spiritual  life  is  lived  in  the  presence  of  ideals.  Life  thus 
comes  to  move  in  a  world  where  things  are  beautiful  as  well  as  pleasant 
and  useful ;  truth  may  be  loved  and  sought  for  its  own  sake  and  society 
be  an  ideal  to  be  served  as  well  as  an  environment  in  which  one  lives. 
In  other  words  the  world  possesses  an  ideal  dimension  and  it  seems  to 
be  on  this  plane  that  our  spiritual  life  occurs,  for  in  Santayana's  words 
"man  is  spiritual  when  he  lives  in  the  presence  of  the  ideal."10 

Before  proceeding  to  a  more  direct  analysis  of  the  spiritual  life  it 
may  be  well  to  pause  for  a  brief  parenthesis  on  the  domains  or  planes 
of  being  to  which  reference  has  been  so  frequently  made.  The  com- 
parison with  a  layer  cake,  in  which  each  plane  rests  upon  the  one 
below  it,  though  perhaps  the  readiest  to  hand  does  not  appear  to  be 
accurate,  as  it  would  arrange  them  in  a  hierarchy  in  which  each  level 
would  rest  upon  the  preceding  one  and  thus  appear  to  be  dependent 
upon  it.  But  this  does  not  seem  to  be  the  case:  for  example  we  saw 
that  value  does  not  appear  to  be  dependent  upon  consciousness,  as 
such  a  scheme  would  seem  to  require.  Now  it  seems  to  me  that  the 
realms  or  planes  of  being  that  we  have  had  occasion  to  consider,  could 
be  more  accurately  likened  to  the  various  types  of  ether  waves,  such 
as  those  of  light,  heat  and  wireless  telegraphy,  which  pass  through  the 
same  space  without  confusion  or  interference,  using  the  same  material 
while  each  preserves  its  specific  identity.  Similarly  concrete  things 
conform  to  different  structures  or  orders  in  a  perfectly  simple  and 
natural  manner.  Thus  the  river  which  conforms  to  mechanical  and 
chemical  structure,  may  also  possess  meaning  in  so  far  as  it  enters  into 
logical  structure,  and  may  further  possess  value  as  it  serves  for  trans- 
portation or  irrigation,  and  finally  it  may  appear  as  a  special  expres- 
sion or  embodiment  of  beauty  and  possibly  even  be  worshipped  as  a 
god. 

H  Cf.  G.  Santayana :    Loc .  cit.,  Vol.  Ill,  p.  169. 
10  Ibid.,  Vol.  Ill,  p.  193. 


IDEALS   AND   THE   SPIRITUAL   LIFE  6l 

There  then  appears  to  be  no  discontinuity  between  the  ideal  and  the 
natural  and  Santayana  insists  constantly  that  every  ideal  has  a  natural 
basis  while  all  natural  processes  have  ideal  fulfillments.  Similarly  the 
spiritual  life  is  continuous  with  the  other  forms  of  life  and  the  inner 
or  personal  life  may  be  understood  to  include  some  of  the  types  dis- 
cussed in  earlier  chapters  as  well  as  those  considered  in  the  present 
one,  while  human  life  may  evidently  move  in  all  the  realms  or  planes 
of  being  that  we  have  considered.  Thus  the  terms  "person"  and  "self" 
may  be  used  with  very  different  extensions  as  James  has  so  well 
pointed  out  in  connection  with  the  self,  for  "/;/  its  widest  possible 
sense,  however,  a  man's  Self  is  the  sum  total  of  all  that  he  CAN  call  his. 
not  only  his  body  and  his  psychic  powers,  but  his  clothes  and  his  house, 
his  wife  and  children,  his  ancestors  and  friends,  his  reputation  and 
works,  his  lands  and  horses,  and  yacht  and  bank-account."11  In  other 
words  the  self  lives  on  the  physical,  mental  and  social  planes  as  well 
as  on  the  spiritual,  and  although  James's  introspective  analysis  did  not 
show  him  a  purely  spiritual  element,12  it  was  apparently  because  he 
looked  for  it  among  sensations.  In  a  similar  fashion  Hume  failed  to 
find  any  self  at  all  and  James  later  came  to  question  the  existence  of 
consciousness.13  Now  the  conclusion  to  be  drawn  would  seem  not  to 
be  the  one  commonly  adduced,  namely  that  spirit  or  self  or  conscious- 
ness does  not  exist,  but  -rather  that  the  methods  used  in  investigating 
them  were  at  fault.  In  fact  psychological  methods  appear  to  be  better 
adapted  to  an  investigation  of  sentient  than  of  spiritual  life. 

But  at  present  our  primary  concern  is  with  the  spiritual  life,  which 
we  have  seen  moves  in  a  much  richer  and  more  inclusive  world  than 
does  sentient  life,  for  the  ideal  as  well  as  the  natural  is  important  for 
it.  When  now  we  try  to  see  just  what  are  the  fundamental  features 
of  the  life  of  the  spirit,  we  find  them  to  be  essentially  the  same  as  in 
the  other  forms  of  life  we  have  examined,  the  differences  in  all  cases 
being  due  to  the  nature  of  the  environment  in  which  life  is  found  and 
not  to  the  nature  of  life  itself,  which  seems  to  be  everywhere  the  same. 
Thus  the  organization  characteristic  of  personality  is  often  described 
in  terms  of  selection  and  assimilation,  as  for  example  by  Gilson,  or  of 
discrimination  and  integration,  as  by  Holt ;  while  for  an  adequate 
understanding  of  it,  it  is  necessary  to  take  account  both  of  its  temporal 
structure  and  teleological  reference.  Royce  of  course  stresses  the  pur- 
posive aspect  of  the  individual  self  and  also  emphasizes  the  need  of  a 

11  Psychology,  New  York,  Holt,  1809,  Vol.  I,  p.  JQI. 

12  Ibid.,  p.  300. 

13  See    "Does    Consciousness    Exist?"    Essays    in    Radical    Empiricism.    New 
York,  Longmans,  Green  &  Co.,   1912,  pp.   1-38. 


62         THE  NATURE  OF  LIFE A  STUDY  IN   METAPHYSICAL  ANALYSIS 

coherent  plan  in  the  religious  life  as  well  as  elsewhere.14  This  he  very 
definitely  connects  with  the  temporal  structure  of  personal  life:  in  his 
own  words,  "a  self  is,  by  its  very  essence,  a  being  with  a  past,"15  and 
"my  idea  of  myself  is  an  interpretation  of  my  past, — linked  also  with 
an  interpretation  of  my  hopes  and  intentions  as  to  my  future,"16  also 
"our  idea  of  the  individual  self  is  no  mere  present  datum  or  collection  of 
data,  but  is  based  upon  an  interpretation  of  the  sense,  of  the  tendency, 
of  the  coherence,  and  of  the  value  of  a  life  to  which  belongs  the  memory 
of  its  own  past."17  Though  some  of  the  phrases  here  are  suggestive  of 
a  particular  philosophical  theory,  they  none  the  less  indicate  very 
clearly  certain  important  features  of  the  personal  or  spiritual  life. 
The  future  aspect  of  its  temporal  structure  is  brought  out  especially 
well,  I  think,  in  Fosdick's  discussion  of  "Faith  and  Life's  Adventure/'18 
For  example  he  describes  life  as  "a  continuous  adventure  into  the  un- 
known/'19 demanding  insight  and  daring,20  and  further  says,  "if  one 
tries  to  imagine  the  world  with  all  faith  gone — knowledge  supposedly 
having  taken  its  place — he  must  conceive  a  world  where  no  conscious 
life  and  effort  remain  at  all."21  In  other  words  it  is  impossible  to 
conceive  our  personal  and  spiritual  life  without  reference  to  temporal 
structure. 

The  teleological  aspect  of  life  is  also  especially  prominent  here  in 
connection  with  ideal  aims  and  ends.  Thus  while  the  personal  life 
may  possess  a  great  variety  of  purposes,  which  indeed  could  be  used 
to  distinguish  some  of  its  different  forms  or  types,  in  its  more  gen- 
erally recognized  spiritual  forms  these  usually  are  quite  definitely  con- 
nected with  ideals  of  some  sort  or  another.  Thus  the  spiritual,  like  the 
other  forms  of  life,  is  seen  to  possess  a  characteristic  organization 
which  can  be  adequately  expressed  only  in  terms  of  its  temporal  struc- 
ture and  teleological  reference. 

14  Cf.  The  Problem  of  Christianity,  Vol.  II,  pp.  3-4. 

15  Ibid.,  p.  40. 
i«  Ibid.,  p.  42. 
IT  Ibid.,  p.  43- 

^  The  Meaning  of  Faith,  New  York,  Association  Press,  1921.  Chapter  I. 
*»  Ibid.,  p.  3. 

20  Ibid.,  p.  13. 

21  Ibid.,  p.  17. 


CONCLUSION 


CHAPTER  VIII 

DEFINITION     OF     LIFE 

The  preceding  examination  has  shown  that  life  possesses  the  same 
fundamental  features  wherever  it  is  found  and  that  the  great  multi- 
plicity and  variety  of  its  forms — which  at  first  appeared  so  confusing 
as  to  make  us  almost  despair  of  finding  any  common  terms  in  which  to 
define  it — is  the  result  of  its  occurring  in  so  many  different  realms. 
Life  can  therefore  be  defined  in  terms  of  these  common  features, 
namely  organization,  temporal  structure  and  teleology,  and  it  will  not 
he  necessary  to  give  one  definition  of  the  spiritual  life  and  another  of 
physical  life,  etc.  However,  the  fact  that  life  is  fundamentally  the 
same  everywhere  does  not  necessarily  imply  that  it  is  a  simple  or 
ultimate  category  nor  that  each  of  its  elements  or  factors  is  always 
of  the  same  relative  importance:  thus  in  some  connections  its  organiza- 
tion is  most  emphasized,  in  others  its  temporal  structure  is  more  evident 
or  again  its  teleological  aspect  may  be  more  prominent.  Not  only  do 
these  features  of  life  vary  in  the  relative  emphasis  that  they  receive, 
but  they  are  also  curiously  interrelated  in  ways  that  require  further 
investigation  before  the  final  formulation  of  a  definition  of  life. 

Perhaps  the  most  obvious  characteristic  of  living  beings  is  their  type 
of  organization,  so  that  life  is  sometimes  conceived  in  terms  of  organic 
unity.  On  the  biological  plane,  the  individual  organism  appears  to  be 
the  result  of  selection  and  assimilation  of  material  derived  from  its 
environment;  for  the  biological  organism  is  composed  of  the  same 
elements  as  other  things  in  its  domain  and  is  differentiated  from  them 
by  the  mode  of  its  organization,  which,  though  describable  in  terms  of 
differentiation  and  integration,  can  be  adequately  defined  only  by  refer- 
ence to  its  temporal  structure  and  teleological  aspect.  The  psycho- 
logical organism  is  often  described  as  an  integration  of  simpler  com- 
ponents, and  mental  life  evidently  requires  a  discrimination  and 
organization  of  meanings.  On  the  moral  and  spiritual  planes  the 
development  of  the  inner  life  proceeds  by  a  process  of  selection  and 
assimilation.  In  fact  organization  is  quite  as  evident  here  as  on  the 
biological  plane  and  much  of  the  discussion  of  the  moral  and  spiritual 
life  deals  with  the  question  of  the  manner  in  which  this  organization 
is  to  be  obtained.  Here  its  teleological  aspect  is  particularly  evident, 
but,  as  progressive,  it  requires  temporal  structure  as  well. 


66        THE  NATURE  OF  LIFE A  STUDY  IN   METAPHYSICAL  ANALYSIS 

Turning  then  to  the  consideration  of  temporal  structure,  we  have 
seen  that  life  everywhere  implies  growth  and  development,  whether  of 
organism,  consciousness,  character  or  personality;  thus  life  is  always 
a  process  even  if  at  times  it  does  not  appear  to  show  progress  as  well. 
It  exists  in  time  in  something  the  same  way  that  matter  exists  in 
space:  that  is,  life  is  essentially  temporal.  This  is  evident  I  think  in 
all  its  varieties;  it  is  especially  emphasized  when  life  is  identified  with 
one's  career  or  the  duration  of  an  activity  as  when  we  speak  of  the 
"life"  of  a  motor.  Though  this  latter  figurative  expression  only  em- 
phasizes the  fact  that  life  has  a  temporal  aspect,  the  examination  of  its 
more  essential  forms  has  shown  that  it  possesses  temporal  structure 
as  well!  Thus  we  saw  that  organisms  not  only  grow  and  develop,  but 
also  that  their  very  nature  and  character  can  be  understood  only  in 
terms  of  their  history  and  future :  an  acorn  is  not  only  so  much  matter 
of  a  certain  mechanical  and  chemical  structure,  it  is  also  so  much 
growth  of  a  special  kind  as  well  as  the  result  of  past  growth.  And  not 
only  organic  forms  but  protoplasm  itself  seem  to  be  dependent  upon 
their  temporal  structure  as  well  as  upon  their  spatial  structure  and 
chemical  composition.  By  reference  to  these  latter  features  alone  it 
seemed  impossible  to  adequately  differentiate  living  organisms  from 
the  inorganic  world  in  which  they  are  found,  for  protoplasm  contains 
no  unique  chemical  element,  nor  can  living  beings  be  defined  in  spatial 
or  mechanical  terms  in  such  a  way  as  to  clearly  separate  them  from 
physical  forms  that  are  not  alive.  Its  temporal  structure  however  does 
seem  to  definitely  distinguish  physical  life  from  its  environment. 

The  temporal  structure  of  life  is  perhaps  even  more  evident  on  what 
we  called  the  plane  of  sentiency  for  want  of  a  better  term.  The  be- 
havior of  the  organism  at  any  time  depends  upon  its  past  experience 
and  history,  as  well  as  upon  the  present  situation  in  which  it  finds 
itself.  The  future  aspect  of  behavior  is  of  course  most  obvious  in 
purposive  action,  but  its  presence  elsewhere  is  evident  and  will  be  more 
readily  recognized  when  it  is  not  confused  with  the  question  of  con- 
sciousness. Though  the  temporal  aspect  of  emotional  life  is  perhaps 
not  so  obvious  as  that  of  instinctive  and  impulsive  life,  its  importance 
is  none  the  less  readily  seen  when  it  is  realized  how  important  are  not 
only  our  own  pasts  but  probably  those  of  even  our  remote  ancestors  in 
determining  the  character  of  our  emotions  at  any  time,  and  the  same 
is  probably  true,  though  perhaps  to  a  less  degree,  in  the  case  of  sen- 
sations. The  future  reference  of  both  emotion  and  sensation  is  evident 
in  their  relation  to  the  activities  of  various  sorts  that  depend  upon  and 
follow  from  them. 

With  mental  life  these  processes  become  conscious,  the  past  is  re- 


DEFINITION     OF    LIFE  67 

tained  in  memory  and  the  future  is  planned  and  hoped  for,  and  the 
effectiveness  of  the  past  and  future  is  clearly  recognized.  This  is 
evident  in  varying  degrees  and  extensions.  All  our  knowledge,  how- 
ever momentary  or  eternal  it  may  seem,  appears  to  be  understandable 
as  it  occurs  in  definite  and  individual  form  only  by  reference  to  our 
pasts  and  futures:  in  Carr's  words,  "all  cognition  is  recognition"  and 
the  pragmatists  are  also  right  in  emphasizing  the  future  reference  of  all 
consciousness.  This  does  not  necessarily  imply  that  mind  in  the  meta- 
physical sense  evolves  or  that  truth  is  not  eternal ;  but  only  that  knowl- 
edge as  it  occurs  in  mental  life  is  dependent  upon  the  temporal  struc- 
ture of  life,  just  as  the  physical  form  and  chemical  composition  of  the 
biological  organism  depend  upon  the  temporal  structure  of  life  as  it 
is  found  on  the  physical  plane.  In  other  words,  though  logical, 
mechanical  and  chemical  structures  are  quite  independent  of  temporal 
structure,  their  definite  forms  in  connection  with  life  do  depend  upon 
its  temporal  structure.  Or  we  may  say  that  life  is  essentially  temporal 
and  that  while  each  of  its  various  types  conforms  to  the  structure  of  the 
realm  in  which  it  occurs,  everywhere  living  beings  can  be  understood 
only  in  connection  with  their  temporal  structure.  Thus  any  attempt 
to  explain  them  wholly  in  terms  of  the  domains  in  which  their  temporal 
structure  is  worked  out,  inevitably  results  in  a  failure  to  differentiate 
them  from  non-living  things  within  the  same  domain. 

The  examination  of  social  life  only  made  more  clear  its  temporal 
aspect  by  exhibiting  it  in  more  extended  form  and  wider  range  in  con- 
nection with  history  and  education  and  in  the  formation  of  communities 
of  memory  and  of  hope. 

Growth  and  development  were  also  found  to  be  important  charac- 
teristics of  the  inner,  moral  and  religious  life  as  well  as  of  physical 
life.  Spirit  may  be  permanent  and  unchanging  and  ideals  eternal  and 
immutable,  but  the  spiritual  life  requires  the  progressive  organization 
and  expression  of  them.  This  is  perhaps  most  commonly  recognized 
in  connection  with  the  development  of  character  and  personality;  for 
not  only  do  we  hope  for  progress  here,  but  what  we  are  at  any  time  is 
a  function  of  both  our  past  and  future,  of  our  memories  and  experi- 
ences, of  our  purposes  and  hopes. 

Thus  life  not  only  extends  through  time  in  the  same  way  that  physical 
objects  exist  for  varying  periods  of  time,  but  it  possesses  a  peculiar 
temporal  structure  that  differentiates  it  both  from  them  and  from 
eternal  realities.  It  seems  to  be  particularly  difficult  to  make  clear 
the  exact  nature  of  this  structure,  perhaps  because  of  our  tendency  to 
spatialize  time  as  Bergson  has  so  eloquently  urged.  The  difficulty 
seems  to  be  due  to  a  number  of  causes  some  which  Bergson  has  stated 


68        THE  NATURE  OF  LIFE A  STUDY  IN   METAPHYSICAL  ANALYSIS 

and  some  of  which  appear  to  be  very  different  from  those  that  he  has 
most  emphasized.  For  one  thing  I  have  urged  that  our  difficulty  in 
understanding  the  nature  of  temporal  structures  is  due  partly  to  the 
fact  that  we  have  treated  them  from  too  practical  a  standpoint  and 
have  not  accorded  them  the  independent  investigation  that  has  made 
us  so  familiar  with  the  variety  of  spatial  structures.  On  the  one  hand 
time  has  been  treated  only  as  it  appears  in  connection  with  physical 
nature.  It  there  resembles  space  in  being  a  mode  of  separation  be- 
tween things  or  events  and  is  conceived  as  a  succession  of  instants  or 
simultaneities.  Its  parts  are  all  alike  and  in  themselves  quite  indis- 
tinguishable. In  this  way  time  has  figured  as  an  independent  variable 
in  the  equations  of  physics.  So  science  has  dealt  rather  with  duration- 
less  instants  than  with  temporal  structure  and  when  time  has  been 
thought  of  as  having  any  structure  it  is  commonly  compared  with  a 
line  as  a  one-dimensional  series.  It  is  this  spatialized  time  that  Berg- 
son  contrasts  with  duration  which  he  tends  to  identify  with  life.  I 
think  that  he  is  quite  right  in  maintaining  that  what  we  have  been  term- 
ing the  temporal  structure  of  life  is  very  different  from  time  as  it 
appears  in  the  physical  sciences.  But  his  discussions  of  duration  seem 
to  me  to  be  dominated  too  much  by  practical  and  immediate  interests 
to  be  wholly  clear  in  a  technical  and  metaphysical  sense,  for  the  treat- 
ment of  temporal  structure  wholly  in  terms  of  past,  present  and  future 
is  too  much  like  trying  to  develop  a  geometry  in  terms  of  here  and 
yonder  or  of  in  front,  behind  and  beside  with  reference  to  the  point 
at  which  we  happen  to  be.  I  am  not  questioning  the  possibility  or  the 
value  of  such  distinctions  but  only  suggesting  that  if  such  a  basis  had 
been  insisted  upon,  our  knowledge  of  spatial  structure  might  be  in  as 
elementary  a  state  as  is  our  knowledge  of  temporal  structure  and  we 
might  find  ourselves  quite  as  much  at  a  loss  for  adequate  terms  in 
which  to  describe  spatial  structures  as  we  now  do  for  temporal  ones. 
Now  with  a  full  recognition  of  the  difficulties  before  us,  let  us  try 
to  make  as  clear  as  possible  the  nature  of  the  temporal  structure  that 
appears  to  be  characteristic  of  life.  It  is  most  naturally  expressed,  if 
we  use  the  terms  of  the  common  distinction  of  past,  present  and 
future,  by  saying  that  life  unites  or  transcends  them,  or  that  it  makes 
the  past  and  future  effective  in  the  present.  But  this  immediately 
gets  us  into  trouble,  for  how  can  past  and  future  be  present  and  if 
life  transcends  the  distinctions  of  past,  present  and  future,  does  it  not 
cease  to  be  temporal?  This  not  only  emphasizes  the  inadequacy  of  the 
terms  at  our  disposal  for  a  description  of  temporal  structure,  but 
indicates  as  well  how  quickly  an  attempt  at  analysis  and  definition  runs 
over  into  questions  of  explanation.  As  the  aim  of  the  present  examina- 


DEFINITION     OF    LIFE  69 

tion  is  not  explanation  but  definition,  we  need  not  attempt  to  explain 
how  the  past  can  be  preserved  in  the  present,  nor  how  the  future  can 
be  effective  now.  What  I  do  wish  to  make  as  clear  as  possible  is  that 
life  possesses  a  temporal  structure  that  is  not  confined  to  the  moment. 
In  Montague's  words  "action  at  a  distance  in  time"  is  characteristic  of 
living  beings  as  well  as  "action  at  a  distance  in  space,"  and  this  quite 
regardless  of  how  these  are  to  be  explained  and  whether  or  not  it  is 
necessary  to  suppose  connecting  media  through  which  effects  can  be 
propagated.  But  temporal  structure  is  not  to  be  confused  with  activity 
or  movement,  it  being  no  more  productive  or  effective  than  spatial  or 
other  structures,  all  of  which  are  merely  the  inert  principles  to  which 
all  activity  conforms,  while  all  efficacy  resides  in  concrete  and  indi- 
vidual things.  That  these  may  operate  in  complex  temporal  as  well  as 
spatial  structures  is  especially  evident  in  the  case  of  living  beings  for 
whom  things  distant  in  time  may  be  quite  as  real  and  effective  as  things 
distant  in  space.  Indeed  living  things  may  be  said  to  extend  in  time 
as  physical  things  extend  in  space  and  the  operations  of  the  former 
conform  to  temporal  structure  as  those  of  the  latter  do  to  mechanical 
structure. 

Whether  life  is  to  be  identified  with  temporal  structure  or  rather  with 
a  special  kind  of  temporal  structure  is  not  clear,  as  the  conceptions  of 
time  and  temporal  structure  have  not  yet  been  adequately  considered. 
An  examination  of  all  kinds  of  temporal  structure  is  obviously  be- 
yond the  range  of  the  present  paper ;  we  may  however  point  out  some  of 
the  characteristics  of  it  as  it  appears  in  connection  with  life.  As  has 
already  been  noted,  the  growth  and  development  so  characteristic  of  life 
clearly  indicate  its  temporal  aspect  and  show  that  life  transcends  the 
moment — that  life  can  not  be  compressed  into  an  instant.  Every  at- 
tempt to  understand  the  characteristics  of  living  forms  as  they  appear 
at  any  time  requires  reference  to  both  their  pasts  and  their  futures.  On 
the  mental  plane  this  is  very  evident  in  memory,  purpose,  anticipation 
and  hope;  consciousness  does  not  appear  to  create  this  temporal  struc- 
ture, but  rather  to  recognize  and  utilize  it.  In  fact  temporal  structure 
seems  to  be  characteristic  of  life  rather  than  of  consciousness.  Of 
course  the  same  individuals  may  be  both  conscious  and  living,  but  that 
is  only  the  more  reason  for  not  confusing  the  categories  of  life  and 
mind.  It  is  the  failure  to  make  this  distinction,  I  think,  that  is  re- 
sponsible for  a  great  part  of  the  confusion  that  has  attended  the  dis- 
cussion of  each  of  them.  If  mind  can  be  defined  in  terms  of  logical 
structure  and  life  in  terms  of  temporal  structure,  it  should  be  possible 
to  distinguish  the  two  and  avoid  the  confusion  that  has  naturally  re- 
sulted from  an  unconscious  blending  of  such  different  categories. 


TO        THE  NATURE  OF  LIFE A  STUDY  IN   METAPHYSICAL  ANALYSIS 

But  returning  to  our  examination  of  temporal  structure,  we  may 
note  that  in  connection  with  life  it  appears  to  be  closely  related  to 
teleology,  while  in  the  physical  world  time  is  often  considered  in  con- 
nection with  causation.  In  fact  it  is  possible  to  conceive  teleology 
as  the  future  aspect  of  temporal  structure,  while  there  is  certainly 
a  tendency  to  conceive  past  time  in  causal  or  at  least  deterministic 
terms.  The  future  would  then  appear  to  be  radically  different  from 
the  past  and  if  teleology  and  causality  are  taken  as  opposite  and  conflict- 
ing categories,  it  is  not  surprising  that  the  attempt  to  express  past, 
present  and  future  in  the  same  terms  is  productive  of  so  little  but 
confusion.  If  the  past  is  the  realm  of  the  irrevocable,  the  future  that  of 
possibility  and  the  present  that  of  efficacy  and  actuality,  there  is  little 
wonder  that  they  can  not  be  arranged  in  a  simple  one-dimensional  series, 
and  it  might  be  well  to  recognize  that  the  past,  present  and  future  are 
distinct  dimensions  of  time.  But  such  a  distinction  can  be  maintained 
only  by  reference  to  the  present,  which  is  too  variable  and  practical  to 
form  a  satisfactory  basis  for  an  adequate  conception  of  temporal 
structure.  This  also  seems  to  be  the  reason  for  much  of  the  difficulty 
we  have  in  conceiving  events  as  they  pass  from  future  to  past,  and 
what  was  considered  to  be  teleological  and  free  is  described  in  terms 
of  causality  and  necessity.  It  is  evident  then,  if  temporal  structure 
is  to  be  expressed  in  terms  of  past,  present  and  future,  these  can  not 
be  reduced  to  a  single  dimension.  But  I  have  been  urging  that  it 
should  be  possible  as  well  as  desirable  to  find  more  adequate  and 
serviceable  terms  in  which  to  describe  time,  for  past,  present  and  future 
are  united  in  temporal  structures,  if  not  in  a  single  dimension,  and  the 
distinction  between  them  seems  to  be  a  practical  and  existential  affair 
that  should  conform  to  temporal  structure  rather  than  define  it. 

However  closely  teleology  and  temporal  structure  may  seem  to  be 
connected,  they  are  hardly  to  be  identified,  I  think,  for  though  the  dis- 
tinction of  means  and  ends  points  to  the  future,  it  implies  more  than 
temporal  structure,  as  "the  definition  of  natural  teleology  involves 
.  .  .  the  recognition  that  uses  are  specific,  in  specific  and  controlled 
directions,  and  of  comparative  value  in  view  of  these  directions."  l  In 
fact  it  is  generally  recognized  that  teleology  requires  reference  to  value 
as  well  as  to  time.  But  unfortunately  recent  discussions  of  value,  which 
are  amongst  the  most  perplexing  and  unsatisfactory  of  those  of  con- 
temporary philosophy,  seem  to  have  been  generally  confused  by  the 
introduction  of  epistemological  and  psychological  material,  which  has 
befogged  the  subject  of  investigation  and  raised  unnecessary  questions, 
largely  in  connection  with  the  relation  of  consciousness  and  value.  That 

1  Woodbridge :    "Natural  Teleology,"  p.  322. 


DEFINITION     OF    LIFE  7! 

teleology  is  not  dependent  upon  consciousness  seems  evident;  our  ex- 
amination of  life  has  shown  the  presence  of  use  and  adaptation  on  the 
physical  plane  as  well  as  upon  others,  and  Woodbridge  and  Henderson 
agree  that  teleology  is  found  in  inorganic  nature  also  though  their 
treatments  of  it  differ  widely.  Now  as  physical  nature  is  admittedly 
mechanical,  this  recognition  of  its  teleological  aspect  might  be  regarded 
as  implying  a  conflict  between  the  two ;  but  I  think  that  the  situation  is 
much  better  described  when  mechanism  and  teleology  are  recognized 
as  categories  of  different  levels  as  suggested  by  Haldane  in  his  use 
of  the  terms  lower  and  higher,2  or  in  others  words  that  there  is  no 
contradiction  involved  in  anything  being  both  mechanical  and  teleologi- 
cal so  long  as  the  fundamental  distinction  between  them  is  not  for- 
gotten: that  is,  use  has  nothing  to  do  with  causation — "if  a  thing  is 
useful,  it  is  useful  irrespective  of  the  causes  that  produced  it."  3 

Now  our  examination  of  life  has  shown  that  teleology  occurs  on 
other  planes  of  being  than  the  mechanical  and  is  present  in  all  types  of 
life  as  well  as  in  inanimate  nature.  It  is  found  in  the  biological  realm 
in  connection  with  growth  and  development,  becomes  more  obvious  in 
behavior,  is  generally  recognized  in  the  domain  of  consciousness  as 
purpose,  and  becomes  highly  significant  in  the  field  of  morals  as  design, 
while  in  the  spiritual  realm  ideal  ends  and  aims  become  important. 
Thus  we  find  life  presenting  a  teleological  aspect  at  all  its  levels,  for  the 
distinction  between  means  and  ends  is  always  important  for  it  and  it 
everywhere  seems  to  require  organization  with  reference  to  specific 
ends,  though  the  nature  of  these  ends  varies  with  the  different  types 
of  life.  In  fact  much  that  is  written  about  the  moral  and  spiritual  life 
concerns  the  problem  of  what  ends  should  be  chosen,  and  the  question 
of  the  meaning  and  value  of  life  evidently  centers  in  its  theological 
aspect  and  is  usually  answered  in  terms  of  its  organization  with 
reference  to  particular  ends. 

Life,  then,  possesses  an  organization  that  is  temporal  and  teleological, 
so  that  it  may  be  defined  as  that  type  of  organization  which  possesses 
temporal  structure  and  teleological  reference  or  more  graphically  as 
individualized  temporal  structure.  But  suggestive  as  this  latter 
definition  is,  it  does  not  appear  to  be  wholly  adequate,  as  there 
seem  to  be  other  forms  of  temporal  structure,  such  as  those  charac- 
teristic of  music  and  of  the  history  of  non-living  things  like  the  earth's 
crust.  Further  differentia  of  life  therefore  seem  to  be  required  and 
unfortunately  we  do-  not  know  enough  about  temporal  structure  to  be 
able  to  find  them  in  terms  of  its  different  kinds.  We  shall  therefore 

2  Cf.  Mechanism,  Life  and  Personality,  New  York,  Dutton,  1914,  pp.  95-99. 
*  Woodbridge  :    Loc.  cit.,  p.  313. 


72        THE  NATURE  OF  LIFE A  STUDY  IN    METAPHYSICAL  ANALYSIS 

have  to  look  again  to  our  analysis  of  life  to  get  its  further  characteristics. 
We  have  seen  that  life  processes  have  a  teleological  as  well  as  a  tem- 
poral factor :  they  are  in  specific  directions  and  definite  ends  are  at- 
tained through  a  variety  of  means.  Life  means  progress  as  well  as 
accumulation,  and  growth  and  development  possess  a  teleological 
reference  as  well  as  a  temporal  structure.  Thus  Singer  would  define 
life  as  purposive  behavior. 

As  we  have  already  seen,  the  teleological  and  temporal  aspects  of 
life  are  very  closely  connected  but  the  exact  relations  between  them  are 
far  from  clear.  Teleology  is  sometimes  identified  with  the  future  por- 
tion of  temporal  structure,  or  taken  as  the  defining  characteristic  of 
the  future  dimension  of  time.  But  though  the  distinction  of  means 
and  ends  points  to  the  future,  it  hardly  seems  to  be  identified  with  it. 
If  value  were  not  such  an  uncertain  and  controversal  term,  it  would  be 
natural  to  say  that  teleology  differed  from  temporal  structure  primarily 
because  it  implied  reference  to  values.  The  distinction  is  probably  less 
ambiguously  stated  by  defining  teleology  in  terms  of  the  distinction  of 
means  and  ends,  which,  though  conforming  to  temporal  structure  in 
their  operation,  would  not  serve  to  define  it. 

We  have  further  seen  that  while  all  life  is  teleological,  ends  vary 
greatly  with  the  different  types  of  life.  The  development  and  main- 
tenance of  specific  form  is  most  in  evidence  on  the  biological  plane, 
while  behavior  seems  to  be  directed  toward  a  great  variety  of 
ends  generally  connected  with  the  preservation  of  the  organism 
or  the  species.  With  consciousness  a  greater  range  of  ends  becomes 
possible,  and  the  moral  life  is  so  concerned  with  ends  that  morality  has 
been  called  "the  realm  of  ends,"  while  with  the  spiritual  or  inner  life 
ideal  ends  are  sought.  Means  as  well  as  ends  naturally  differ  with 
the  different  types  of  life,  as  they  have  to  conform  to  the  structure 
characteristic  of  the  realm  in  which  it  moves.  Thus  on  the  biological 
plane  life  attains  its  ends  by  the  use  of  means  that  conform  to  the 
mechanical  and  chemical  structure  of  that  domain,  and  similarly  on 
the  other  planes  as  well,  living  beings  conform  to  the  structure  of  their 
environment.  In  fact  life  seems  always  to  make  use  of  elements  derived 
from  its  environment  as  the  means  for  obtaining  its  ends.  In  this 
sense  it  may  be  said  to  be  continuous  with  its  environment  or  the  realm 
in  which  it  is  moving.  But  attempts  to  define  any  of  its  many  forms 
wholly  in  terms  of  those  domains  fail  to  differentiate  them  from  other 
objects  found  therein,  since  the  essential  characteristics  of  life  are  not 
limited  to  any  one  of  the  planes  on  which  it  occurs  but  cuts  them  all, 
so  that  different  types  of  life  appear  to  be  continuous  with  each  other. 
Thus  there  appears  to  be  no  break  between  physical  and  sentient  life. 


DEFINITION     OF    LIFE  73 

nor  between  sentient  and  mental  life,  while  the  moral  and  spiritual  lives 
are  continuous  with  mental  life  and  social  life  is  possible  only  because 
of  the  existence  of  individual  life  of  various  types. 

In  conclusion  we  may  note  that  the  individuality  and  activity,  so  evi- 
dently characteristic  of  living  beings  in  all  realms,  are  due  to  the  fact 
of  their  particular  and  concrete  existence  and  do  not  appear  to  be  a 
defining  characteristic  of  life.  Their  activities  conform  to  the  temporal 
structure  of  life  as  well  as  to  the  structures  of  the  different  domains  in 
which  its  various  forms  occur.  The  individuality  of  living  things 
seems  to  be  the  result  of  the  particularization  of  the  organization 
characteristic  of  life,  an  organization  that  we  have  seen  is  dependent 
upon  temporal  structure  and  teleological  reference.  Life  thus 
seems  to  be  definable  ultimately  in  terms  of  temporal  structure  and 
teleology,  but  an  adequate  picture  of  it  would  also  include  reference  to 
the  different  realms  in  which  it  occurs.  It  is  then  seen  that  each  type 
of  life  is  continuous  with  its  domain  and  can  be  conceived  as  a  particular 
organization  of  elements  derived  therefrom,  by  a  process  of  selection 
and  assimilation,  of  differentiation  and  integration,  but  a  careful  analy- 
sis of  this  organization  shows  that  it  is  dependent  for  its  characteristic 
form  upon  the  temporal  structure  and  teleological  reference  of  life. 


74        THE  NATURE  OF  LIFE A  STUDY  IN   METAPHYSICAL  ANALYSIS 


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"Life  and  Consciousness,"  Hibbert  Journal,  vol.  10  (pp.  24-44). 
BOSANQUET,  B.  :    The  Principle  of  Individuality  and  Value,  1912. 

The  Value  and  Destiny  of  the  Individual.     London,  Macmillan,  1913. 
BROOKS,  W.  K.  :     The  Foundations  of  Zoology.     New  York,  Macmillan,  1899. 
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The  Science  and  Philosophy  of  the  Organism.     London,  Black,  1908. 
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The  Order  of  Nature.    Cambridge,  Harvard  University  Press,  1917. 
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VITA 

I,  Florence  Webster,  was  born  in  Haverhill,  Massachusetts,  on 
February  14,  1889.  My  father  is  George  H.  Webster,  my  mother, 
Mary  Etta  (Gardner)  Webster.  I  was  graduated  from  the  Haverhill 
High  School  in  1908.  Entering  Wellesley  College  that  autumn,  I  re- 
ceived its  B.A.  degree  in  1912,  having  attained  the  rank  of  Durant 
scholar  and  had  been  elected  to  Phi  Beta  Kappa  (in  1911).  I  con- 
tinued the  study  of  philosophy  under  the  direction  of  Professors  Mary 
W.  Calkins  and  Mary  S.  Case  at  Wellesley  during  the  next  two  years 
and  acted  as  graduate  assistant  in  the  Department  of  Philosophy  and 
Psychology  in  the  second  year  (1913-14).  I  also  attended  a  seminary 
at  Harvard  University  each  year :  the  first  in  ethics  conducted  by  Pro- 
fessors George  H.  Palmer  and  Ralph  B.  Perry,  the  second  in  logic 
under  Professor  Josiah  Royce.  In  November  1914,  I  received  the  M.A. 
degree  from  Wellesley  College,  with  philosophy  as  my  major  subject 
and  mathematics  as  a  minor. 

During  1915-16,  I  studied  at  Columbia  University,  attending  courses 
in  philosophy  given  by  Professors  F.  J.  E.  Woodbridge  and  John 
Dewey  and  in  mathematics  by  Professor  Cassius  J.  Keyser.  The 
following  year  I  attended  Professor  R.  F.  A.  Hoernle's  seminary  in 
metaphysics  at  Harvard  University  and  in  the  winter  of  1919  a  course 
in  mathematical  logic  given  there  by  Dr.  Henry  M.  Sheffer.  Returning 
to  Columbia  University  in  the  fall  of  1919,  I  continued  work  upon  my 
dissertation  there  until  February  1921  and  attended  classes  conducted 
by  Professors  F.  J.  E.  Woodbridge,  W.  P.  Montague,  J.  H.  Tufts  and 
Dr.  Helen  H.  Parkhurst. 

The  conception  of  life  as  the  basis  for  a  thesis  was  first  suggested 
to  me  at  Wellesley  College  by  Professors  Mary  W.  Calkins  and  Mary 
S.  Case  and  it  was  under  their  direction  that  I  began  the  study  of  it. 
My  conclusions  at  that  time  were  embodied  in  a  thesis,  entitled  "  A 
Conception  of  Life,"  offered  in  partial  fulfilment  of  the  requirements 
for  a  master's  degree  at  Wellesley  in  November  1914.  The  subject  still 
fascinated  me  and  in  1919,  with  the  encouragement  of  Professor  W. 
P.  Montague  and  the  permission  of  the  Graduate  Council  at  Wellesley 
College,  I  decided  to  continue  with  it  for  a  doctor's  dissertation.  The 
final  work  was  done  upon  it  under  the  direction  of  Professor  F.  J.  E. 
Woodbridee. 


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